Mega-project construction management--the Corps of Engineers and Bechtel Group in Saudi Arabia by Smith, Jeffrey Craig, 1958-
MEGA-PROJECT CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
AND BECHTEL GROUP IN SAUDI ARABIA
by
Jeffrey Craig Smith
B.S., United States Military Academy
(1980)
Submitted to the Department of
Civil Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the
Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in Civil Engineering
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
February 1991
O Jeffrey Craig Smith
The author hereby grants to MIT the permission to reproduce
and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or
in part.
Signature of Author
Department/bf civ' Engineering
December 11, 1990
Certified by _
Fred Movenzadehi
Professor, Department of Civil Engineering
Director, Center for Construction Research and Education
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Ole S. Madsen
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
MEGA-PROJECT CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT: THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
AND BECHTEL GROUP IN SAUDI ARABIA
by
JEFFREY C. SMITH
Submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering
on December 11, 1990 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in
Civil Engineering
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to develop empirical
hypotheses for the successful construction management of
international mega-projects through a multiple exploratory
case study methodology.
The case study involves two massive construction
programs recently completed in Saudi Arabia by American
engineering/construction firms. The first is a $6 billion
military city constructed for the Saudi Arabian Army by the
US Army Corps of Engineers at Al Batin from 1976 -1987. The
second is a $20 billion industrial port city constructed by
Bechtel Group at Jubail from 1976 - Present. The projects
are analyzed separately then compared in the areas of
planning, organization, staffing and control. The comparison
also highlights differences between public and private sector
approaches to mega-project management.
The thesis identifies the unique challenges of
international mega-projects and develops hypotheses for
maximizing construction management performance while
minimizing management costs and contract disputes.
The study establishes 10 hypotheses for effective
international mega-project management. They encompass:
specific organizational forms; staff locations; personnel
policies; management cost control; contract types;
controlling international contractors; minimizing disputes;
Life Cycle Project Management; owner provided equipment,
materials and services; and infrastructure development to
support project construction.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering
Director, Center for Construction
Research and Education
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
As mankind approaches the 21st Century, international
mega-projects are likely to become increasingly common in the
engineering and construction industry. Participants at the
Engineering Foundation Research Conference defined a mega-
project as a high impact technically complex project which
requires careful advanced planning, lasts three or more
years, has a significant impact on the public and industry,
employs thousands of people and typically costs over $1
billion./l The reasons for projecting an increase in the
need for mega-projects are:
1. Deterioration and deficiencies of existing
infrastructure, particularly highways, bridges,
water and sewage treatment plants.
2. Massive infrastructure required in third world
countries to improve their economies.
3. Accumulation and impact of hazardous wastes on the
environment.
4. Continuing need for aggressive private development
and huge industrial projects.
The very nature of these needs implies that fulfilling them
falls within the definition of a mega-project. It is
essential that both proponents and implementers of mega-
projects fully understand the factors involved in their
planning, execution and overall management.
1.1 PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH
Since the growth of large scale construction projects is
increasingly probable, now is an opportune time to examine
whether construction managers can afford a "business as
usual" approach to mega-project management. My purpose for
researching this topic is to develop an understanding of the
challenges unique to mega-projects, particularly
international mega-projects, and to identify universal
construction management techniques to meet them.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the nation's
largest buyer of constructed facilities and an organization
with worldwide mega-project management experience. It has a
well developed organizational structure, standing operating
procedures for construction management, primary
responsibility for the nation's waterways and wetlands and
diplomatic duties in performing military construction for
friendly foreign nations. The Corps has a well documented
track record in mega-project management. Therefore, its
performance on international mega-projects is relevant to
developing hypotheses of management techniques which should
be applied to these types of projects.
The Corps' experience represents a useful source of
construction management information. However, as a public
agency, it operates under limitations imposed by the
government and has different motives than private companies
do. Therefore, it is also appropriate to examine the private
sector for international mega-project management innovations.
Bechtel Group, Incorporated, with a sixty year
mega-project management, provides a construction
perspective fro
some of the sim
objectives and
illustrate the
FACTOR
Primary Motive
for Existence
Secondary Motive
Objectives
Constraints
m the private sector. An informal
record of
management
listing of
ilarities and differences in motivations,
constraints of the two approaches helps
need to analyze both sectors of the industry.
USACE (PUBLIC) BECHTEL (PRIVATE)
Public Service
Maintain Reputation
as World-Class
Engineering/Const
Contractor
Respond to Changing
Public Needs
Control US Waterway
Use & Development
Be Effective Arm of
Gov't for Foreign
Diplomacy
Must Follow Defense
Acquisition Regs
Cannot Compete with
Private Firms for
Work
Manning Level &
Appropriations Set
by Congress
Terms of Agreements
With Foreign
Governments
Business Profit
Maintain Reputation
as World-Class
Engineering/ Const
Contractor
Grow & Remain
Profitable
Be Preeminent US
Contractor in
Target Markets
Be Competitive in
Foreign Target
Markets
Competition From
Other Firms in the
International
Marketplace
Conformance With US
Laws Not Applied
to Foreign Firms on
International Work
Terms of Contracts
With Clients
Although USACE and Bechtel often perform similar functions
for their clients, it is clear that they often do them for
different reasons. Thus, the construction management efforts
of each firm should be evalua. ed in the context of its unique
motivations, objectives and restrictions. The combination of
public and private sector philosophies of international mega-
project management forms the basis of this project.
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1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The central problem and focus of this thesis is to
determine techniques international construction managers can
use to effectively plan, organize, staff and control
international mega-projects. The following are specific
questions addressed in this thesis:
1. What organizational forms are effective for a
construction manager to use in international meja-
projects? At what levels within the organization
should responsibilities and authority be assigned?
2. What personnel policies can be used to attract the
right people with the right skills to the project at
the right time, and to support them during
demobilization?
3. What are the logical physical locations for the
construction management staff?
4. How can construction managers adequately staff
projects while controlling management costs?
5. What construction contract types are the most
appropriate for use in international mega-projects?
6. What special management techniques are effective for
controlling international contractors?
7. How can construction managers minimize contract
disputes?
8. Does a Life Cycle Project Management philosophy
apply to mega-projects?
9. How many construction support services should
construction managers provide their contractors?
10. How do construction managers plan for infrastructure
development in conjunction with completing mega-
projects?
With these problems in mind, specific research
objectives are:
1. To study construction management techniques used in
recent public and private international mega-
projects to determine whether they were appropriate
for the mega-projects' unique challenges.
2. To develop an empirical hypothesis of a suitable
approach to construction management of future
international mega-projects.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To develop this thesis, I chose a multiple exploratory
case study methodology. The cases are of two mega-projects
performed in Saudi Arabia during the late 1970s through the
mid-1980s. They are similar in scope and magnitude except
that the construction manager of one was a public firm (U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers) and the other a private firm
(Bechtel Group). First, I analyze and critique each case
separately within the context of the challenges faced by the
construction manager. Then, I compare and contrast the
techniques used by each construction manager across the two
cases. Third, I synthesize international mega-project
management techniques from the comparison/contrast of the
cases. Finally, I summarize the techniques to develop
conclusions and make specific recommendations regarding
international mega-project management.
1.3.1 CASE STUDY JUSTIFICATION
This thesis requires a novel research design for
analyzing the construction management techniques used by the
US Army Corps of Engineers and Bechtel Group in their Saudi
Arabian mega-projects. The research design must facilitate
the determination of management techniques from the analyses
which should be successful if repeated on future
international mega-projects.
A valid statistical comparison of construction
management is almost impossible to make because construction
management, by its very nature, represents more of an art
than a science. Each project is unique in design, materials
used and built upon, and in environmental conditions under
which constructed. When one adds to this the unique aspects
of international mega-projects such a., nonhomogeneous labor,
management and equipment, varying infrastructure and diverse
governmental policies, most forms of empirical analysis
become invalid.
The most appropriate research design for this thesis is
the case study. A case study's structure, by definition,
best fits the objectives of this thesis without ignoring the
significant variables encountered in international mega-
projects:
"Case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes...the investigator's goal is to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to
enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)."L2
Thus, the case study's design facilitates "hypothesis-
generating" through an empirical inquiry that investigates
the management of contemporary construction projects within
their real-life contexts where the boundaries between the
management techniques and context are not clearly evident and
multiple sources of evidence are available.!!
Perhaps more importantly, the case study is an excellent
way to examine the universal challenges construction managers
face in any project. These similarities are the need for
proper planning, organizing, staffing and control of the
project. Case studies facilitate the application of
management theories to examine problems encountered in
individual mega-projects. They allow the investigator to
isolate similarities in different cases for study without
ignoring variations in the case environments. Finally,
multiple case studies form the basis from which to compare
the effectiveness of different management techniques
addressing common challenges. New management theories can
then be distilled (or old theories supported) from the case
comparisons.
1.3.2 CASE STUDY DESIGN
According to Yin, the critical components of an
exploratory case study's research design are:
1. The study's questions.
2. The study's unit(s) of analysis.
3. The logic linking the data to the questions.
4. The criteria for interpreting the findings.L4
The first component has already been described in
Section 1.2. The second component involves defining what the
case is. For the purposes of this study there are two
primary cases. One is the Corps of Engineers' management of
the construction of King Khalid Military City. The other is
Bechtel's management of the construction of an industrial
port and city at Jubail. However, several subunits are
useful in developing the primary units' analyses. Some
examples of subunits whose analyses contribute to the overall
study are; specific functional areas of USACE and Bechtel,
performance on individual contracts and facilities, and
management decisions affecting portions of the work. In
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every instance, subunit analysis relates to the comprehensive
analysis of the primary units. The ultimate result is a
multiple, embedded case study design involving a
comparison/contrast of construction management across the
cases._5
I intend, in the research design, to link data to the
study's questions through a pattern-matching technique called
"hypothesis-generating".L6 My goal is to analyze the case
study data by making critical insights into large scale
international construction management and building a series
of hypotheses about the cases. The hypotheses derived from
the case study lead to the development of recommendations for
future construction management policies.
Since the data in this case study doesn't lend itself to
statistical evaluation, it requires a narrative criterion for
interpreting the study's findings. In order to accomplish
the final component of research design the study compares
rival hypotheses, where possible, and interprets the
findings. In addition, it compares and contrasts findings
from the individual case analyses across the cases to ensure
proper evaluation of the case study data.
1.3.3 TESTING CASE STUDY DESIGN
The case study design passes the three tests of validity
that Yin established for exploratory studies. The tests are:
- Construct Validity: Establishing correct operational
measures for the concepts being studied.
- External Validity: Establishing the domain to which
a study's findings can be generalized.
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- Reliability: Demonstrating that the operations of a
study can be repeated, with the same results./7
My primary strategies to ensure Construct Validity are
the use of multiple sources of evidence to encourage
convergent lines of inquiry and the establishment of a chain
of evidence. I collected case study data using four of the
six normally accepted sources of evidence:
EVIDENCE SOURCE USED KKMC JUBAIL
Documentation Yes Yes
Archival Records Yes Yes
Interviews Yes Yes
Direct Observation Yes No
Participant Observation No No
Physical Artifacts No No
Sources of documentation used in this case study include
letters, memoranda, meeting minutes, proposals, formal
studies and articles from mass media and trade publications.
Archival records sourced include organizational charts,
budgets, maps, survey data and project lists. Interviews
came from key personnel from USACE, Bechtel and some of the
contractors involved in the projects. I also made some
direct observations from site visits to KKMC in 1983 and
1984.
To enhance construct validity, I obtained copies of
virtually all evidence used in my analysis of the cases. The
evidence was then carefully reviewed, cataloged, cited and
filed for future review. The use of multiple sources of
evidence enhances the validity of the multiple case study
research design selected for this thesis.
In order to pass the second test of exploratory case
study design, External Validity, I strove to generalize the
results of data analysis for the KKMC and Jubail projects to
broader hypotheses which apply to the each case. Thus, as in
the process of experimentation, the hypotheses posed gain
credibility through replication logic and can be applied with
more confidence to future international mega-project
management.
In this case study's design the third test, Reliability,
is tied inextricably to the Construct Validity test. The
Reliability test's objective is to ensure that if another
investigator performs a study of the same case he will arrive
at the same findings and conclusions. To that end, the
quantity, quality and availability of the data base to
inspection are imperative. Establishing a diverse data base
for this case study and carefully cataloging it to meet the
Construct Validity test criterion also goes a long way toward
satisfying the Reliability test criterion. In addition, I
attempt to enhance reliability by testing conflicting
hypotheses across the cases to make reasoned, rather than
impassioned, findings and conclusions.
In summary, the design selected for this case study
passes the tests established for validating exploratory case
study designs. I assert that the design supports the study's
findings, conclusions and recommendations.
1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
In the next chapter, I provide general background
information necessary for complete understanding of the case
analyses. I discuss the growth of international mega-
projects and specifically highlight their importance in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's development plan. Later in the
chapter I describe the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
historical construction management role and identify how it
became involved in assisting the Saudis. I also provide a
similar background description of Bechtel Group and describe
how it became involved in the Kingdom's development program.
Finally, I review the current theory of construction
management techniques for mega-projects in the areas of
organization, contract types and authority, dispute
resolution and Owner Furnished Equipment.
In Chapter 3, I perform a case study of the Corps of
Engineers' management of the construction of an entire Saudi
military base. The King Khalid Military City (KKMC) is a $6
billion divisional army installation designed and constructed
under USACE management in the desert near the Iraqi border.
The chapter includes a case background as well as the
complete analysis of USACE's performance as the construction
manager.
Chapter 4 is the case study of Bechtel Group's $10
billion construction of an industrial port and city at
Jubail, on the Persian (Arabian) Gulf. Although it is a
separate case study from Chapter 3's, wherever possible I
analyze Bechtel's performance in the same areas of
construction management.
In Chapter 5, I compare and contrast the techniques of
the two construction managers across the cases, noting
similarities, differences, strengths and weaknesses of their
approaches.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I complete the analyses of the
two cases by developing hypotheses for successful management
of international mega-projects. I conclude which hypotheses
can be generalized to other mega-projects and make
recommendations for their adoption within the industry. I
also identify the limitations of my research efforts and
recommend areas of further research into international mega-
project management.
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CHAPTER ENDNOTES
1. Engineering Foundation Research Conference, Planning,
Engineering and Constructing the Superprojects (New
York: ASCE, 30 Apr-5 May 1978), p. 395.
2. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods,
(Beverly Hills: -Sage Publications, 1984), p. 21.
3. Adapted from Yin's definition of a case study. Ibid.,
p. 23.
4. Ibid., P. 29.
5. Yin gives a complete discussion of multiple, embedded
case design in Chapter 2. Ibid., pp. 41-53.
6. Yin mentions the "hypothesis-generating process" as an
outgrowth of the explanation-building analytic
strategy and which is applied to exploratory case
studies, only. Ibid., p. 107.
7. These are identical to the four tests that Yin proposes
for validating case study design except for "Internal
Validity, which doesn't apply to exploratory studies
Ibid., p. 36.
CHAPTER 2 - GENERAL BACKGROUND
2.1 GROWTH OF MEGA-PROJECTS
In an address to the American Society for Macro-
Engineering the Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General E.R.
Heiberg III identified a mega-project's characteristics in
the following way:
"...size; being beyond the capacity of a single
organization; requiring the collaborative efforts of
government and private firms; utilizing state-of-t-e -art
technology; and, having economic, sociocultural, and
environmental impacts that extend well beyond the
project sponsors."L._
General Heiberg's description is appropriate although I will
add, for the purposes of this paper, that modern mega-
projects also generally exceed $1 billion in current-dollar
value. He touched on some of the characteristics that make
mega-projects increasingly commonplace in the world economy.
Although dominated in the 1970s and 1980s by modernization
programs in the oil-rich states of the Middle East, future
mega-project opportunities are more likely to result from the
collaborative efforts of government, industry, and financial
institutions from a heterogeneous mix of countries. The
tunnel currently being constructed under the English Channel
is a prime example of this new mix of partners.
Some would take exception to General Heiberg's assertion
that mega-projects, by definition, use state of the art
technology since the construction industry has always lagged
behind manufacturing industries in technological advances.
However, consider one of the fertile areas for 21st Century
mega-projects - construction in space. This wi 1 be
impossible without significant developments in construction
technology. Another growth area for mega-projects,
environmental cleanup, will also require new construction
technology to be successful. Thus, the interface between
public and private sectors will be critical to ensure that
there is adequate funding for research and development of new
construction technologies.
Finally, we are becoming increasingly aware of the
global impacts of international mega-projects. The world
construction industry experienced a boom during the decade of
intense construction in the Middle East, then suffered a
recession when the programs were cut back in the mid-1980s.
Mega-projects will likely be key to converting the lagging
economies of eastern European countries under authoritarian
rule into competitive free market economies. Also, as
worldwide concern for a safe environment increases, the role
of mega-projects in controlling environmental hazards (and in
eliminating them) will become increasingly important. In a
1981 article on the Bechtel Group, Forbes summed up the
importance of mega-projects to the future of the construction
industry and identified the US world position in mega-project
management:
"In a sense this vast engineering of whole systems is a
growth industry as much as computers or communications
are. It is what the world needs to develop scarce
resources and to develop the undeveloped and lesser-
developed. If the US is no longer the leader in
manufacturing technology, it remains the leader in
engineering technology on these grand scales."L2
In my opinion, the most significant development in the
growth of mega-projects from a construction management
perspective is that it signals the need for a different
approach to construction management and a new breed of
manager. General Heiberg recognized this when he said:
"The opportunities and challenges for [mega] projects
are out there. To meet them will require new and
broader thinking. We must be willing to work across
national boundaries, across the traditional limits of
professional disciplines, and in arenas that may be new
and even strange to some of us..."L3
It appears that global construction companies are also aware
of the need for new thinking. Fortune magazine recently
noted:
"From Amsterdam to Yokohama, recruiters are looking for
a new breed of multilingual, multifaceted executive who
can map out strategy for the whole world...To prepare
for the wide-open world of 1992, companies are pushing
out their traditional managerial corps of stodgy
engineers and aristocrats.".A
Although I don't focus on individual personalities in
this thesis, I do examine the organizational cultures of
the Corps of Engineers and Bechtel and determine whether they
were adaptable to the mega-projects the companies managed.
Ultimately, I attempt to identify organizational types and
staffing philosophy which can consistently be applied
successfully to a wide variety of international mega-
projects.
2.2 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Despite the vast reserves of oil discovered in Saudi
Arabia during the 1930s and the West's increasing dependence
on imported oil after World War II, the Kingdom's economy
remained agrarian and at a subsistence level until the early
1970s. The first paved road connecting the old port capital
of Jeddah with the new capital at Riyadh wasn't completed
until 1967. The Kingdom's literacy rate was only 30% as
recently as 1974 and the highest structure in Riyadh in 1968
was its water tower. Recognizing the need for Saudi Arabia
to expand and modernize the structure of its economy, King
Faisal created the Central Planning Organization (the
forerunner of the present Ministry of Planning) in 1968.
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia hoped to accomplish four long term
objectives with its burgeoning oil wealth. It sought to
maintain and improve the Kingdom's security and stability;
increase its status as a leader in the developing world;
diversify its economy from dependence on crude oil exports;
and keep oil prices at a level that discourages oil importers
from developing alternative energy sources. With help from
Western economists the Central Planning Organization created
Saudi Arabia's first five year economic plan, which covered
the years 1970 to 1975./5
The theme of the first development plan was to build an
infrastructure and create a national public education system
by concentrating efforts in urban areas such as Jeddah, al-
Khobar and Riyadh. The plan involved a rather modest outlay
of $9.1 billion over the five year period. However, during
the first five year plan Saudi Arabia's fortunes improved
dramatically. Its phased buyout of US oil company interests
in its national oil company, OPEC's newly discovered power,
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the oil embargos which followed
fueled a meteoric rise in the Kingdom's revenues. From 1973
to 1975 Saudi Arabia's national income grew 44% in real
terms.L6 The Kingdom's ability to spend money on development
lagged far behind its increasing revenues from sales of oil
and natural gas. Saudi Arabia lacked adequate berthing
facilities to unload freight. As a result, construction
material intended for use in executing the first plan was
often moored off its congested ports for six to eight months.
In addition, the Kingdom's road transportation networks were
inferior. This lack of infrastructure gave rise to the more
ambitious second five year plan for the years 1975 to 1980.
The second plan focused on port, airport and highway
construction to ease the movement of people and goods. In
addition, it provided for huge outlays to correct the
education, communications, health and housing gaps. The
infrastructure problem so inhibited further development that
the government created the General Ports Authority to improve
the efficiency of existing ports and the Royal Commission for
Yanbu and Jubail, a "...purpose-built agency devised by
[Crown Prince] Fahad to avoid the red tape of existing
bureaucracy."/7 It was under this second five year plan and
Royal Commission supervision that Bechtel Corporation was
hired to build the port and industrial city at Jubail. The
Kingdom allocated approximately $80 billion to the second
five year plan, an estimated $30 billion of this to build the
Jubail and Yanbu ports.
The third development plan, 1980 to 1985, came at the
peak of Saudi national confidence and was extremely
ambitious. The $234 billion plan departed from its
predecessors in several ways:
"While the first two plans concentrated on building an
infrastructure, the Third Plan was to move on to
industrialization, make agriculture self-sufficient,
expand social services, limit the growth of
bureauracracy, and distribute the wealth of the country
more evenly among the people."/8
The theme surrounding the third development plan was
"industrialization" and relieving dependence on foreign
expertise and labor. A less publicized but equally important
feature of the third plan was its $100 billion allocation to
the Ministry of Defense and Aviation to build infrastructure
and procure weapons systems for each branch of the armed
services. Most of the funding for the Corps of Engineers'
construction of KKMC came from this plan.
Midway through the execution of the third development
plan a worldwide recession, coupled with an oil glut, hit
Saudi Arabia and almost stopped development in its tracks.
Oil production and prices dropped nearly 75% during 1982 and
1983, causing the government to lower its development
objectives. Riyadh cut military expenditures by 20%, despite
increasing instability in neighboring states. It also
cancelled some industrial construction programs outright and
delayed payments to many projects under construction.
Virtually all elements of the third plan were cut back.
Since declining revenues continued icto 1984, the fourth
development plan (1985 to 1990) focused on themes rather than
spending goals. The first theme was to diversify the economy
through manufacturing, agriculture and finance. The second
was to reduce the government's near total dominance of the
economic system and to develop incentives for private
enterprise. The third theme was to increase government
efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. Finally, the plan called
for reducing the Kingdom's dependence on foreign labor.L9
Instead of heralding major new construction programs, it
concentrated on maximizing output from the previous
development plans. Saudi Arabia's performance on the fourth
development plan is not complete but it's safe to say the
Kingdom will make less progress on its goals than it did on
the previous five year plans.
Considered from any point of view, Saudi Arabia's
development during the past 20 years has been remarkable. In
less than a generation, the Kingdom's economic base went from
"manual agrarian subsistence" to "fledgling industrial" based
on developing petroleum products and byproducts. Virtually
every facet of Saudi society has been impacted. A country
with no paved roads in the 1950s now has 25,000 kilometers of
multi-lane paved highway; international class ports have
increased from 3 to 15; airports with paved runways have
grown to 54; the literacy rate has increased from less than
30% to more than 50% in 6 years and continues to climb; the
country produces large amounts of cement, steel rods,
electrical cable and desalinated water where none was made a
decade ago; and the Saudis have become a net grain
exporter./l0 These impressive statistics are not intended to
mask Saudi Arabia's severe shortcomings. Even after
instituting massive programs providing technical training for
Saudis, the Kingdom remains heavily dependent on expensive
foreign skilled labor. The high cost of doing business in
Saudi Arabia and the unyielding severity of its climate also
hinder its attempts to enter competitive markets. Oil
revenues remain flat and the government still subsidizes much
of the Kingdom's output. The Ministry of Defense can only
muster 5000 soldiers to man its 50,000-man showcase
installation. Even considering these drawbacks Saudi
Arabia's development plans, which provided the funding to
plan and complete the Jubail and KKMC programs, achieved most
of their goals and may have exceeded some of them.
2.3 US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
The United States Army Corps of Engineers is both a
civil and a military engineering and construction agency.
Its workforce of more than 40,000 civilians and 1000 military
personnel makes it the single largest engineering and
construction organization in the world.
"...the Corps is broadly responsible for military
construction, military engineering supply and military
engineering training programs. It is a major Army
command and, as such, is the direct responsibility of
the Secretary of the Army. As a civilian construction
agency, the Corps is responsible for the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of navigation
and flood control improvements and related works."/1l
2.3.1 HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION
The commander of the Corps of Engineers is a lieutenant
general, called the "Chief of Engineers", who also holds an
Army Staff position. His command consists of 13 Divisions
(commanded by brigadier generals) and 40 Engineer Districts
(usually commanded by colonels).
2.3.1.1 HISTORY
The Corps of Engineers has an important place in the
nation's history. The Corps predates the establishment of
the United States. The Continental Congress authorized its
formation in 1775. It was disbanded in 1783, but reinstated
in 1802 with the creation of the United States Military
Academy at West Point, New York. West Point was the only
technical engineering school in the country until Rensselaer
Polytechnic was founded in 1825 and it was administered by
the Corps of Engineers until 1866./12
From its inception the Corps has been thu predominant
constructor of civil works in the nation. It was the
engineering department of the government which planned and
executed the internal improvements initiated in the 1820's,
which included navigation improvements on the Mississippi and
Ohio Rivers, construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
and completion of the Cumberland Road. Rivers and harbors
work has generally fallen under the Corps since 1852 and
flood control since 1936./13 The Corps' civil mission
currently includes many forms of conservation work,
environmental protection and cleanup, and development work
affecting water and wetlands./14 The Corps' water resources
program currently has more than 1500 projects covering 25,000
miles of navigable waterways and 500 ports./15
In its military role, the Corps of Engineers provides
military facility construction support to the US Army and Air
Force at home and abroad, as well as to friendly foreign
governments when directed by Congress._16 The Corps is also
responsible for Army facilities engineering, property
maintenance and management of more than 24 million acres of
real estate. In addition, the Chief of Engineers is
responsible for the combat readiness of all military engineer
soldiers, as well as for doctrinal development and emergency
policies and plans. The Corps of Engineers also manages the
Army's nuclear power program./17
2.3.1.2 ORGANIZATION
The US Army Corps of Engineers' current organization is
at Figure 2.1. The Corps is a proponent of centralized
planning and decentralized execution. Its organization
reflects this philosophy. It generally places a great amount
of construction management responsibility and contract
administration authority at the lowest levels (at the
resident engineer or area engineer offices within engineer
districts) while maintaining responsibility and authority for
engineering and program management at district and division
levels.
The Corps of Engineers has an extensive network of
laboratories and support activities to assist its
construction mission. The Corps has four laboratories
engaged in both military and civil construction research.
The Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory is
located in Hanover, New Hampshire and has a field office at
Ft Wainwright, Alaska. Its research concentrates on
construction and engineering issues involving the nearly 70%
of the earth which is subject to ice, snow, seasonally frozen
ground, permafrost and sea ice./18 The Waterways Experiment
Station at Vicksburg, Mississippi performs most of the
engineering research for navigable waterways and includes a
scale model of the Mississippi River. The Construction
Engineering Research Laboratory at Champaign, Illinois
investigates engineering materials and methods in temperate
environments. The Engineer Topographic Laboratories at Ft
ORGANIZATION OF USACE/19
ACE CG USACE
DIRECTORATE DII
OF-
INFORMATION PI
MANAGEMENT
I
OFFICE OF 0
THE CHIEF SI
COUNSEL
ENI
EUROPE
HUNTSVILLE
RECTORATE
OF
ERSONNEL
I
FFICE OF
ECURITY
& LAW
FORCEMENT
DIRECTORATE
OF
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
I
OFFICE OF
ENGINEER
INSPECTOR
GENERAL
LOWER
MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY
MISSOUR I
RIVER
DIRECTORATE
OF
ENGINEERING/
CONSTRUCTION
I
OFFICE OF
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS
U.S. ARMY
NEW
ENGLANID
NORTH
ATLANTIC
E TARAPES 
FIELD
ENGINEER
TOPO
LABS
COLD REGIONS
RESEARCH &
ENGINEERING
WATERWAYS
EXPERIMENT
STATION
FACILITIES
ENGINEERING
SUPPORT
AGENCY
ENGR
STUDIES
CENTER
DIRECTORATE
OF
CIVIL
WORKS
I
OFFICE OF
EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
BOARDS
BOARD OF
ENGINEERS FOR
RIVERS & HARBORS
COASTAL
ENGINEERING
RESEARCH BOARD
BOARD OF
CONTRACT APPEALS
DIRECTORATE
OF
REAL
ESTATE
COMMISSIONS
MISSISSIPPI
RIVER
COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE
OF
RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
I
OFFICE OF SMALL
& DISADVANTAGED
BUSINESS ADMIN
UfmTmFFR flVtSTaOS
NORTH
CENTRAL
OHIO
RIVER
NORTH PACIFIC
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTH
ATLANTII
G NITAREPO ACTIVI 
S
CONST
ENGINEERING
RESEARCH
LAB
AUTOMATION
SUPPORT
ACTIVITY
WATER
RESOURCE
SUPPORT
CENTER
MILITARY ENGINEERING
AND
TOPOGRAPHIC DIVISION
INSTALLATIONS
PLANNING
DIVISION
I
RPMS INTEGRATION
AND
PLANNING OFFICE
DIRECTORATE
OF
LOGISTICS
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF THE
PRINCIPAL
ASSISTANT FOR
CONTRACTING
SOUTH
WESTERNC
SOUTH
PACIFIC
MISSLE
CONST
OFFICE
ENGR
SUPT
ACTIVITY
CONSTRUCTION
PROGRAMMING
DIVISION
FACILITIES
ENGINEERING
DIVISION
I
ARMY
ENVIRONMENTAL
OFFICE
ARMY HOUSING
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
L
U.S. AR ENGINEER DIVISIONS
SEPARAT FIELD O A ACTIVITIES
mL
FIGURE 2.1
I I
Belvoir, Virginia researches military aspects of topographic
engineering. In addition, the Corps has support activities
involving toxic and hazardous materials, engineering and
housing, automation, water resources and specialized
management studies. 2_
2.3.2 EXPERIENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA
The Corps of Engineers first appeared in Saudi Arabia in
1951 as the construction manager for a US Air Force base at
Dhahran. Years later, the base was turned over to the
Saudis. During the lean years for Saudi Arabia that
followed, the Corps continued to construct small projects
funded by the US. The most significant of these was a $5
million civil air terminal completed at Dhahran in 1961. In
1979, retired Lieutenant General Frederick Clarke (a colonel
when he was responsible for construction of the terminal in
the late 1950s) reminisced about the terminal,
"It won the first honor award of the American Institute
of Architects as the most beautiful building designed by
an American architect...I've always said it's because of
that building that the Corps is still in Saudi
Arabia. "21
The Corps' primary mission in Saudi Arabia was, "...to
provide engineering and construction management services to
Saudi military agencies, but it [was] also involved in other
than military programs..."/22 After the early projects,
Saudi Arabia entered into a series of formal country-to-
country agreements with the US to manage projects funded by
the Saudis. The programs involved both military construction
and civil works and the Saudis paid all Corps of Engineer
expenses, including salaries. The nonmilitary projects
consisted of a $28 million television station completed in
1971 and a $14 million radio station finished soon after.
The Corps also participated in the Jeddah flood relief
program in the mid-1970s.
The most significant of the country-to-country
agreements executed by Saudi Arabia and the US was the
Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA), concluded on May 24,
1965 and extended five times. It called for the United
States to provide advice and assistance in designing and
constructing certain facilities for the Ministry of Defense
and Aviation (MODA) and for training Saudi engineers./23
Under the EAA, the Corps built military cantonments at Khamis
Mushayt (completed in 1971 for $81.4 million) and Tabuk
(completed in 1973 for $81 million). In addition, USACE
built several smaller military facilities across the Kingdom
and completed a $1.5 billion military academy in Riyadh./24
The crowning achievement under the EAA was the Corps'
construction of the $218 million port at Ras Al Mish'ab and
the $6 billion King Khalid Military City, the subject of one
of the case studies in this thesis.
However, the EAA was only one of several agreements
under which the Corps performed engineering and construction
management services to the Saudis. USACE helped modernize
the Saudi Ordnance Corps under a $2.9 billion program created
in 1966 by serving as contract administrator for the
maintenance and supply of ordnance and engineering equipment,
as trainer for Ordnance Corps Cadets, and as disbursing agent
for equipment purchases. The Corps constructed a $300
million headquarters complex, other facilities and ranges
under the 1972 National Guard Modernization Program. In
addition, USACE acted as the design and construction manager
on behalf of the US Navy for the $5.2 billion Saudi Naval
Expansion Program. This involved constructing naval bases
with deep water ports at Jubail and Jeddah, a repair facility
at Dammam and a naval headquarters complex in Riyadh.
Finally, the Corps acted as contractor and construction
manager under the US Air Force to modernize Saudi airfields
at Dhahran, Khamis Mushayt and Taif during the 1979 Peace
Hawk VII and Peace Sun II programs. In the Peace Hawk
program, the Corps performed design review and quality
assurance inspections during construction of support
facilities for F-5 fighter aircraft purchased from the United
States. USACE performed full construction management duties
during the Peace Sun program to provide support facilities
for the advanced F-15 fighter. The combined cost of these
programs was $545.6 million./25
The Mediterranean Division, located in Italy, was
responsible for all USACE projects in Saudi Arabia from 1952
through 1976. As the amount of work in Saudi Arabia
increased during the mid-1970s the Corps closed its Italian
office (in 1976) and reorganized in Riyadh as the Middle East
Division (MED), where it remained until 1986. At its peak
from 1980 until 1984, the Division consisted of districts at
Al Batin and Riyadh, the Engineer Logistics Command (ELC) in
Jeddah and a Division Rear Headquarters to monitor US design
firms at Winchester, VA. The MED was also responsible for
small projects in Oman, Egypt, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain.
After completing its major programs in Saudi Arabia, USACE
dissolved the MED and completed the remaining projects from a
district-level element of the South Atlantic Division called
the Middle East/Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), in
Winchester. The total Saudi Arabian program, including KKMC,
reached $17 billion and was completed in 1988./26 USACE
currently has no active projects in the Kingdom.
The Corps of Engineers' total Saudi Arabian Program was
as extensive as any of the Kingdom's massive private
programs. Saudi Arabia sought and received USACE assistance
in part because it was impressed with the Dhahran civil air
terminal and other early projects the Corps built with US
funds. The Kingdom also lacked the expertise to manage a
huge program at that time. However, equally important was
the Corps' reputation as an effective and honest public
servant. The Saudis prefered entrusting their defense
construction to a government agency. Enqineerin _News Record
suggested that USACE was chosen over private firms because
developing nations had, "...been burned by shoddy [private]
design and construction supervision work."/27 Also, USACE
was never perceived as a threat to perpetuate itself in the
country. In any case, the Corps of Engineers' public service
role gave the Saudis confidence that they could delegate
considerable authority to USACE and receive a good product at
a fair price.
2.4 BECHTEL GROUP
Bechtel Group is a privately owned and operated
corporation based in San Francisco, that "...has probably
done more to transform the landscape of America and the world
than any other company of this century." 28 After 92 years
of family ownership, Bechtel Group has become one of the
largest and most productive engineering and construction
companies in the United States. It provides technical and
management services to develop, manage, engineer, build and
operate installations worldwide.
Bechtel developed from its humble beginnings in the
Oklahoma territory into an international organization of
27,800 employees working for 950 clients on almost 1600
active projects and studies. Bechtel performed $5.1 billion
of work in 1989./29 Although not required and not willing to
disclose its financial information to the public, Bechtel's
$13.6 billion in revenues for 1982, alone, would have placed
it in Fortune 500's top 20, had it been listed on the public
exchange./30 It has consistently been in the top 5 domestic
construction firms in terms of dollar placement since
Engineerin _News Record began publishing results in 1964.
Unencumbered by the demands of shareholders, as Newsweek put
it in a 1977 article, "Bechtel seems to have the best of both
worlds: unlimited growth opportunities and the flexibility to
pursue them pretty much as it pleases."L31
2.4.1 HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION
Bechtel Group's family-based origin and company
leadership give a clue to its corporate personality and
current organization. Bechtel is a hard driving,
opportunistic, politically well-connected and secretive
corporation, much like the family that runs it.
2.4.1.1 HISTORY
The Bechtel Group's history began in 1898 when its
founder, Warren Bechtel, travelled from Kansas to Oklahoma
territory with a team of mules looking for railroad work. By
1900, he was in Reno, Nevada working as an engineering
estimator for Southern Pacific.132 In 1906, Bechtel created
his own construction company in northern California and hired
himself out as a subcontractor on railroad work. Bechtel's
company grew slowly over the next 25 years, concentrating
primarily on railway and pipeline work. While still
operating as a small subcontractor, Bechtel pioneered the use...
of trucks to haul construction supplies and to haul and dump
soil.133 Bechtel also developed the side-boom tractor for
pipe laying./34
Warren Bechtel incorporated his company in 1925 and the
new corporation made a national reputation for itself as one
of an 8 member consortium which constructed the Hoover Dam
under budget and ahead of schedule from 1931 until 1936.
Since then, its name has become synonymous with big jobs,
from multi-unit nuclear power plants to airports, refineries,
defense and space facilities and rapid transit systems./35
45
The company became an international contractor after World
War II and it maintains a sizeable presence overseas today.
Since the mid-1970s, Bechtel has received significant
revenues from overseas projects. In 1989, 48% of its new
work was international./36 Bechtel has a reputation for
technical and management innovation and was involved in
developing project management concepts several years ago.137
Today, the Bechtel Group engineers and manages many of
the world's largest and most complex construction projects.
It is involved in construction of the Eurotunnel between
France and England, a 170-mile portion of the Trans-National
Turkish Highway, the Shoubrah El-Kheima fossil power plant in
Egypt, an offshore gas development in Qatar's North Field,
the SEMASS waste-to-energy project in Massachusetts, an
international airport for greater Hong Kong, decontamination
of Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor, the Disney-MGM Studio
Tour park in Florida and Boston's Central Artery and Tunnel
project./38 This international construction management
organization has performed more than 15,000 projects in 135
countries on all seven continents during its history./39
2.4.1.2 ORGANIZATION
Bechtel's somewhat secretive corporate personality has
made the organization a mystery to outsiders for four family-
run generations. Unlike most corporations, it doesn't
publish an organization chart and places no importance in
one. However, one can discern some of the critical elements
46
of the organization from publicly held information.
Bechtel's current organization is the result of adapting
to industry trends from the last 30 years. The company
expanded from its construction contracting role into design
and engineering work after World War II. Although the
corporation continued to perform most of its own direct
construction through the 1950s, Bechtel became primarily an
engineering and construction management company in the 1960s
and, in an attempt to capture the largest share of total
construction dollars, began offering additional services such
as assistance in obtaining financing and providing advice on
technological advances, taxation, labor relations and public
affairs in the 1970s. As the construction industry becomes
more competitive and risky, Bechtel subcontracts more and
more of its direct construction work. It currently performs
its own construction work on less than half of its
projects. /40
Bechtel has also become a more specialized company,
focusing on large projects ($25 million or greater) in
electrical power generation, air and ground transportation,
petroleum and chemical plants, environmental remediation,
mining, paper plants, buildings, infrastructure and water
storage and treatment facilities./41 During down business
cycles, however, the company will pursue smaller projects
within that realm.
To support its operations, Bechtel Group, Incorporated
is organized into 8 companies, each responsible for a
specialized business. Figure 2.2 breaks down the Bechtel
Group into an organization table. There are 5 regional
offices (one overseas) which include the engineering,
construction and non-technical workforce needed to execute
projects. There are also 22 major domestic and int rnational
offices and the US private engineering industry's largest
research and development staff./42
2.4.2 EXPERIENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA
Bechtel first became involved in Saudi Arabia in 1943,
when the company was called in at the request of ARAMCO to
improve refinery facilities on the island of Bahrain and lay
a 23 mile underwater pipeline from Bahrain to Ras Tanura in
an emergency measure to increase supplies of oil to the
Allies during World War II. In 1944, Saudi Crown Prince
Faisal visited Bechtel's shipbuilding projects in California
and was very impressed with the work. Sensing an opportunity
in Saudi Arabia, Bechtel created a new division,
International Bechtel, Inc., to focus exclusively on the
Middle East.J43
Soon, Bechtel was flooded with work from both ARAMCO and
the Saudi government. It engineered and managed the 450,000
bbl/day "Tapline" for ARAMCO, a 1068-mile, 30-and 31-inch
line across Saudi Arabia, through Syria to the Mediterranean
Sea. At the same time, Bechtel became the principal public
works contractor for the Kingdom. It built a railroad from
Dammam to Riyadh, the Jeddah and Dammam harbors, the airports
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there and at Riyadh, provided the electrification of Riyadh
and resurfaced the Mecca-Medina roads by 1951. However,
Bechtel ceased working for the Saudi government in 1952, when
progress payments fell behind by $1.8 million./45
During the 1950s and 1960s, International Bechtel
concentrated on projects in surrounding Arab lands, building
pipelines, refineries, ports and hotels in Iraq, Syria,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Abu Dhabi and Libya./46 Bechtel's nmphasis
returned to Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s, just in time to
take advantage of the Saudi oil boom. It created a splinter
company, called Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited (50% Saudi
owned), and promptly won contracts to increase oil field
production at Ain Dar, engineer and build the $3.4 billion
Riyadh International Airport, construct a natural gas liquid
pipeline from Safaniyah and Uthmaniyah to Juaymah, build a
1600MW power plant at Ghazlan, and develop another oil field
and lay a pipeline from Shaybah to Ras Tanura./47
Of course, Bechtel's 20 year contract to engineer and
manage the construction of Jubail is, by far, the largest of
the jobs resulting from the Saudi oil boom. However, Arabian
Bechtel's Riyadh office had already managed billions of
dollars of construction and had three decades of experience
in the Kingdom before the Jubail project ever broke ground.
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2.5 MANAGEMENT THEORY
Before performing case studies of the Saudi Arabiar.
projects, it's appropriate to review current management
theory regarding mega-projects. This review provides a
summary of the state-of-the-art in project and construction
management theory and provides an academic base of comparison
for the management performance of the Corps of Engineers and
Bechtel. Specifically, the review involves current theory on
project organization and staffing, contract types and
management of those contracts, resolving disputes and
providing Owner Furnished Equipment (OFE) and materials to
construction contractors.
2.5.1 ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY
Of the theories of construction management examined in
this thesis, project organization and authority is the most
-thoroughly studied and developed. Still, most organizational
research regarding construction is of industrial companies
with internal construction divisions and permanent functional
staffs. There is no body of research dedicated to organizing
engineering and construction management firms such as the
Corps of Engineers and Bechtel Group. Although there is no
proven "best way" to organize and staff mega-projects,
management researchers have developed some widely accepted
theories.
Industrial companies generally organize according to
functional or divisional forms. However, the core structure
of construction and engineering companies is the project.
The organization of the project takes place within and is
subsidiary to the overall organization form./48 This has
spawned project management as an organizational form within
the corporate structure. Project management has been
described as, "...the mobilization and management of company
resources for a finite duration for the purpose of completing
a specific project."L49
Within the project organization of construction and
engineering firms are the disciplines needed to serve the
project, such as civil, structural, mechanical and electrical
engineering. Recognizing the specialized nature of different
types of construction projects, large construction and
engineering companies often create divisions (or separate
operating companies) to serve specific clients. For example,
Bechtel Group has separate operating companies to handle
airport,--- nuclear plant, petrochemical and space/defense
construction projects. By combining expertise from these
separate companies, large firms can undertake mega-projects
which call for a combination of many specialized project
types.
Growing from project management theory are three basic
organizational alternatives for industrial companies
performing construction projects: functional, matrix and pure
project forms. Figure 2.3 shows the authority structure
within these organizations. Table 2.1 identifies the factors
influencing the choice of organizational and authority
structure for projects in industrial companies .
Engineering and construction companies almost
exclusively use the matrix form to execute projects. At
issue in the matrix organization is whether the project
manager controls th±e functional elements (project driven) or
the functional chiefs retain control with the project manager
acting as coordinator (responsibility without authority).
Albert Kelley sees the need for the project manager to have
real authority over functions in mega-projects:
"With larger, more complex projects, the project manager
and his staff, who have always been key figures, acquire
much more responsibility: they must be innovative; they
must be entrepreneurial; and they must be leaders."L50
In this thesis, I intend to identify the principles
which should guide the overall mega-project management
structure. The mega-project creates a complex set of
interfaces. Stanford professor C.B. Tatum recognized the
external influences which require project interfaces and
combined them with goals and design and work technology to
establish the project situation under which organizations are
created.
First, Tatum stressed that mega-project organizations
should reflect the goals of the owners and management firms
involved in the project. Although technological challenges
in design and construction practice are also driving forces
in determining project organizations, he stressed that
external influences should be considered when designing mega-
project organizations. Major external organizations which
influence construction/engineering firm organizations for
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TABLE 2.1 FACTORS INFLUENCING CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
TYPEL52
FACTOR
1. Project size & duration
2. Organizational expertise
(with other than
functional organization)
3. Resources (funding & depth
of in-house technical
expertise)
4. Difference (uniqueness in
comparison to the normal
business of the firm)
5. Importance (urgency of the
project)
6. Technology uncertainty
(dynamic, unstable
technology)
7. Financial uncertainty
(related to contract,
technology & regulations)
8. Number of projects (work
load from other projects)
9. Cost & schedule control
(the need for tight
control, anticipated
difficulty in achieving
it)
APPROPRIATE STRUCTURE
DECENTRALIZED
F
Aviod
Try P
CENTRALIZED
P
F, M, or P
P
P or M
P
M or P with
technical
depth
M
M
P
F = Functional; M = Matrix; P = Project.
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mega-projects include:
"(1) Owners; (2) operators; (3) the architect/engineer
and the design contractors; (4) fabricators and
suppliers; (5) construction contractors; (6) craft labor
unions; (7) regulatory agencies; and (8) others unique
to individual projects."/53
Having identified the situation under which mega-project
organizations are established, Tatum listed seven criteria
which should be used to evaluate potential organization
types:
"1. Establish clear responsibility for external
interfaces with engineering, purchasing and
operations.
2. Provide single point of responsibility at lowest
practical level.
3. Integrate craft, engineering, planning, and
materials resources at the lowest practical level.
4. Establish and enforce craft discipline priorities
consistent with the construction phase of the
project.
5. Limit manageable spans of control.
6. Assure clear and effective reporting relationships.
7. Assure most effective utilization of available
management, support and craft resources."/54
I rate the two matrix forms used by construction and
engineering firms to organize for projects against Tatum's
criteria in Table 2.2. Tatum recommended that project
managers create a decision matrix to evaluate alternatives
for each project, emphasizing the criteria which are most
important for the project. Additional criteria should be
added for the unique characteristics of each mega-project.
2.5.2 CONTRACT TYPES AND MANAGEMENT
No particular contract form is universally recognized as
superior to others. There is, however, general agreement on
the proper approach for mega-project contracting and
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TABLE 2.2 TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL EVALUATION FOR
CONSTRUCTION/ENGINEERING FIRMS PERFORMING
MEGA-PROJECTS
ORGANIZATION TYPES MATRIX W/ MATRIX W/
FUNCTIONAL PM
CRITERIA CONTROL CONTROL
(1) Responsibility for External Strength Strength
Interfaces
(2) Single Point Responsibility Weakness Strength
at Lowest Level
(3) Integrate Resources at Neutral Strength
Lowest Level
(4) Discipline Priority Consistent Neutral Strenc'th
with Phase
(5) Limit Span of Control Weakness Strength
(6) Clear and Effective Reporting Weakness Strength
Relationship
(7) Effective Use of Management, Strength Weakness
Support & Craft Resources
management. Contract packages are one of the most important
tools for engineering, procurement, construction management
and overall project management of mega-projects.L55 The key
issues regarding contract type and management include,
"...making equitable allocations of risks, liabilities,
responsibilities and authority and incorporating them clearly
in contractual arrangements."/56 At an Engineering
Foundation Research Conference on mega-projects, the
participants identified the following considerations in
selecting contractual arrangements:
1. Purpose of the Project - Public service or profit.
2. Funding Availability and Cash Flow Schedule - All
available; uncertainty of amount available and when;
even if committed may come in an uncertain trickle.
3. Desired Completion Date - Also interim dates;
schedules tight or ample.
4. Time Available for Design(s) - For complete project
or parts barely ahead of construction contract.
5. Availability and Qualifications of Owner's Staff -
For design and for construction management.
6. Availability and Qualifications of Engineering and
Construction Resources.
7. Affects - Number and type of design packages and
schedule for each; possible engineering consultants;
optimum size and number of construction contracts
and related design packages; construction management
assignment - early.
8. Location of Project - Remote; urban area; near or
far from manpower and material sources.
9. Geological and Climatological Conditions.
10. Laws or Regulations - Public agencies.
11. Policies and Experiences - Private agencies.
12. Availability of Real Estate - Timing
13. Facilities or Services Owner Should Furnish.
14. Allocation of Risks and Liabilities - Between owner,
designer and contractor./57
After considering the varied and often interrelated
aspects of mega-projects listed above, five basic types of
construction contracts are recommended:
1. Firm Fixed Price or Lump Sum - Generally required
for public works and other government construction.
Establishes the firm funding requirement for
accomplishing a particular piece of work. Usually
based on having sufficient time to have a fully
engineered design and specific set of contract
documents. Also requires the construction
contractor to shoulder most of the risk for cost
escalation.
2. Cost Reimbursable - Has several variations,
including cost plus a fixed fee, cost plus an award
fee and cost plus a percentage of cost. It
transfers risk for cost escalation to the owner. It
also provides greater flexibility to the owner for
changing work under the contract. It is based on
expectations that the contract will require changes
because of design developments or changed local,
international or physical conditions.
3. Target Plus Incentive - Combines some of the
features of both fixed price and reimbursable
contracts. Owner and contractor share risks of cost
escalation, while the contractor has additional
monetary incentives for keeping costs down.
4. Fast-Track - Used when time is considered paramount
and it is desirable to start construction before the
design is completely engineered. Owner bears risk
for cost escalation. Used when higher construction
costs are justified by faster delivery of a (usually
revenue-producing) facility.
5. Turnkey - Similar to fast-track, except that a
single contract is let for needed design and
construction. Concentrates responsibility on one
agency but tends to reduce competition because there
are few firms capable of concept-design-construct
operations. Owner generally bears risk of cost
escalation up to a negotiated amount.L58
In particular, who accepts the risks for the 14 factors
described earlier is the primary source of contention in
mega-project contracts. Most construction firms agree that
owners should accept more risk than is normal when
contracting for mega-projects because the dollar amounts of
risks are so great, there is great difficulty and expense in
insuring the risks, there are more unknowns and more factors
beyond the contractor's control./59 Traditionally, owners
have tried to assign as much risk as they can to their
contractors. Considering the magnitude of the mega-projects,
however, owners are reexamining the cost-benefit of this
approach and, more frequently, are adopting other than fixed
price contracts. Figure 2.4 compares owner flexibility with
risk assignment in a continuum across the different types of
contracts.
Although fixed price contracting is still acknowledged
as an effective way to promote competition and reduce owner
risk of price escalation if used under the proper
circumstances, some facets of most fixed price contracts are
being criticized. For example, the Better Contracting for
Underground Construction Report pointed out that, "...fairer
allocations of risks between the parties and better
procedures for avoiding or settling disputes and minimizing
[work] disruptions..."' in fixed price contracting would lead
to more satisfactory project completion./0o In addition,
many project managers question fixed price contracts'
suitability for mega-projects, which generally involve fast-
tracking design and construction concepts and greater risks
of cost escalation due to environmental restrictions,
remoteness and international finance.
In recent years a hybrid of fixed price and cost
reimbursable contracting has gained favor on mega-projects.
An example of this comes from the Alaska Pipeline Project,
where contracts were advertised based on fixed prices for
FIGURE 2.4 CONTINUUM OF RISK ASSIGNMENT IN CONTRACT TYPES
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costs of contractor-furnished equipment, salaried personnel
and off-site overhead, a fixed fee and reimbursable labor./61
The key point in considering this type of contracting is that
owners are beginning to recognize the usefulness of altering
traditional contracts to address the unique requirements of
mega-projects. Creative managers can equitably share the
risk of cost escalation with contractors by varying a
standard contract. In the James Bay electric generation
project, for example, the owners contractually indemnified
their contractors for 80% of unknown labor cost escalations.
The contractors were responsible for 20%, giving them
sufficient incentive to control labor costs./62
Researchers maintain that the success of contractual
arrangements depends not only on choosing the best contract
form, but also matching it with the appropriate management
philosophy for the specific project and its situation.
Rules, responsibilities and authority of the key parties
should be spelled out clearly in the contract./63 Managers
should also strive to eliminate confusing and duplicative
layers of authority and decision making by spelling out
authority and responsibilities in the contract.
Sol Kutner, an executive consultant at Bechtel Group,
summarized the prevailing industry view of factors that
should be considered when formulating a complete contracting
strategy for superprojects:
1. Carefully divide the project into specific work
packages of a definitive scope.
2. Establish work packages early.
3. Select the best contract formula to meet the needs
of each work package (lump sum, target plus fee,
etc.).
4. Survey the contractor and supplier market to
determine guidelines for optimum contractor/supplier
response.
5. Stay flexible in order to maintain contractor
confidence in a changing market, a market which
varies with cost escalation and work load.
6. Define services to be furnished by owner. Do not
overextend owner's service capacity.
7. Plan for large equipment fleet needs.
8. Consider having owner furnish bulk materials, such
as rebar and concrete, at fixed cost to all
contractors.
9. Include bonus and penalty clauses in contracts./64
2.5.3 DISPUTE RESOLUTION
There are two current schools of thought regarding how
to resolve disputes on mega-projects. One contends that the
best way to resolve disputes is to avoid them, by creating
contracts which are unambiguous and correctly assign
responsibilities and by using management techniques which
emphasize teamwork and problem solving. The other school
acknowledges that some disputes are unavoidable and it's best
to try alternative methods of dispute resolution which end
short of litigation. Considering the great risks inherent
for owners and contractors in mega-projects, a successful
management strategy for resolving disputes may combine both
schools of thought.
When disputes are unavoidable, current theory is that
alternate dispute resolution (ADR) techniques often prove to
be the most cost-effective and least divisive way of
resolving them. The primary dispute resolution techniques
are arbitration (binding and non-binding), mediation, mini-
trial and litigation. Their attributes are summarized in
Table 2.3.
Managers must make an informed decision of whether to
choose a form of ADR over litigation. Some factors to
consider are:
1. It may not affect the ultimate amount of a
settlement when compared to litigation but ADR
generally reduces the cost of arriving at a
settlement.
2. ADR is usually very effective in addressing highly
technical or industry-specific issues.
3. Some forms of ADR allow great control of one's own
destiny, avoiding the uncertain outcome of
litigation (and binding arbitration).
4. Voluntary ADR is a "no risk" situation; any party
may back out at any time and seek settlement through
traditional methods.
5. ADR Preserves business relationships.
6. ADR allows parties to meet face to face rather than
through intermediaries.
7. Even when unsuccessful, ADR can enhance the
effectiveness of litigation by allowing both sides
to prepare their cases and air much of the dispute
before meeting in court.
8. ADR can be disadvantageous when it is not to the
advantage of one of the parties to resolve the
dispute promptly.
9. ADR proceedings can be made private.
10. ADR prohibits joining third parties to the
proceedings. /65
ADR methods of are not available under the laws of some
countries involved in international contracting and there are
even more alternatives available in others, so construction
managers should thoroughly research options for dispute
resolution before writing construction contracts on
TABLE 2.3 ATTRIBUTES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS/66
ATTRIBUTE
Appearance
of Parties
Relation
of Parties
Who
Presides?
Technical
Knowledge
of Neutral
Structure
of
Proceeding
Decision
Rendered?
Decision
Binding?
Appeal
Allowed?
Forced
Revealing?
Rules of
Evidence
Applies?
Disclosure
COURT ARBITRATION MEDIATION MINI-TRIAL
Involuntary
Adversarial
Assigned
Judge
No
Specialty
Highly
Structured;
Inflexible
Decided by
Third Party
Binding
Appealable
Discovery
Rules of
Evidence
Voluntary or
Contractual
Adversarial
Arbitrator
Selected by
Participants
Can Select
Based on
Knowledge
Rules May be
Set by Parties,
Though Usually
Structured
Decided by
Third Party
Binding and
Non-binding
Not Usually
Appealable
Limited
Discovery
No Rules of
Evidence
Voluntary
Cooperative
Neutral
Selected by
Participants
Can Select
Based on
Knowledge
Very
Flexible
Settled by
Mutual
Agreement
Non-binding
N/A
No
Discovery
No Rules of
Evidence
Voluntary
Cooperative
Neutral
Selected by
Participants
Can Select
B•sed on
Knowledge
Rules May be
Set by Parties
Though Usually
Somewhat
Formal
Settled by
Mutual
Agreement
Non-binding
N/A
Limited
Discovery
Rules of
Evidence
Mutually
Agreed
Public Confidential Confidential Confidential
Public Confidential Confidential Confidential
international mega-projects. After more than ten years of
experience with ADR, most construction managers are convinced
that, when applied under the right circumstances, ADR can
resolve disputes more economically and more quickly than
court action while maintaining better business relationships.
2.5.4 OWNER FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (OFE)
OFE procurement is a common contract management
technique used on mega-projects to save costs and time. OFE
can speed delivery of long lead items, such as major pieces
of mechanical equipment. Often, it also accomplishes the
objective of obtaining shop drawings required to do the
engineering for lump sum construction contracts. However,
OFE's usefulness has often been questioned. Many managers
feel that the additional costs of managing OFE procurement,
delivery, storage and maintenance, as well as the increased
risk to the owner of claims resulting from late delivery,
overshadow its cost benefits.
Researchers at the University of Illinois, Urbana,
recently performed a study of 55 projects involving OFE and
made some interesting conclusions of costs and benefits.
They are summarized below:
OFE Benefits
1. There was an average cost saving of 6.4% of the
furnished product and 0.7% of total project costs.
This was a consistent finding and did not vary with
project size.
2. Typical time savings to deliver OFE were 3.7 months.
3. There were fewer product disputes than under
traditional procurement (7% versus 10-15%) and
reduced dispute costs and delays.
OFE Costs
1. There was an estimated additional project cost of
0.2-0.4% for contract administration.
2. Owner should dedicate one person (organization) to
monitor OFE contracts throughout the project for
best results.
3. OFE is not appropriate for every project or
product. /67
The researchers also found that 75% of OFE supply contracts
mentioned the anticipated time that the equipment was
required on the job site for informational purposes. The
specified delivery date for the OFE was almost always the
same in both the supply and construction contracts, leaving
no float in the documents./68 Finally, the researchers
determined that retaining a substantial amount (5% or more)
against the OFE supply contracts led to considerable
improvements in delivery times, while cost savings were
negligible. 69
The remoteness of sites and speed of construction
required in many mega-projects adds to the opportunities to
provide OFE. On smaller, domestic projects, mechanical
equipment accounts for 86% of OFE supply contracts.770
However, the owner often provides services as well as
equipment to contractors on mega-projects. These services
can include worker housing and food, utilities, access roads
and bulk construction materials, such as cement, reinforcing
steel, aggregate and fill. In addition, OFE can facilitate
the engineering of preassembled components. Thus, not only
can OFE speed up the design and delivery process but it can
also improve construction a.sembly time.
Industry representatives are quick to point out that OFE
is not a panacea on every mega-project. Bechtel Quebec's
Peter Behr summed up industry reservations by warning:
"Each project must be examined according to its own
needs in this regard. Care should be taken to avoid
infringing on contractors' responsibilities. An
overambitious owner may end up with some major headaches
if he is not prepared to live up to all commitments."/7l
2.6 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
This thesis involves in-depth case studies of mega-
project planning, organization, staffing and control. It
examines many of the management issues which are crucial to
the successful completion of large international projects.
However, several issues that the thesis doesn't address in
detail can be equally critical. They include environmental
concerns, interpersonal skills for project managers, and
project finance. I will discuss them briefly here.
Environmental impact assessment of mega-projects is now
commonplace all over the world. More important, managers are
beginning to realize that environmental engineering is as
critical to the planning and design effort as traditional
engineering functions are. Environmental considerations will
impact the planning and execution of future mega-projects.
In addition, correcting or avoiding environmental hazards
..will become a major-source of future mega-projects. The
Boston Harbor Cleanup Project is a prime example of the
growing need for environmental mega-projects. For these
reasons, mega-project engineering/construction managers must
be more environmentally aware and capable than their
predecessors.
Modern mega-projects also require their managers to have
more proficiency in interpersonal skills than before. The
global nature of construction contracting routinely brings
together representatives of many different countries and
cultures to plan, design and build mega-projects. Often,
marshalling far-flung resources and developing effective
lines of communication are more challenging than the
engineering aspects of these projects.
Engineering/construction managers must have the capacity to
communicate effectively with owners, engineers and
contractors. In addition, they often act as mediators of
the conflicting interests represented by these parties.
For example, mediating skills are critical for the $12
billion Channel Tunnel's program manager. Disputes and
cultural differences between English and French members of
the construction consortium caused it to hire an American
with international mega-project management experience as its
chief executive. He won praise, "...from both Eurotunnel and
his own employees by vastly improving coordination between
the separate British and French construction crews."1L2
It's evident from this example that mega-project managers
need highly developed interpersonal skills to compliment
traditional planning, organizational, and engineering skills.
Another facet of modern mega-projects is the requirement
for innovative financing to get them started and keep them
going. Financing wasn't a factor in either of the Saudi
Arabian case studies. However, it's likely that future mega-
projects, even in Saudi Arabia, will require significant
financing. Therefore, the managers of these projects must
become familiar of the increasingly complex array of
financing available to support them. Many project decisions
have a financing component. The mega-project manager must be
aware of its implications and adjust planning to accommodate
it.
One should not infer from the omission in this thesis of
environmental, interpersonal skill and financing issues that
they're not important. On the contrary, these issues can
often make or break a mega-project. I don't examine them in
detail because it's not clear from my research that they were
major issues in the Saudi Arabian case studies. Still,
they're worthy subjects of future study.
71
2.7 CASE STUDY FOCUS
In the preceding sections I've emphasized the importance
of studying mega-project management, established the research
methodology, summarized the Saudi Arabian experience of the
case study subjects and discussed pertinent management
theory. At this point, it's appropriate to identify the
focus of the case studies that follow.
A major difference in mega-project management from that
of smaller projects is the requirement to spend huge sums of
money effectively, efficiently, rapidly and steadily. By its
nature, this requirement exceeds the capabilities of most
engineering/construction management firms in the world. Only
a small number can marshall the necessary resources and
expertise and organize to accomplish the mission. Therefore,
the focus of the USACE and Bechtel case studies is to
determine how those organizations get the job done. I'll
research four key management tasks on the KKMC and Jubail
mega-projects; (1) planning, (2) organization, (3) staffing
and (4) control and identify the critical components of these
tasks for in-depth study. I'll identify USACE's and
Bechtel's successes and failures in their respective case
studies. Then I'll compare and contrast their approaches to
mega-project management. Finally, I'll determine strategies
for planning, organizing, staffing and controlling
international mega-projects which should have universal
applications. My goal is to generate hypotheses of
management principles that can be applied successfully to any
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international mega-project.
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CHAPTER 3 - CASE f#: US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AT KING
KHALID MILITARY CITY
3.1 CASE BACKGROUND
At more than $6 billion, King Khalid Military City is
the largest military construction project ever undertaken by
the US Army Corps of Engineers. Design work began in 1976,
soon after USACE was directed by the State Department to
perform as the project's design and construction manager.
USACE completed facilities for one armored brigade at KKMC in
1984. King Fahd inaugurated the city on April 6, 1985 and
USACE completed construction of KKMC in 1987. Saudi Arabia's
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) now controls and
operates KKMC with engineers from its General Directorate of
Military Works (GDMW) who were trained by USACE./I
This chapter is a case study of the construction
management techniques applied to this international mega-
project by USACE's Middle East Division (MED) and a
determination of their effectiveness. The first portion of
the chapter provides background on the KKMC project and its
challenges. The remainder of the chapter examines how USACE
addressed those challenges and determines the effectiveness
of its management efforts.
3.1.1 ENGINEER ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT
The Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA) was a country-
to-country pact concluded on May 24, 1965 between the US
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Minister of Foreign
Affairs. It was sponsored by the US State Department. The
EAA called for the United States to provide advice and
assistance in the design and construction of certain military
facilities for MODA, funded by Saudi Arabia, as well as
providing a training program for Saudi engineers._2 The two
countries agreed that the US Army Corps of Engineers would be
the agency to perform the assistance defined under the
agreement. Ultimately, the agreement was extended five times
and USACE performed most of its Saudi Arabian program,
including construction of KKMC, under the EAA's guidelines.
The EAA warrants more than just passing attention
because some of its provisions were far-reaching and
farsighted. They had a great impact on USACE's management
philosophy for KKMC and, later, became sticking points in
relations between MODA's GDMW and USACE.
Some of the important statements regarding construction
management made in the EAA include:
1. The Corps shall be entirely responsible for the
administration of all construction contracts awarded
under the terms of this agreement.
2. ... the contractor shall receive instructions only
by the contracting officer.
3. The Corps shall have the right to issue change
orders to construction contracts as required by
field conditions, technical and engineering
considerations, construction problems
encountered,...
4. Change orders that would change the authorized scope
of the facilities being constructed will be issued
only with the concurrence of the Saudi government../
In essence, the EAA made USACE an agent of the Saudi Arabian
government, acting for and on its behalf. This arrangement
gave USACE full control of design and construction management
efforts with GDMW acting as Program Manager.
During the early years of the Saudi Arabian program,
this arrangement worked very well. GDMW had a large budget
but virtually no qualified engineers and managers and no
construction industry base to work from. The Saudis welcomed
the Corps of Engineers' expertise and delegated the necessary
authority to compliment it. However, by 1983 the Saudis had
developed a core group of USACE-trained engineers, the
country had a growing construction materials industry and
GDMW was running short of funds. This combination of
developments caused GDMW to increase pressure for an active
role in construction management.
According to Tom Olson, Al Batin's District Counsel, the
Saudis began restricting EAA authority in the early 1980s.
GDMW began requiring USACE to submit constructability change
orders and claim settlements for approval.L4 At times, GDMW
review was slow, even on changes which were intended to
improve constructability. USACE perceived this GDMW
involvement as a compromise of the EAA. In some cases, it
reduced construction management efficiency and increased
costs. However, USACE chose not to raise its concerns beyond
its MODA liaison. The Corps attempted to foster teamwork and
avoid more serious dilution of its construction management
authority by generally complying with GDMW's wishes.L5
By 1985, as government funding purse strings for KKMC
continued to tighten, GDMW focused on review and approval of
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claim settlements. Although the status of the owner (GDMW)
in USACE's construction management system was never resolved
to the full satisfaction of either party, USACE was able to
hang on to the strengths of the EAA and complete the program
with it intact.
An examination of owner - construction manager
relationships is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I
briefly summarized the EAA because the agreement defined
USACE involvement at KKMC and had a significant effect on how
it organized and conducted its business. It is worth noting
that clearly defining the role of the construction manager
and the owner in advance is a prerequisite of effective mega-
project management.
3.1.2 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT
Although the EAA guided USACE's organization for and
management of the KKMC program, the Foreign Military Sales
Act (FMSA) determined that the US would become involved in
the program. The FSMA became Public .Law 90-629 on October
22, 1968 and was modified six times from 1971 through 1976.
Section 2769 set policy for foreign military construction
sales.
Its primary provisions are that the President may sell
design and construction services to any eligible foreign
country if that country agrees (1) to pay the full amount of
a contract which assures the United States Government against
any loss on the contract and (2) to make funds available in
such amounts and at such times as required to meet the
payments under the contract and any damages and costs of
cancellation of the contract in advance of when they are
due. The President delegated his functions under this law to
the Secretary of Defense in a 1977 Executive Order. Unlike
the EAA, the FMSA did not spell out the extent and explicit
terms of Defense Department involvement in providing design
and construction services to foreign governments.L6
Due to Saudi Arabia's strategic importance in the 1970s
and its oil wealth, the Kingdom easily met the FMSA's
prerequisites. This paved the way for Corps of Engineers
involvement in the KKMC project under the terms of the EAA.
3.1.3 STATIONING DECISION AT AL BATIN
USACE's first task during its involvement in the KKMC
project was to perform studies of suitable areas for
construction of a divisional-sized military city in Saudi
Arabia. In 1974, the Saudis had cantonments at Khamis
Mushayat (in the west near the border with troubled Yemen)
and Tabuk (in the northwest near the border with Jordan and
traditional enemy Israel). Other than its naval and air
installations on the east coast and armed forces headquarters
in Riyadh, the Saudis lacked a defense presence near its
border with Kuwait and the radical countries of Iraq and
Iran. Establishing a sizeable installation in that area
became a priority during the Kingdom's second five year
development plan.
The Corps of Engineers commissioned several studies of
the barren region near the Iraq/Kuwait border and eventually
recommended a site 35 kilometers south of the Iraqi border,
in a desolate area near the 5000-person village of Hafar AL
Batin. The site is 450 kilometers north of Riyadh and 550
kilometers from the closest port, at Dammam. In add tion,
the closest improved road to Al Batin was the aged Tapline
Road, built by Bechtel in the late 1940s. It came no closer
than 95 kilometers to Al Batin (at Quaisumah) and required
extensive upgrading to become a primary access road. Al
Batin is 15 kilometers from a road between Riyadh and Kuwait
that was eventually completed by the Saudis in 1978. There
was no existing labor force or basic utilities in the Al
Batin area.
Actually, none of the sites contemplated by USACE
boasted an infrastructure, so the driving selection criteria
were the base's proximity to the Iraq/Kuwait border and
favorable soil conditions for construction. Al Batin
provided this combination and GDMW selected it for
development in 1975. Figure 3.1 on the following page shows
KKMC's ultimate location.
3.1.4 POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There were many political considerations which affected
USACE's construction management approach for KKMC. They
ranged from congressional reluctance to employ the American
government's civil works experts in a foreign country, to
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FIGURE 3.1 MAP OF SAUDI ARABIA SHOWING LOCATION OF KKMCL•
protests over Saudi boycotts of Jewish workers and products,
to US construction firms' international lack of price
competitiveness in fi ed-price contracting.
The first issue, at the beginning of the KKMC program,
revolved around a congressional debate of whether to employ
the Corps of Engineers in such a massive foreign program.
USACE had just completed a four year struggle with the Carter
administration to maintain its role as the nation's primary
civil works manager when the House Appropriations Committee
criticized USACE in an annual report for stretching its
manpower pool by taking on the massive Saudi projects,
alleging that its domestic capabilities suffered as a result.
The Chief of Engineers defended USACE involvement in the
program, saying that the Saudi work helped to hone and
maintain the agency's construction management skills. He
stressed that the Saudi mega-project would produce and train
the future engineers and managers of American military and
civil works mega-projects._8
By this time, Saudi Arabia had become strategically
important to the US. The Saudis were staunchly anticommunist
and, many felt, would provide a bulwark against Russian
intrusions into the Middle East. In addition, they had
become the leading supplier of foreign oil to the United
States. As some US officials saw it, the Corps of Engineers
could be used to cement ties between the two nations - at no
cost to the US taxpayer._9
The argument expanded and took on additional foreign
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policy implications as a result of USACE involvement in
engineering and constructing two fast tracked military
airports for the Israelis during the same period. Not only
did this put a further drain on rapidly shrinking Corps of
Engineers manpower resources but it created a potential
diplomatic war over loyalties to adversaries separated only
by the Gulf of Aqaba. Remarkably, USACE was able tp deflect
most of the criticism of this arrangement by having two
completely separate divisions control the projects (North
Atlantic Division managed the Israeli airfields), each in
relative secrecy._10
The controversy regarding USACE managing construction
for feuding countries died down in the late 1970s. Then
congressional investigations regarding the Arab League's
blacklist and boycott of several companies with Jewish or
Israeli ties sprung up to replace it. In 1976, the United
States Justice Department filed an antitrust suit against
Bechtel Corporation for cooperating with the boycott. The
case was eventually settled out of court and a Senate
filibuster defeated anti-boycott legislation. However,
during its hearing, Bechtel's defense lawyers accused USACE
of participating in the boycott for ten years through a
provision in the EAA./11 Even though the EAA did give the
Saudis, "...the right to reject any contractor on the
[prequalification] list submitted by the Corps," none was
rejected during USACE's entire Saudi Arabian program._12
Still, USACE generally complied with Saudi government
requirements for its individual workforce, at least regarding
employees located in Saudi Arabia. USACE avoided (though it
did not prohibit) stationing Jewish employees in Saudi
Arabia, although they were free to work on the program from
the Division Rear office in Virginia. When USACE ignored the
boycott, it did so surreptitiously to avoid incensing the
Saudis. In the long run, the Arab League boycott had
virtually no effect on the quality of services provided by
USACE although it caused a small black eye to the Corps'
public image in the United States.
The final and most pressing political consideration for
USACE during construction of KKMC involved its attempts to
provide work for US architect/engineers, suppliers and
construction contractors. Although USACE had a mandate from
Saudi Arabia to ensure the project was open to competitive
international bidding, the Corps also felt an obligation to
secure work there for American companies. The difficulty in
meeting both requirements was that, by the mid-1970s, US
contractors were less competitive on the international market
due to high labor costs. To compound the difficulty, US
personal income tax reform legislation in 1976 removed the
tax exemption American overseas workers had enjoyed for
years. As a result, US firms working in Saudi Arabia had to
increase compensation packages by an average of $4000 to
$10,000 per employee to offset income lost to the new tax.113
Interestingly, the tax reform had no direct effect on
USACE's competitiveness because military personnel and civil
service employees had never been authorized a tax exemption
for working overseas. It did, however, impact the Corps'
attempts to provide work for American contractors.
In comments made just prior to his retirement as the
Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General John W. Morris said
about the Corps, "Our job [abroad] is to make a place for US
designers and constructors."/l Early in the EAA program, US
firms did capture a significant number of contracts. By the
middle of 1976, USACE had awarded 43% of its $1.5 billion in
contracts to US companies. Still, critics of government
involvement charged (rightfully) that even when US firms won
construction contracts, most of the labor wages went to
foreign workmen. "If the aim is to bring petro-dollars back
to the US, then the whole deal is overrated," one House
member said.•15
After tax reform, US firms fared poorly. American
companies won only 5 of 39 construction contracts at KKMC
(all awarded after 1976) for approximately $1.5 billion, only
25% of the city's construction cost. All but $400 million of
this total went to the Morrison-Knudsen led consortium which
received the life/construction support contract on a
negotiated basis.•16 There turned out to be some truth in a
congressional critic's prediction that USACE would evolve
into an "employment agency" for foreign contractors./17
American architect/engineers and supplierv fared much
better than construction contractors, though. Virtually all
design work went to US firms and many of the sophisticated
mechanical, electrical, communications systems and finish
products came from American manufacturers. MED's decision to
maintain its design and procurement headquarters in the
United States enhanced the competitive advantage of American
companies in these areas. All factors considered, USACE
probably did as well as could be expected in providing
opportunities to US firms during construction of KKMC.
3.2 PROJECT SIZE AND SCOPE
Lieutenant Ge eral E.R. Heiberg concisely summarized the
scope of the KKMC undertaking in his speech to the American
Society for Macro-Engineering when he said:
"The challenge was to take the remote desert of Wadi Al
Batin with no infrastructure, forty miles from the
nearest highway, extreme congestion at the nearest port
over 100 miles distant, no local labor force, no
available construction materials (except aggregate) with
wide price fluctuations and annual price escalations at
20-25%...to take this environment and create the King
Khalid Military City for a population of [50,000]."/18
KKMC is a self-contained city, completely independent of
the surrounding area. It is octagonally shaped and 2.7
kilometers across. It generates its own electrical power,
has its own water supply and chilled water system and
completely treats and recycles its wastewater for irrigation.
KKMC has its own road network, houses and provides all
support facilities for the city's 6500 families and has its
own hospital, mosque and education system. The current city
has complete military support and training facilities for two
armored brigades, with the capability to expand to accomodate
a third. The troop facilities include a command center,
engineer school, maintenance shops, ammunition and petroleum
storage areas, ranges and a medium-sized airfield.
The octagonally-shaped city is divided into north and
south sections. Family housing dominates the north section,
while housing for single men and military facilities dominate
the south. KKMC was assembled from precast concrete
elements. Most of the city's buildings are arranged in low-
rise clusters to provide natural protection from the harsh
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environment./19 The design, by Brown, Daltas and
Associates/Sippican Consultants International (JV), combined
features of traditional Islamic architecture with modern
technology to produce a functional community which is less
opulent than much of the contemporary work done throughout
the Kingdom.
Some statistics give the engineer a better feel for the
magnitude of the city:
- 2.5 million square meters of buildings (27 million
square feet).
- 18 wells, each 1600 meters (approximately 1 mile) deep
to provide 21 million gallon of water per day, with a
peak demand of 30 mgpd.
- A water treatment plant designed to treat 18
mgpd.
- A chilled water plant rated at 52,000 tons.
- A sewage treatment plant designed to treat 7 mgpd.
- A 200 mega-watt power plant with 8 gas-turbine
generators.
- The entire city, including training ranges, was built
on a mere 70,000 acres of land./20
The effort required to bring the forces to bear in
creating this city was, of itself, a major undertaking. The
dedication of KKMC on February 1, 1978 also represented the
initiation of serious construction on life support and
construction support facilities. The first task for MKSAC
(USACE's support contractor) was to construct a camp to feed
and house up to 15,000 workers. It also constructed
warehouses, vehicle and equipment shops and administrative
offices for construction contractors. Simultaneously, MKSAC
began stockpiling material and equipment to be provided
contractors by the government.
Tasks that MKSAC had already completed by Dedication Day
included lengthening an existing airfield for contractors,
paving 6 kilometers of road to the site and constructing
several VIP villas.
MKSAC completed camps for 1200, 1500 and 5000 workers,
as well as villas and trailers for USACE and MKSAC senior
employees by mid-1979. It also provided temporary utilities
to the worker community until permanent KKMC utilities (some
also provided by the support contractor) became available.
Early construction support activities concentrated on
supplying adequate concrete and aggregate for construction
needs and on developing warehouse space for material and
equipment provided as GFP. MKSAC eventually built two
concrete batch plants and an asphalt concrete plant,
developed a quarry 20 kilometers from the site, erected 12
materials warehouses and provided computer and data
processing centers. The largest operation provided by MKSAC
was for precast concrete. The support contractor built and
operated four precast plants, three for producing building
elements and one for paving tiles.2! These statistics
highlight the construction effort.
- Construction of a 4 berth port about 250 miles from
the construction site and dedicated to support the
massive construction effort.
- Used more than 500,000 precast elements and 10
million walkway pavers.
- Engineering and design costs exceeding $135 million,
yet less than 2% of total project costs of more than
$6 billion.
- A $1 billion contract for life and construction
support including the world's largest pre-cast
concrete plant (at that time), an asphalt plant,
quarry, bulk concrete production and housing, food
and medical services for all construction workers.
- 12 separate construction contracts exceeding $100
million, with the largest single contract at $330
million.
- A work force exceeding 15,000 people at its peak.
- A program requiring 12 years to complete (1975 -
1987); major construction was completed in 6 years
(1979-1985) ./22
The figures on the following pages consist of a KKMC
area map (Figure 3.2), a KKMC site plan concentrating on life
support and construction support areas (Figure 3.3) and a
more detailed site plan breaking the city into areas which
were packaged into separate construction contracts (Figure
3.4).
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3.3 PROJECT PLANNING
USACE had performed many mega-projects in its history
but most were civil works. KKMC loomed as the largest single
military construction project in its history. It was the
first time that USACE had attempted to build an entire
military city from scratch. Clearly, the effort required an
unprecedented planning effort. This section examines USACE's
planning of the KKMC project and determines its
effectiveness.
3.3.1 PLANNING OBJECTIVES
The Engineer Studies Center at USACE headquarters
prepared "A Plan for Project Planning" for MED in April 1978.
Its purpose was to provide the Saudi Program Manager with a
way to approach planning of individual projects. Since USACE
produced the guidance document two years after MED began
detailed planning for KKMC, it had limited impact on the
project. However, it provides a basis for evaluating MED's
planning efforts on KKMC.
"A Plan for Project Planning" identified the following
objectives of a formal project planning strategy:
1. Streamline project administrative and support
activities to facilitate technical execution of the
project.
2. Minimize unproductive time in the project definition
stage.
3. Provide a "contingency" capability during the
project execution stage.L26
MED concentrated on planning activities during three distinct
project planning phases: (1) Project Preplanning or
Programming Phase; (2) Master Planning Phase; and (3) Project
Execution Phase. By 1978, MED was in the third of its
project planning stages for KKMC. The remainder of this
section focuses on whether MED met its objectives during
these planning phases.
3.3.2 KEY PLANNING ISSUES
MED faced several key issues during each of the
project's planning phases. I'll identify what the critical
issues were and evaluate the Division's plan to address them
in this portion of the study.
3.3.2.1 ISSUES DURING THE PROGRAM PLANNING PHASE
The primary issues MED faced during the earliest
planning phase were general and of a macro nature but they
carried consequences that affected every detailed project
activity that followed. The issues were:
1. Who would perform the project planning in MED?
2. Who would produce the conceptual design?
3. What were owner requirements for the project?
The MED Commander followed established USACE guidelines
and directed that project planning be done centrally at the
Division Rear in Virginia. The Chief, Engineering Division
was responsible for project planning and he formed a team
from the rear office. He retained project planning authority
during the construction program and his office provided
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continuity throughout the planning phases. The Office of the
Chief of Engineers (OCE) also had a big part in making some
of the early key decisions but it eventually pulled out of
project planning. The eventual Project Manager for KKMC
hadn't been selected and no representatives of the MED staff
who were already located in Saudi Arabia took part in the
planning. The Engineering Division did an exceptional job
getting the macro planning initiated.
One of the successes of the KKMC project was the
excellent work of its design contractors. MED recognized the
need to hire a skilled A/E firm immediately to perform
location and requirements studies. It hired Brown, Daltas
and Associates to perform the necessary program studies and
the firm performed excellent work.
The final issue faced by the project planners in this
phase was to ascertain owner requirements for the project.
This turned out to be one of the weakest aspects of the
entire effort. The blame lies partially with MED for not
seeking detailed owner involvement and with MODA (the owner)
for being unsure of what it wanted. It appears that MED
never cultivated a close owner - manager planning
relationship. The planners were oriented to making decisions
that would give the design process momentum. MODA was an
impediment to the process. It was easy for the planners to
develop this attitude because of their great geographical
separation from MODA's project managers in Saudi Arabia.
There were few Saudi representatives in Virginia. As a
result, the planners lacked an understanding of the project's
cultural considerations and under-designed the city for its
Saudi culture./27 For example, the oversight caused a
sizeable delay in awarding the family housing contracts.
MODA rejected the initial design after it had been completed
because it felt the individual units were too small for Saudi
families./28 The costly delay for redesign could have been
avoided if there had been a more detailed owner - manager -
designer review in the conceptual stage.
3.3.2.2 ISSUES DURING THE MASTER PLANNING PHASE
During the master planning phase, project planners made
critical decisions about what to design and how to organize
and build it. Although they didn't begin detailed designs at
this point, the planners made a number of decisions with
organizational, constructability and project control
implications. Here are some of the more important ones:
- MED would procure and furnish a large amount of
equipment, material and services to construction
contractors.
- The Division would construct a port facility designed
to support only military construction projects in
Saudi Arabia.
- A/E firms would be required to produce state-of-the-
art designs for military facilities.
- Construction would be performed to US standards.
- Construction design and contract award planning would
be based on a 5 year construction schedule.
- MED would produce a precast concrete city and achieve
economies of scale in all utility design.
- Construction contracts would be firm fixed price and
100
limited to 3 years at $100 - $200 million apiece to
improve international competition.
By and large, the project planners developed a workable
master plan. However, it exhibited significant construction
inefficiencies and other drawbacks when put into motion. For
example, the plan to use American material standards and
measurements caused construction contractors difficulty
later. They had trouble cross-referencing American standards
to materials from European and Asian suppliers. MED could
have avoided the submittal review delays and materials
rejections that resulted from its policy if it had developed
a cross-reference guide for its construction managers.
Another case involved the precast concrete elements
designed for the city. MED hoped to reduce costs while
maintaining high construction quality by assembling the city
from precast elements produced by the construction support
contractor. However, MED lost much of the potential economy
of scale that precast offered because it failed to
standardize panel designs. The design called for more than
5000 different types of elements with over 3000 variations
(for penetrations, utilities, etc.) out of the half-million
pieces required for KKMC. Construction managers claimed that
the city could have been built with 300 to 400 different
elements if the design had been properly coordinated./29
The final example of constructability problems stemming
from the master plan involved coordinating utility tie-ins
between adjacent contractors. The Al Batin District Engineer
used the water supply system as an example of the
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coordination problems encountered during the peak
construction period:
"...most of the water system can be run through either
of two different pipes to get to a specific location,
and sometimes more than two...we had some 17 fixed price
contractors that had put in portions of the water
system, and those get connected together at some 57
locations...it's a difficult enough task to make sure
that you have caps on the end of the pipes and valves at
the proper locations so that if one contractor can
finish his work before the next contractor [he can]
hook on to those pipes and carry on with his work."130
It's clear from this example that the planners put more
effort into system design than contract interfacing, which is
a constructability issue.
The preceding illustrations highlight a serious flaw in
the master planning which carried over into the project
execution phase. Al Batin District's Chief, Construction
Division summed it up. "I think there was nothing wrong with
the design being done back in the rear. What the real
problem was -- there wasn't cohesive construction planning
along with it."/31 Construction planning wasn't performed
because no representatives from the construction functions
were on the planning staff to provide a builder's
perspective. The Engineer Studies Center recognized the need
for construction planning in this phase and recommended
placing members from field offices on project planning teams
beginning in the master planning phase. However, this didn't
happen during the KKMC project and construction managers paid
the price.
3.3.2.3 ISSUES DURING THE PROJECT EXECUTION PHASE
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The consequences of the issues I discussed in the
previous two sections carried over into the project execution
phase to cause difficulties for the construction managers. In
addition, a new planning oversight during the third phase
impaired contract award and sequencing. The oversight was a
lack of contingency planning. The study performed by OCE for
the Middle East Division indicated that contingency planning
is a key ingredient of the project execution phase. It
recommended that the Division develop construction plans to
address three levels of project execution: accelerated,
optimal and protracted. By doing this, MED would have made
plans for the most likely MODA funding alternatives.
Initially, though, MED made only one plan for project
execution. It was based on the MODA budget for a 6-year
construction schedule, from the end of 1976 through the end
of 1982./32 Project planners agreed that this was the
fastest they could expect to complete KKMC. However, by 1978
it was obvious that the project wouldn't be completed that
quickly. The primary reason for the slowdown was that MODA
reduced the level of project funding. MED was unprepared for
the cuts.
The Al Batin District Engineer then directed his staff
to prepare construction plans for 8 and 10 year programs. He
produced these plans at Al Batin in concert with his MODA
liaisons. The District Engineer's major concern was to
ensure that he sequenced contract awards and construction
correctly. These factors varied considerably with different
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construction program lengths.L33 Ultimately, MED completed
the KKMC project using the 10-year plan but it didn't realize
all of the plan's potential cost savings because it was
initiated late.
3.3.3 CONTRACTOR RISK REDUCTION
The objective for much of MED's KKMC planning wE ; to
reduce the risks that its firm fixed price construction
contractors would face when bidding the project. The
planners felt they could lower project costs by reducing
contractor risk. Contractors facing less risk would
theoretically place lower contingency costs in their
proposals, thus reducing the price of the lowest bidder. The
planners maintained they could simultaneously increase
competition by lowering risk. Smaller, but otherwise
qualified contractors who couldn't secure bonding against
high contingencies would be able to bid if the risks were
lowered. For these reasons, MED aimed much of its project
planning at reducing risk for firm fixed price contractors.
I'll discuss whether MED accomplished this objective in the
following sections.
3.3.3.1 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS
The cornerstone of MED's risk reduction program was its
Government Furnished Equipment, Materials and Services
program (hereafter called GFE). The plan included MED's
negotiated life/construction support contract with Morrison
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Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium (MKSAC), a dedicated port at
Ras Al Mish'ab and an extensive GFE procurement program.
MKSAC, which provided the Services portion of the plan
deserves separate treatment. I'll discuss it in the next
section. This section concentrates on port services and
GFE.
From its earliest project planning, Middle East Division
worried about delays in unloading equipment and materials at
existing Saudi ports. Dammam, the closest port to Al Batin,
had dozens of cargo ships mired offshore collecting huge
demurrage charges in 1976. Since the Kingdom was just
launching an ambitious 5-year development program, there was
no relief in site. Fixed price contractors became
increasingly reluctant to bid on projects or placed huge
contingencies in their bids to offset the risks of losing
schedule control from port delays. Therefore, MED planned
and built a 4-berth port north of Dammam at Ras Al Mish'ab.
It would handle only material and equipment for MODA
projects, primarily for KKMC. MED finished the first phase
of the project and had a functional port by July 1977. For
the next several years, the Engineer Logistics Command (ELC)
operated the port and tracked GFE that arrived there. Even
though the project had a dedicated port, it was still 250
miles from the construction site and connected by a tenuous
supply route. However, MED performed some road improvements
and continuously monitored its condition during the project.
The port worked effectively and international contractors
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displayed confidence in it. This was reflected in many bids
below Gcvernment Estimýaes z early contracts.
MED was less successful in planning its GFE program.
When the Engineer Studies Center performed a lessons learned
survey on the Saudi Arabian Program, its GFE planning and
execution received the lowest rating of any aspect of MED
work. 34 Most of MED's problems with GFE can be traced to
poor planning. Some of the major ones follow:
- No central control of GFE.
- Coordination lacking among engineering, construction
and procurement.
- ELC got responsibility for GFE too late.
- ELC staff was too small with too few expert
logisticians.
- Tracking system never effectively worked./35
Project planners failed to define a GFE Program Manager and
segmented its functions among several offices./36 They
established no direct chain of responsibility and authority.
As a result, Procurement and Supply Division in the Virginia
Office, Huntsville Division and MKSAC (through its support
contract) ordered GFE. MKSAC and ELC tracked and received
the material and equipment in Saudi Arabia. There was no
common tracking system or directed coordination between the
organizations. Material often arrived too early or too late,
some of it didn't meet specifications and packing lists were
inaccurate.•37
Although MED's problems with GFE didn't have a major
impact on contractor bids, they caused claims, disputes and
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delays after contract award. MODA lost confidence in MED's
ability to manage the GFE program. It pressured the Division
to change its procedures and, in 1980, MED assigned
responsibility for the entire GFE program to ELC. By then,
it was too late to recover the benefits envisioned during
program planning. MED reduced GFE's scope and required
contractors to procure more of their own materials and
equipment.
3.3.3.2 LIFE/CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT
The cost plus award fee (CPAF) negotiated contract with
MKSAC deserves special treatment because it was the
centerpiece of MED's Government Furnished Equipment,
Materials and Services Program. Planning for the entire
project hinged upon MODA's acceptance of a CPAF contractor to
provide life and construction support services to the firm
fixed price builders. I'll discuss MED's management of the
CPAF contract in Section 3.5 of the thesis. Here, I'll
concentrate on the planning behind the life/construction
support concept and evaluate its effectiveness.
Without question, MED made a risky decision when it
planned to negotiate a $1 billion contract with a consortium
for life/construction support of the entire KKMC project.
The consortium's performance would be pivotal to the
project's completion in its planned 6 year period.
Therefore, the planners emphasized that the consortium be
headed by a large, respected international construction firm
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with a solid track record in mega-projects. It eventually
settled on Morrison Knudsen and its partners Fischbach and
Moore (Dallas) and Interbeton Construction N.V. of Curacao (a
precast concrete specialist). The contract with MKSAC had
the following scope of work:
Design & Construction of Construction Support Facilities
- Rough grading, underground utility lines, perimeter
and construction roads in designated areas of the
project.
- Design, procure and erect precast concrete plants.
- Construct concrete and asphalt batch plants.
- Construct and operate aggregate quarries.
- Transport GFE from the port to KKMC.
Contractor Support Services
- Operate electrical generation plants and distribution
systems, sewerage, air conditioning and refrigeration
systems.
- Provide rental vehicles and construction equipment to
support contractor mobilization.
- Receive and store all GFE.
Life Support
- Provide, maintain and administer contractor housing
for 20,000 workers.
- Construct contractor support buildings, such as
warehouses, storage areas, offices, maintenance and
POL facilities.
- Provide medical and dental services.
- Operate and maintain food service for contractors.
- Provide postal, messenger, recreation, laundry,
reproduction, security, communications and banking.
Management Assistance
- Participate in design review.
- Coordinate life/construction support services.
- Project construction equipment needs for all
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construction.
- Provide personnel to augment the MED construction
management staff./38
MED's planning for the life/construction support contract was
detailed and effective. The Division built its construction
plan aro!nd MKSAC. MED integrated the support contract into
all aspects of design and construction planning. The
planning for MKSAC's life/construction support contract was
good. The concept should have worked, but it didn't. MED's
experience with the CPAF contract was a disaster. Although
it completed the original 3-year contract, MKSAC lost its bid
to extend for another three years. MED essentially fired
MKSAC in 1980. The problem with the MKSAC contract was not
in planning but in contract administration and control. I'll
examine the control weaknesses in detail in Section 3.5.
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3.4 PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
USACE's project organization and staffing metamorphosed
during the 12 year duration of the KKMC project. Though
carefully planned initially, the actual organization and
staffing differed significantly from the plan. This was a
result of unforeseen recruiting and construction
difficulties, as well as changing requirements from the
owner. In this section, I examine USACE's organization and
staffing throughout the project and determine the
effectiveness of its selections.
3.4.1 ORGANIZATION TYPES
Within the USACE organization, Division Offices are the
equivalent of divisions or separate operating companies in
private engineering and construction firms (see Figure 2.1
for USACE Divisions). The rapid growth of the entire Saudi
Arabian program, of which KKMC was a part, caused USACE to
create a new Division Office in 1976. The US Army Engineer
Division, Middle East (MED) was responsible to the Chief of
Engineers to perform all construction projects in the Middle
East, except for those in Israel. Most of the projects were
in Saudi Arabia, but there was also work in Jordan, Oman and
Egypt.
The analysis of organizations in this section will
concentrate on MED's organization and those of the Engineer
Logistics Command and District Office at Al Batin.
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3.4.1.1 ORGANIZATION DURING PLANNING (1976 - 1977)
During the planning stage, MED established an
organizational precedent which remained in effect until the
Division was dissolved in 1986. Its most important
objectives were to develop an organization which could
simultaneously: (1) Manage design by American engineering
companies; (2) Manage massive construction by foreign firms;
(3) Manage procurement and supply of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE); and (4) Accomplish the first three
objectives at the lowest possible cost. During the planning
stage, MED consolidated its organization in the United
States. Initially, the Chief of Engineer's office was
heavily involved. It provided the impetus to negotiate a
CPAF life/construction support contract and supplied the lead
negotiator from its Military Programs Directorate. There was
almost no permanent party in Saudi Arabia dedicated to KKMC
until 1977. The only in-country contingents were an Area
Office located in Riyadh under the Saudi Arabian District and
a few people at Al Batin supervising well and airfield
construction. Figure 3.5 shows a simplified MED organization
as it planned for construction of KKMC after award of the
CPAF contract.
During this period the organization was a matrix form
with strong functional control. The Saudi Arabian District
established the KKMC Area Office. The Area Engineer served
as Project Manager. The Area Office was located in Riyadh,
but it maintained a Project Office at the Division Rear's in
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FIGURE 3.5 KKMC PROJECT ORGANIZATION DURING PLANNING
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Virginia. The MED's Engineering Branch in the Virginia
office and its Construction Branch in Riyadh performed most
of the planning and coordination for KKMC. Although the
Project Manager (Area Engineer) had a dedicated liaison in
each of the Division's functional offices, the functional
chiefs controlled their staff's work output and prioriti.s.
At this early point in project design and planning, the
matrix organization with functional area control was
appropriate. Although it had other work in the Kingdom, KKMC
was clearly the top priority for MED. All fi. :nctional areas
within the Division were oriented to planning the KKMC
project. The Project Manager didn't have to compete with
other projects to marshall support for his own. Therefore,
he didn't need full control of the project planning elements.
The research material from extensive interviews indicates
general agreement that this was an effective organization for
the project planning stage. However, some key individuals
question whether the physical location of some of the
Division's elements during this time was appropriate.
Section 3.4.3 addresses this issue.
3.4.1.2 ORGANIZATION DURING MOBILIZATION (1977 - 1979)
MED made major organizational changes from late 1977
through early 1978 to supervise Morrison Knudsen Saudi Arabia
Consortium's (MKSAC) on-site mobilization as the
life/construction support contractor. MED established an
organizational objective of strengthening the authority of
its project manager without completely dismantling its matrix
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organization and functional control.
The major organizational changes made during the
mobilization phase of the project were:
1. Replacement of the Area Office for KKMC with a
dedicated District Office.
2. Establishment of 2 new area offices: one to
administer the life/construction support contract
and one for the fixed price contracts.
3. Incorporation of "Management Assistance" personnel
provided by MKSAC under CPAF contract into USACE
offices.
Middle East Division split the Saudi Arabian District into
two elements creating Al Batin District, which was dedicated
to the KKMC project. The other, named Riyadh District,
handled all other construction projects in the Kingdom. The
split also entailed staffing up both districts so that they'd
be self supporting.
The creation of Al Batin District accomplished the
reorganization's primary objective. It established the
District Engineer as the KKMC project manager and
strengthened the project manager's authority within the
matrix organization. The District Engineer (DE) had more
personnel and functions under his direct control than the
Area Engineer who preceded him. Most important was MED's
transfer of construction functions to the project site under
the DE. Al Batin District began moving its operation from
Riyadh to KKMC as temporary housing (provided by MKSAC)
became available. The entire process took most of 1978 to
complete.
Another reason for the DE's appointment as Project
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Manager was that MED felt the reaction of the division's
engineering and procurement functions to suggestions from the
field was too slow./40 Although the DE had no direct
authority over the Division's functional chiefs, he had
greater stature in the organization than an Area Engineer.
His military rank (Colonel) placed him second only to the
Division Engineer in the organization. The District Engineer
worked directly for the Division Engineer with no
intermediate supervisor. Also, the title "District Engineer"
carried weight in the organization because USACE's culture
places great value on its autonomous operating districts.
Thus, MED increased the project manager's influence on its
functional chiefs by increasing his status within the
organization. In addition, MED increased the project
manager's inherent capabilities by placing a competent
functional organization under his direct control.
Although the structure was ultimately successful, there
wasn't unanimous agreement within MED that forming a district
at KKMC was a good organizational move. One senior manager
in MED's Construction Division is convinced that MED should
have created an area office with a contracting officer at
KKMC. He noted that MED added a duplicate organizational
layer when it established the District.j41 He was not alone
in reaching this conclusion. A USACE "lessons learned" study
determined that there were "...too many different
organizations (division, district, MED Forward, MED Rear);
too many organizational layers; too much management."L42 The
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District virtually mirrored the Division's functions (with
the exception of Personnel Management) and placed additional
bureauracracy between the field offices and the engineering
function in Berryville, Virginia.
It's debatable whether a district or area office was
more appropriate for KKMC. Certainly, there were pros and
cons involving either choice. More significant is that MED
realized it needed to increase the project manager's
influence over the organization's functions when mobilization
began. MED strengthened its matrix by creating the Al Batin
District and established a base for organizational evolution
into the construction phase.
The second organizational change was to establish one
Area Office to administer the contract with MKSAC and one to'
administer all fixed price contracts. These offices had core
structures representing most of the functional elements
within the District. They had quality assurance, technical
review, and contract administration representatives in each
office. The Area Engineers were directly responsible to the
project manager (DE) for performance on the contracts.
This structure was typical of USACE districts having
geographically remote area offices. All work at KKMC was
within an 8 kilometer radius, however, so one could argue
that the area and district offices created unnecessary
duplicate functional layers. Still, there's no information
which indicates the duplications inhibited contract
management during this phase.
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The final major organizational change during the
mobilization phase was to incorporate 70 personnel provided
by MKSAC under its contract for "Management Assistance" into
MED's organization. The assistance personnel were necessary
because MED was restricted by manning level ceilings for
USACE employees. Since the Corps of Engineers is part of the
US Army, Congress limits the number of employees authorized
in its civil service workforce. The Corps couldn't provide
all of the management personnel needed for KKMC from within
the organization because it would cause USACE to exceed its
mandated employee ceiling. To compensate for this
limitation, MED contracted with MKSAC to provide management
assistance. The Management Assistance Group worked under the
direction of the Chief, Office Engineering, a section of the
District's Construction Division. The group primarily
performed support work managing fixed price contracts in 12
functional areas. It also did some planning and
scheduling./43 For the most part, the combination of
contractor and USACE personnel worked smoothly. From an
organizational standpoint, the arrangement was effective.
3.4.1.3 ORGANIZATION DURING CONSTRUCTION (1980-1984)
MED faced a significant reorganization as it entered the
heavy construction phase of the KKMC project, particularly in
the Al Batin District. During 1980, it established an
organization that remained essentially intact until 1984.
The following changes comprised the main part of the
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reorganization:
1. Attachment of an MED engineering support element to
the District at KKMC.
2. Consolidation of functional control of engineering
disciplines within the District under the
Construction Division.
3. Establishment of 6 resident offices to provide
quality assurance for construction contracts
under control of the Chief, Construction Division.
Why did MED decide to make major changes to its
engineering organization at this stage of the project? Early
in the construction phase at KKMC, it became apparent that
the separation of engineering (Virginia) and construction (Al
Batin, Riyadh) functions would make construction management
difficult. The District office had no engineering element
and the Division had only a small satellite section in
Riyadh. Thus, many engineering and constructability issues
had to follow this path to resolution: Field Office
(discovery) --> Al Batin District's Construction Division
(review) --> MED Forward's Engineering Planning and Liaison
Office (review) --> MED Rear's Engineering Division (review,
approval) --> Appropriate Architect/Engineer (solution).
Engineering solutions followed the same path in reverse. MED
Rear centralized decision-making authority in Virginia.
One District Engineer noted that it became tempting for
his personnel to solve design problems despite their lack of
an integral engineering element. The prevailing attitude was
"...let's devise a fix and go on with it. And just don't get
Engineering Division involved because they take too long."144
Of course, this attitude was often counterproductive because
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some of the decisions made in the District unwittingly ran
against the design intent. Engineering Division countered
with equal mistrust when it learned of district-level
mistakes, fueling a debilitating we-they relationship./45
The District Engineer pressed the Division to provide an
engineering functional element at Al Batin District. He
wanted the authority and architect/engineer support at KKMC
to make minor design decisions that would be speedy and
informed. The DE had only limited success lobbying for
engineering representation at KKMC. MED supplied a design
group to the District called the AL Batin Engineering
Technical Branch. However, it was assigned to MED. This
meant that it was only a coordinating element for the
District. The project manager (DE) lacked direct control of
its efforts. In addition, the Engineering Technical Branch
couldn't go directly to A/E firms for problem resolution.
First it had to go through the engineering project manager in
Virginia. Therefore, although the addition of this branch
relieved some of the engineering interface problem, it still
fell far short of what the District needed.A46
Until late 1979, Al Batin District's Construction
Division was a skeleton organization. The DE made a critical
organizational decision as dozens of construction contractors
mobilized to begin work. He set three objectives for the
reorganization:
1. Avoid layers and duplication of effort.
2. Organize the District on a functional basis.
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3. Facilitate development of control systems to be used
throughout construction.L47
The Construction Division was the key element in the
reorganization. The Chief, Construction Division convinced
the DE to centralize control of all construction functions in
the Construction Division. The DE delegated responsibility
for all construction to the Chief and he organized the
section accordingly. Note the Al Batin District's
organization during the construction phase shown in Figure
3.6. Construction Division dominates the organization chart
with its 5 branches and 6 resident offices. The resident
offices replaced the 2 area offices which had existed during
the mobilization phase. The Chief, Construction Division
stripped the resident offices down so they consisted only of
project engineers, construction inspectors and a few clerks
or secretaries. He designed the branches to be centralized
service groups for the resident offices, but under his
functional control.L48
This organization eliminated the duplication of
functions which existed under the previous area office
concept. It also created a matrix organization having strong
functional control within the District. Previously, the area
engineers, who were project managers in a micro sense, had
greater control of the functions. The newly appointed
resident engineers now controlled only their inspection
staff. They had to coordinate with the Chief, Construction
Division for use of his functional assets. However, even
though the resident engineers had less control of support
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functions than their predecessors did, the functional chief
had a direct responsibility to support them. This occurred
because the Chief, Construction Division was also the
resident engineers' first line supervisor. In the old
organization, the area engineers worked directly for the DE.
After the reorganization, the resident engineers worked for
the Chief, Construction Division.
It's clear that Chief, Construction Division became the
most powerful position in the District after its
reorganization. The DE retained his previous level of
control within MED. He remained the KKMC project manager and
had a strong subordinate organization but division chiefs at
MED still controlled his high-level functional support.
With the exception of a lack of engineering review
support at KKMC (a problem that plagued the project manager
for the remainder of construction), MED's organization for
the project appears to have been appropriate and effective.
3.4.1.4 ORGANIZATION DURING DEMOBILIZATION (1985-1988)
USACE completed its major KKMC construction packages by
the end of 1985. As construction wound down, MED planned an
organizational phase down with the following objectives:
1. Manage the remaining construction at KKMC with an
appropriate organization to respond to customer
needs.
2. Consolidate functions to hold down costs and provide
centralized direction.
The Al Batin District remained operational until its
deactivation in 1985. The Division headquarters moved from
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Riyadh to Winchester, Virginia the same year. An Area Office
remained at KKMC for another year under the control of Riyadh
District. Finally, in 1986 Riyadh District deactivated and
MED reorganized into the Middle East/Africa Projects Office
(MEAPO) at Winchester. At this point a single area office in
Riyadh closed out the remaining work at KKMC, as well as all
other programs in the Kingdom. The closeout organization is
shown in Figure 3.7.
To summarize the changes made in little more than a
year, USACE reorganized a Division with forward and rear
offices and two operating districts into a single stateside
district-level projects office with one area office in Saudi
Arabia./50 USACE completed contract closeout and turnover of
facilities to MODA with this organization. It settled the
final contract claims and disputes in 1988.
It appears that MED accomplished both of its
reorganization objectives. Since it maintained a fully
functioning district in Riyadh until 1986, MED had the in-
country organization required to respond to all of KKMC's
engineering, construction and administration issues. MED
eliminated two organizational layers (Al Batin District and
MED Forward) and consolidated its functions in the district
office at Riyadh and the Division's at Winchester.
Ultimately, USACE removed another organizational layer in
1986, when it reorganized into MEAPO and deactivated the
Riyadh District.
The reorganization also centralized control in
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FIGURE 3.7 MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA PROJECT OFFICE ORGANIZATIONL1
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Winchester. The Area Engineer in Riyadh became the KKMC
Project Manager but had virtually no functional control. He
had only inspection and limited contracting capability in
Saudi Arabia. MEAPO maintained all functional areas in
Virginia and the Saudi Arabia Area Engineer (project manager)
had no authority over them. In fact, the area office fell
under control of MEAPO's Construction Division. Thus, the
Area Engineer depended on the Chief, Construction Division to
coordinate with the other functional areas at MEAPO for
support. (Note: This organization is similar to the one
discussed in 3.4.1.3 that was instituted by the Al Batin
District for its resident offices.)
It was appropriate to centralize control in Virginia at
this point in the project. It massed the organization's
capabilities in one location, reducing costs while allowing
MEAPO to maintain its capabilities. Work placement at Al
Batin was minimal at this point and no longer justified the
stationing of construction managers there. Indeed, the only
criticisms of the centralization were that it happened too
late. Many USACE employees surveyed in 1984 believed that
USACE only required an operating division with area offices
to complete the project./52 This would have entailed
centralizing functions at the Division Office in Riyadh and
dismantling the Riyadh and Al Batin districts a year earlier
(2 years for Riyadh District). Although this option would
have been appropriate from an organizational standpoint, it
wasn't realistic from a personnel administration point of
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view. I'll discuss this further in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.2 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
The Corps of Engineers has developed an organizational
culture which values centralized planning and decentralized
project execution. This concept stems from USACE's military
roots, where centralized planning and decentralized execution
have long been battlefield imperatives. Historically, USACE
district and area engineers have been given extensive
responsibilities and authority to carry out projects in
remote areas. It seems that the KKMC project fits this mold
perfectly. However, a project study reveals some differences
in the authority structure for KKMC when compared to standard
USACE practice. In some cases KKMC project personnel had
more authority than usual. In others, they lacked authority
needed to discharge their responsibilities. The Project
Manager shared authority with other commanders and functional
staff chiefs because of the unique nature of the mega-
project. This portion of the case study examines why this
occurred and whether it was appropriate for the mega-project.
It appears that USACE planned a different approach to
its responsibility/authority structure from the KKMC
project's conceptual stage. As MED established its
organization for project planning, it didn't concentrate
responsibility and authority in a single location. The
following is a summary of the different pockets of authority
in the USACE organization during project planning and
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execution:
- Director of Military Works, Office of the Chief of
Engineers (OCE). Responsible for negotiating and
awarding the CPAF contract. OCE involvement required
by statute due to contract size exceeding $1 billion.
- Division Commander, MED. Contracting Officer for
contracts and modifications exceeding $2 million.
- Deputy Division Commander (Rear), MED. Contracting
Officer (CO) with equivalent authority to the
Division Commander. CO for A/E contracts and early
FFP construction contracts.
- Procurement Contracting Officer, Huntsville Division.
Responsible for GFE supply contracts.
- District Engineer, Saudi Arabian District (later
District Engineer, Al Batin District). In-country
contracting officer. Authority up to $2 million.
- Deputy District Engineer, Saudi Arabian District.
Administrative contracting Officer. Same authority
as DE, but for off-shore procurement by MKSAC.
- Resident Contracting Officer in Columbia, MD to
approve MKSAC procurement.
- Engineer Logistics Command. Responsible for life
support procurement and port operations at Ras al
Mish'ab. Later, responsible for GFE program.
- Al Batin Area Engineer. Resident Contracting Officer
with $100,000 modification authority. Later,
Resident Offices at Al Batin had this authority.
- Chief, Engineering Division, MED (Rear).
Responsible for coordinating design contracting and
estimating. Essentially, project driver in early
years.
Several issues become apparent when examining this list.
First, many different USACE offices had responsibilities and
authority early in the project. This raises questions about
the division of authority and coordination between
organizational groups. During the mobilization phase it
appears that the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE)
exercised considerable authority in dealing with the
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life/construction support contractor. There's no question
that OCE had the authority to be involved as it saw fit.
However, it was unusual for OCE to exercise this right on a
single contract. OCE's involvement runs counter to the USACE
philosophy of decentralized execution.
The Al Batin District Engineer felt that OCE encroached
on his authority as the Contracting Officer for the MKSAC
contract. OCE second-guessed several decisions the DE made
to get MKSAC moving on the job. MKSAC had a direct line of
communication with OCE from its Columbia, MD office and used
it when the consortium disagreed with the DE's directives.
OCE often pressured the DE to "cooperate" with MKSAC. During
August 1978, OCE representatives visited Al Batin and
inquired about the DE's fitness to command.
Two aspects of this situation were disturbing. The
first was OCE's extremely close relationship to the
contractor. It's evident that the Chief of Engineers had a
personal stake in MKSAC's success because he'd been
influential in selecting both the contractor and the
controversial contract type (CPAF) used. He couldn't believe
that Morrison Knudsen's performance was less than outstanding
because of the company's exceptional work in Vietnam and on
other USACE projects. He seemed to have an attitude that
"MKSAC knows best" without knowing the circumstances.
The other disturbing aspect of this situation was that
OCE ignored its traditions of decentralized execution and
chain of command. Al Batin District was two command levels
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removed from OCE. The MED Division Engineer worked for the
Chief of Engineers but OCE ignored its division management
level and dealt directly with the district. Thus, OCE
usurped the authority of a district engineer without
consulting his commander. The MED Division Engineer finally
rectified the problem by expressing confidence in his
district engineer to OCE and requesting that the Chief's
Office stay out of the project's management./53 OCE
involvement in the contract was negligible thereafter and MED
restored decentralized project control.
Another question stemming from having several USACE
offices share responsibility and authority is whether the
authority was clearly divided and appropriately coordinated.
For the most part, MED successfully split responsibilities
and authority between its office in Riyadh, its office in
Virginia and its field office at Al Batin. However, MED ran
into problems when organizing for procuring government
furnished equipment. USACE enlisted the Huntsville Division
to assist MED in procurement because most government
furnished equipment came from the US and Huntsville had an
established procurement network. The relationship with
Huntsville Division posed a problem because MED had no
command authority over it. The Division failed to assign a
dedicated GFE program manager. In addition, the Engineer
Logistics Command initially had no involvement with GFE.
With no clear chain of responsibility and authority, the GFE
program foundered. The majority of USACE employees surveyed
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by the Engineer Studies Center maintained that MED's
procurement program would have been more successful if it had
formed its own logistics branch at the beginning of the
project (ELC didn't pick up the mission until 1979)..L54
The second major issue evident from the levels of
authority summarized above is that many USACE employees with
significant contracting authority were in different
locations. This raises a similar question to the first but
on a personal level. Were there clear divisions of
responsibility and authority between commanders and their
subordinates with contracting powers? Was there coordination
between individuals with authority on the same project?
MED did a good job breaking down specific
responsibilities and authority for its contracting officers.
Each contracting officer received written directions spelling
out the limits of his responsibility and authority. One
noteworthy difficulty, however, was an occasional mixing of
authority between the Al Batin District Engineer (the
Contracting Officer) and his deputy on the MKSAC contract.
The Deputy District Engineer had Administrative Contracting
Officer (ACO) authority for MKSAC. The assignment of a CO
and ACO on the same project was rare because it gave them
virtually the same authority at the same time. It was
necessary because a USACE representative had to approve all
major procurement requests by MKSAC. The contractor had
procurement offices in Saudi Arabia, the United States and
Holland. Since the Contracting Officer couldn't be in these
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locations at the same time, his deputy had to travel
constantly. He needed contracting officer authority to do
his job. The District Engineer and his deputy never
successfully delineated this authority, although they tried.
As a result, on several occasions they approved procurement
of similar items at different sites or failed to take action
on procurement requests, each thinking the other would do
it. /55 Although this inefficiency added to costs and
confusion, it wasn't a critical problem and it disappeared
with completion of the MKSAC contract in late 1980.
The third major management issue evident from the
summary of authority originated from MED's assignment of its
Engineering Division as the project's driving force. The
Chief, Engineering Division may have been the most important
individual in the KKMC project. He was the Program Manager
for all of MED's Saudi Arabian work and had considerable
responsibility for KKMC during construction design and award.
Once construction began, however, he had little designated
responsibility (other than for his functional staff) and he
didn't work for the Project Manager (the Al Batin District
Engineer). Yet he retained the authority to approve and
coordinate all requests for changes (even those for
constructability) from the field. In addition, Engineering
Division had no representatives in Saudi Arabia early in the
project and only a few later on. How did USACE reconcile the
obvious responsibility, coordination and authority
difficulties?
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In reality, the issue never was satisfactorily resolved.
The Engineer Studies Center concluded that the geographical
separation between Engineering and Construction Divisions
caused:
- Change order delays.
- Misunderstanding of issues faced at both locations.
- Communications difficulties and a lack of
responsiveness.
- A "we - they" situation between the rear and the
field locations.L56
This arrangement also left the KKMC Project Manager with full
responsibility for project completion but no authority over
the engineering function. On the positive side, centralizing
engineering authority in the rear resulted in administrative
cost savings, fully coordinated design changes and reduced
owner influence in determining suppliers and contractors.
MED attempted to relieve the negative effects by adding
an engineering.element to its Riyadh office (including its
Engineering Technical Branch at KKMC) in 1980. This improved
communications and coordination but did nothing to change the
authority and responsibility'structure. Engineering Division
retained centralized authority despite USACE's cultural norm
of decentralizing execution. As a result, engineering
response to construction developments remained slow
throughout the project.
To summarize the preceding section, USACE generally
followed its standards for centralizing planning and
decentralizing execution during the KKMC project. When it
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did stray from its normal responsibility/authority
structures, such as in centralizing the engineering function,
it had supporting rationale. However, it's not clear that
the advantages offered by departing from the norm outwei, 2d
the disadvantages they caused. I conclude from this study
that USACE proved its policy of centralized planning and
decentralized execution can be successfully applied to mega-
projects.
3.4.3 STAFF LOCATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS
In the preceding two sections, I briefly addressed the
issue of where to locate staffs working on KKMC for optimal
results from organizational and authority perspectives. Now
I'll examine the other considerations influencing location
choice and evaluate USACE's decisions.
MED made four key staff location decisions that affected
performance on the KKMC project. They're listed below:
- MED decided to locate its Engineering division at its
Rear office in Virginia.
- MED arranged with Huntsville Division to locate a
procurement group in the United States to control
Government Furnished Equipment for the early stages
of the project.
- MED located its Division Forward office in the same
building in Riyadh as one of its districts.
- MED decided to locate a complete district
organization at KKMC (Al Batin District) for the sole
purpose of building the city.
The overriding consideration in choosing the locations of
Engineering Division and the procurement group was cost. At
the time Saudi Arabia suffered from double digit inflation
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and a shortage of local labor and materials industries.
USACE feared that locating its entire staff in the Kingdom
would invite rapid cost escalations for its services. A
USACE project planner explained,
"The Corps' position was that, if you could do it
outside the country, even with some reduced efficiency,
you...would be better off doing that given what it would
cost in-country [versus] out-of-country."L5!
Although cost reduction was the predominant factor
behind the USACE decision to locate engineering and
procurement in the US, it wasn't the only one. Other
considerations included: the Saudis requested US designs; it
benefitted the US economy to procure American equipment and
supplies; and the distance was too great between CONUS and
Saudi Arabia to justify locating engineering and procurement
forward when they were dealing with US companies./58 In the
final analysis, it's not evident that locating these two
staff elements in the US accomplished its goal of cost
reduction. There's not enough statistical evidence to prove
that the absence of engineering and procurement on site led
to significantly increased direct project costs. However,
there's also little proof to an assertion that it reduced
management costs. MED exceeded its goal of an 8% Supervision
and Administration (S&A) rate during the life of the project
despite engineering and procurement's stateside stationing.
It also absorbed construction delay costs that were caused,
at least in part, by slow responses to necessary design
changes by CONUS-based engineers. I conclude from this
analysis that, as a minimum, a small engineering group with
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authority and representatives from A/E firms should have been
located on site from the beginning.
MED's decision to locate the Division Forward's office
and one district office (Riyadh District) in the same
building complex is questionable for the opposite reason. In
this case the Division created an unnecessary additional
functional layer, with its accompanying high cost. Critics
of the arrangement claim that the Saudi Arabian program could
have been completed in either of two ways: (1) With the
entire Division organization in the US and autonomous
districts in the Kingdom; or (2) With a single, operating
division in Saudi Arabia and a series of area offices. I
should point out that the Division's location wasn't
unreasonable during the prime construction years at KKMC
because the Al Batin District was 450 kilometers from Riyadh.
However, KKMC experienced a duplication of staff functions at
the beginning and end of the project when it was controlled
by the district in Riyadh. Since one of MED's goals was to
minimize S&A costs, it's difficult to justify a stationing
decision that created duplicate layers of costly engineers
and managers. It seems that either of the two alternative
stationing proposals would have been adequate for the project
while reducing confusion and costs.
The final stationing decision listed at the beginning of
this section, that of locating a district organization at
KKMC, was the most effective. It's unusual to dedicate an
entire Corps of Engineers district organization to complete a
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single project within a small geographic area. However,
USACE made an exception for KKMC because of the sheer
magnitude of the effort. The functional staff requirements
for this project far exceeded the capabilities of a resident
or area office. MED understood that the Project Manager
needed a large, responsive organization on site. Therefore,
MED staffed a district office at KKMC despite the high costs
involved. In this case, it appears that USACE received a
high return on its investment.
In conclusion, out of the dozens of stationing decisions
made by MED over the life of the KKMC project, four stand out
as risky and worthy of study. The locations that MED chose
contributed to the project's successful completion but they
came at a price. Although MED facilitated engineering,
design and procurement by locating those sections in the US,
it forfeited effective engineering-construction coordination
on site. In addition, there's no evidence that MED reduced
its S&A costs by keeping engineering and procurement in the
US. Conversely, it's evident that MED increased its costs by
collocating its Division (Forward) and Riyadh District
offices. It may also have reduced efficiency by creating
overlapping functional layers. Finally, MED's decision to
station a district office at KKMC during the construction
phase was critical to the project's success. It provided the
Project Manager the expertise (except engineering) and power
he needed to keep construction on schedule. Despite their
drawbacks, MED's stationing decisions were integral to the
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KKMC project's success.
3.4.4 PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND EFFECT ON STAFFING
During 1983, the peak work placement year for the entire
Saudi Arabian Program, MED's workforce topped 1300 employees.
Of this total, 362 were assigned to Al Batin District and at
least 150 more worked on the KKMC project in the Division
Forward and Rear Offices and in the ELC.159 The requirement
to build a large, highly qualified workforce to execute a
huge but finite program raises some questions. How did MED
attract the large number of government service employees
needed to manage this project? What were the human resource
policies MED employed to support the workforce? How did MED
handle the build up and draw down? Was its human resource
strategy successful? In this section, I'll answer the
questions raised by MED's manning requirements.
The first challenge faced by MED personnel managers was
to create incentives to attract qualified personnel. The
living conditions in Saudi Arabia were primitive early in the
project. To complicate matters, there was virtually nothing
on the ground at KKMC to attract employees. Therefore,
Personnel Division advertised KKMC based on a combination of
pay and adventure. It targeted the, "...hard core of people
in the Corps who would go anywhere that's interesting, where
there's a challenge. Those are the kind of people we brought
over in the early days."160
Good pay was the greatest attraction early in the
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project. The pay was based on standard US Government civil
service scales but MED improved it in several ways. First,
almost all employees received a promotion to go to Saudi
Arabia. Thereafter, they were encouraged to stay by the
promise of rapid promotions. Second, employees had an
additional incentive to increase income because there were no
limitations placed on the amount of overtime they could work.
USACE employees who were accustomed to strict limits on
overtime in CONUS districts saw the opportunity to double
take home pay by working in Saudi Arabia. Another pay
incentive was time-and-a-quarter rates for Sunday work even
though Sunday was part of the five day work week in Saudi
Arabia (Thursday/Friday is the weekend in the Moslem
Kingdom). Accompanied employees received a Post Differential
at 20% of salary (taxable). MED provided a Separate
Maintenance Allowance for the families of workers on
mandatory unaccompanied tours. All employees received a Cost
of Living Allowance based on location, salary and number of
dependents./61 These pay incentives enabled many USACE field
representatives (construction inspectors) to draw the maximum
pay authorized by law for grade scale employees.
The pay incentives were sufficient to attract the core
of experienced USACE employees needed to get the project off
the ground. However, MED had to develop a more attractive
package of incentives and life support to attract and keep a
workforce during its build up for peak construction.
By early 1979, Al Batin District had enough life support
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in place at KKMC to support its growing workforce.
recruited its engineering and management staff from the
United States. Since USACE lacked sufficient mobile human
resources to staff the KKMC organization fror- other
districts, the incentive package had to attract employees
from private firms and other government organizations.
Recruiting from foreign countries was minimal and usually for
low pay grades. MED developed the following benefits and
support activities in addition to pay incentives:
- Accompanied Tours. All employees at grade GS-8 or
higher were authorized accompanied tours at KKMC (GS-
12 and above in other parts of the Kingdom).
Accompanied tour length was 24 months, unaccompanied
12 months.
- Housing. Fully furnished villas, apartments and
trailers provided at no charge. Utilities were free.
- Transportation. Male employees were issued a car,
maintenance, fuel and insurance at no cost. Used for
both business and personal reasons. Females provided
free bus and taxi.
- Commissary and Post Exchange. Refrigerated truck
brought food orders once a week. Pork was available
from the commissary but not advertised because Saudi
religious laws prohibit its sale on the open market.
Small post exchange at KKMC. Employees authorized a
liquor ration (also not advertised due to Saudi
sensitivity).
- Medical and Dental. Free routine dental work and 100
bed hospital at KKMC.
- Schools. Kindergarden through 9th grade American
school at KKMC. Free tuition for high school
children attending Department of Defense schools in
Europe. Free transportation for home visits during
the school year.
- Environmental Morale Travel (EMT). Each employee and
dependent living in Saudi Arabia authorized the cost
of a round trip airline ticket from Riyadh to London
(or equivalent amount applied to a different
destination) for each year of employment in Saudi
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Arabia.
- Dining Facilities. Subsidized contractor-operated
family dining facility at KKMC.
- Recreation. KKMC had a movie room, indoor games,
tennis, basketball, volleyball, outdoor pool, video
room, library, weightlifting room and craft shop./62
This was a generous pay and benefits package for
government employees by any standard, yet MED had difficulty
staffing up quickly enough at KKMC to match the pace of
construction. The first Al Batin District Engineer explained
that he couldn't fill key positions fast enough because he
lacked candidates. The DE preferred to choose from 2 or 3
candidates per position but he often received only one./63
USACE lacked a sufficient number of mobile personnel to staff
the project from internal resources. As a result, MED
recruited a large number of people who had no experience with
the USACE management system. Despite the lack of aspirants
for key jobs and training time required for employees with no
USACE experience, MED managers interviewed for this study
concurred that they received high-quality personnel.
Slow personnel recruitment became a critical problem in
1980, when Al Batin District lost the 70-man Management
Assistance Group provided by MKSAC under its CPAF contract.
The District was unprepared to take over the construction
management role that the Management Assistance Group had
filled. The MED Commander authorized Al Batin District to
contract for 35 temporary consultants under Title II of the
US Code to compensate for the loss of its MKSAC workers.
These consultants worked in contract administration,
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estimating and technical review and were an essential part of
the organization until MED recruited permanent personnel.
Word spread of good living and working conditions in Saudi
Arabia by 1982 and MED's recruitment success improved. In
addition, KKMC stabilized its workforce because a significant
percentage of its employees extended their original 2-year
contracts. Within three years, Al Batin District had
sufficient staff to close out its Title II contracts
entirely. /64
MED faced a completely different personnel challenge
during the demobilization phase. It had a large number of
employees working in jobs at pay grades one to two levels
above comparable positions in the US. Ultimately, it had to
outplace all but a handful of its employees over a three year
period. To compound its problem, personnel from government
organizations came to Saudi Arabia with the promise of
reemployment after job completion. Employees from Department
of Defense (DOD) activities had statutory reemployment rights
with the activities that released them to go overseas. Other
employees could enroll in the DOD Priority Placement Program,
which offered them assistance in obtaining positions in CONUS
at or near their overseas grade.J65 Reemployment promises
were easier to make than keep and Personnel Division
struggled to meet its obligations. In the end, though, MED's
outplacement program was successful and it helped settle many
employees with valuable mega-project training into DOD
agencies. Some USACE offices, particularly in Arizona, New
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Mexico and California, obtained a number of employees with
experience at Al Batin._66
The most criticized aspects of MED's personnel policies
involved short tours for military officers in key positions
and the high percentage of accompanied tours. Military
personnel managers were more concerned with the officers'
personal development than with project continuity. Most of
the lower ranking military officers had unaccompanied one
year tours. Officers assigned to key positions had two year
accompanied tours but virtually no opportunity to extend
because of negative career effects. Army personnel policies
stress high mobility and short tour length. Those who stay
in the same job for more than two years are often suspected
of "Homesteading" and suffer negative career consequences.
As a result, MED had 4 Division Engineers and 4 District
Engineers at Al Batin during the 7 most important years of
the project (1978 -1984). This meant that MED lacked
continuity in its most critical positions and suffered the
consequences of each new key officer's learning curve.
Although there's general agreement that the officers were
competent, short tours limited their opportunities to
contribute and created a lack of continuity at the top.
Criticism of accompanied tours revolved around their
high cost. The critics felt that MED should have reduced
expenses by limiting accompanied tours to top-level
managers, since the estimated cost of moving and supporting a
family was $100,000. Accompanied tours clearly drove up
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MED's Supervision and Administration costs but I'm convinced
that the generous policy was necessary. As it was, MED had a
difficult time recruiting sufficient personnel for the
project. Al Batin was a particularly difficult place to be
without a family because it was so remote. MED's policy of
offering accompanied tours to lower-level employees helped
attract and retain many well qualified people who wouldn't
have participated otherwise.
In summary, MED's personnel staffing plan worked well
despite Federal Government restrictions placed on the
process. The Personnel Division developed an imaginative
package of pay and benefits and displayed loyalty to its
employees by working to outplace them into good jobs. As a
result, MED attracted the employees they needed to do the
job. It also effectively used Title II consultants to plug
recruiting gaps. Even its questionable policies offered
undeniable benefits. Only the rigid military officer
assignment policy for key positions (which MED didn't
control) appears ill advised. Overall, MED provided
effective personnel staffing and support of the KKMC project.
3.4.5 MANAGEMENT COSTS
Despite MODA's huge construction budget during the oil
boom of the late 1970s, it was extremely concerned about
keeping project costs down. Cost control was one of the
reasons the Saudis wanted USACE to manage its military
construction program. Since USACE lacked the profit motive
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that drives private companies, MODA counted on the Corps to
save money on construction management. It placed constant
pressure on MED to minimize management costs, eventually
directing that its charges not exceed 8% of the program's
construction placement direct costs./67 This section
concentrates on the sources of MED's Supervision and
Administration (S&A) costs and the effectiveness of MED's
efforts to control them.
Under the Engineer Assistance Agreement, MED charged all
costs of operations which were relatable to KKMC construction
to the S&A account. This included all direct costs incurred
by MED's construction field elements for Supervision and
Inspection (S&I) plus the portion of overhead which applied
to KKMC construction. Specifically, these charges included:
- Personnel. Salaries and benefits for all MED
employees working for KKMC.
- Travel. Transportation, per diem and miscellaneous
costs for MED personnel on KKMC construction-related
travel.
- Contractual Services. Payments to commercial firms
and other USACE districts doing work for KKMC.
- Amortization of Capital Assets. End items > $1000
with a useful life > 1 year were expensed over the
life of the item. Includes vehicles, leased offices
and housing, ADP equipment, communications equipment
and furniture.
- Other. Includes transportation charges, supplies and
materials, MED dependent education, printing and
communications services.L68
MED design management expenses weren't charged against the
S&A rate. Instead, they were added to design contract costs
and charged under a line item called "Engineering and
144
Design". E&D costs were 3% of total project costs. However
MED design supervision costs weren't split out from its
contracts to be scrutinized by MODA. Instead, the S&A rate
received the Saudi's cost-control attention.
It's difficult to separate KKMC's S&A costs and actions
taken to control them from other projects in Saudi Arabia
because MED's bookkeeping and control strategies were done at
program, not project level. Prior to 1976, S&A costs were
charged directly to each Saudi project. When the KKMC
project began, however, MED decided to track S&A against the
entire Saudi program. This worked as a cost-control measure
in itself because it required fewer accountants. MED then
charged S&A to each project as a flat percentage of direct
construction costs. Therefore, it's impossible to identify
exactly what S&A costs applied tc KKMC and, conversely, what
measures were taken to reduce S&A for the military city.
Instead, I'll refer to costs and action taken to reduce them
across the entire Saudi program.
The major sources of S&A cost were personnel expenses
(including pay and benefits), life support contracts and
construction management service contracts. Long term housing
leases were a large S&A expense in other areas of the Kingdom
but not at Al Batin. MED built its own housing at KKMC or
leased trailers for shorter periods since there was no
existing housing available.
During the first three years of the project (1976 -
1979), S&A charges were 8.9% of construction placement costs.
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MODA felt the costs were too high and directed a reduction to
8%. MED saved some money by sub-leasing facilities in other
parts of the country when they were no longer needed.
However, the Division never made a strong effort to reduce
costs in the most expensive S&A area - personnel. MED
couldn't save costs by reducing the size of its expensive in-
country management force because it was actually shorthanded.
Still, there were two areas where MED could have reduced
personnel costs. One was by removing some of the duplicate
functional staff at district and division offices. This was
unsuccessful due to a combination of office politics
(disagreements over what positions were expendable) and
contractual requirements to provide jobs to those who'd been
recruited. The other savings option was to cut back benefit
packages for employees in Saudi Arabia. The Division did
close some commissaries and exchanges during the
demobilization period. However, MED discovered that once it
provided benefits they were almost impossible to take away
without causing serious morale problems.L69
In the final analysis, MED made no sweeping policy
changes to reduce its S&A costs. As a result, it didn't
significantly lower them even after the MODA directive. It's
likely that the S&A rate for KKMC would have been under 8% if
the Division had calculated it separately. I attribute this
to the high rate of placement in a small geographical area
with a compressed time table. These project features weren't
as applicable to many of the other projects in the Kingdom.
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At any rate, MED's S&A costs hovered slightly above the 8%
mandate during the prime construction years of 1980-1983./70
The S&A rates for the final project years were unavailable
but probably higher.
The conclusion I draw from MED's S&A experience is that,
once the KKMC planners decided how to staff the project and
support its employees it was very difficult for the
government organization to change. MED could rapidly adjust
its management procedures to construction plan changes but
not its personnel procedures, due to government regulations.
Since the Kingdom's construction program became slightly
smaller and advanced more slowly than planned, the personnel
costs became higher per direct construction dollar. This
pushed the S&A rate up. Still, MED could have lowered its
S&A costs by creating flexible personnel procedures and
eliminating functional duplication between the Division and
its districts. Its 8% S&A rate wasn't unreasonable but more
flexible personnel planning could have improved it.
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3.5 PROJECT CONTROL
In December 1977, the MED Commander asked the Engineer
Studies Center to develop an automated control system based
in network analysis and having three capabilities:
1. Ability to display interdependence among various
components of the MED program and asses<sing the
impacts of change in one area upon the others.
2. Equipped with an alarm system to identify potential
problem areas and flag them for remedial action at
the appropriate level of management.
3. A "control room" for monitoring the MED program at
the executive level of MED management.L71
It's interesting to note that, despite USACE's previous mega-
project experience, the organization lacked a standard tool
for controlling huge military construction projects.
However, the Engineer Studies Center felt that the pieces of
an effective project control system already existed within
MED and only needed to be collated and extended. In this
portion of the case study, I'll critique the systems that MED
developed to control costs and schedule on its KKMC project.
I'll examine MED's control systems at the program and
individual contract levels to determine whether there was
continuity from the Division Headquarters through the
District to its Resident Offices. I'll also study KKMC's
disputes history, peculiarities it found in managing
international contractors, its GFE control efforts and
project life cycle management.
3.5.1 CONTROL SYSTEMS
The two greatest management challenges that MED faced on
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the KKMC project were controlling costs to stay within budget
and controlling schedule to ensure the project was completed
on time. There's nothing unique about the need to control
these areas. Managers of projects of any size have to
concentrate on cost and schedule control. The challenge for
this mega-project was to develop systems that could process
large volumes of information, then respond quickly to user
commands to produce timely alternatives for cost and schedule
control actions. The systems had to be based on up-to-date
data that was easy to obtain and program. Their products had
to be simple so that managers could digest and use the
information to make decisions. Finally, construction
managers on site needed access and input to the systems. The
next two sections evaluate the systems used by MED to control
costs and schedule for the KKMC project.
3.5.1.1 COST CONTROL
The success of MED's cost control efforts for the KKMC
project hinged on controlling the life/construction support
contractor's spending. Unfortunately, the Division had
little success holding it down. MED didn't have a control
system in place at the start of the contract. Due to the
speed and enormity of required expenditures, spending
snowballed and MED never caught up. There's evidence that
MKSAC overbought materials and equipment, lost and accidently
destroyed material through poor accounting and storage
procedures and overstaffed its contract. These factors acted
149
together to significantly exceed projected costs. Soon the
contract with MKSAC was in disarray. What caused this
problem? Why didn't MED have a control system in place when
its criticality appears obvious?
The control problem was threefold. First, MED required
the contractor to comply with cost and control criteria that
both organizations were unfamiliar with. The contract that
MED negotiated with MKSAC called for the contractor to
validate the "Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria", or CS2,
which was prescribed under the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations. MED intended for MKSAC to comply with CS2 to
provide an approved government accounting, documentation
control and contract administration system./72 However,
neither MED nor MKSAC had any prior experience with CS2. The
system had been developed to control costs on major weapons
development and procurement programs and hadn't been applied
previously to support construction procurement. In its most
basic form, CS2:
1. Ties budgeting and scheduling together so that
management performance and accountability can be
readily traced from the total project to finite work
elements in a comprehensive Work Breakdown
Structure.
2. Time and dollars are placed against each work
Work Breakdown Structure and responsible managers
are identified.
3. Various levels of aggregation and acceptable
variences in cost and schedule are reviewed
regularly at corresponding levels of management.
4. Necessary and timely adjustments can be made to
ensure successful performance in critical areas./73
Although MKSAC (through a subcontractor) had given an
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impressive presentation to USACE during cctract negotiations
on how it would implement CS2, it had made no real attempt to
work out the details of the system. The contractor actually
started out with Morrison Knudsen's normal accounting system
but ended up changing it in the process of trying to get
validated for CS2. The system never was validated during the
3-year contract./74 MED couldn't get control of the system
because it had no experience with CS2 and didn't recruit
contract administrators who did. The Division couldn't push
its contractor in the right direction because it didn't know,
itself.
The second problem which contributed to MED's loss of
cost control was that it understaffed MKSAC contract
supervision, particularly at the beginning. For example, MED
used personnel from The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
to act as cost watchdogs. Yet, the first DCAA auditors
didn't arrive on site until August 1978 - six months after
MKSAC began staffing and procuring. 75 MED's own contract
administration staff was shorthanded and unable to track
material procurement, arrival and storage actions. As a
result, MKSAC overbought material and equipment, lost
accountability for some of it and destroyed a significant
amount through improper storage procedures. All of these
actions led to increased procurement costs.
The third issue at the root of the cost control problem
was an early lack of ADP equipment on site. Effective
computer support was absolutely necessary to make any cost
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control system work. However, neither MKSAC nor MED procured
sufficient, compatible ADP equipment or software before
starting operations in Saudi Arabia. MKSAC's initial order
for its computer system was incorrect. The contractor then
had to time-share with another firm for several months while
it waited for its new computer system to clear bureaucratic
channels. By the time both organizations had dedicated
computers on line in Saudi Arabia, the system was out of
control. MED never recovered cost control on MKSAC's
contract.
3.5.1.2 SCHEDULE CONTROL
MED had different experiences in controlling schedules
at the macro (project) and micro (contract) levels. The
Division adopted a computerized hybrid of existing USACE
schedule control systems to track progress and identify
alternative courses of action at the project level. The
system was designed to allow the Division Rear to shepherd
the project from the concept through the design phases until
construction was underway. At that point, the Project
Manager was expected to control the construction schedule
through individual, contractor-developed CPM systems./76 In
this section, I'll evaluate the effectiveness of MED's 2-
tiered approach to schedule control.
The cornerstone of MED Rear's schedule control was its
development of a computer system which combined Resource
Allocation/Project Management (RA/PM) with existing USACE
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reporting systems. MED recognized that its existing data
base reporting system lacked flexibility. The Engineering
Project Manager had difficulty evaluating scheduling
alternatives when key milestones were missed. He was forced
to fix the milestones and hope there was slack in the
schedule to compensate for slippages. MED required a system
that was:
- In-House
- Network Based
- Automated
- Capable of CPM Scheduling, Management Reporting and
Gamingl77
MED required a network-based system because it was USACE
policy for both internal managers and contractors to use one.
The Engineer Studies Center recommended that MED use RA/PM
after studying several in-house and commercially available
network-based systems. RA/PM met all of MED's requirements
and could use the existing data base. It offered the most
advantages and fewest drawbacks of any system considered.
The system hadn't been used on USACE military construction
projects in the past but it had been successful on some large
civil works projects.
MED ultimately created a hybrid, "... disciplined
configuration management control system which baselined
design and tracked changes and adjustments, thereby allowing
visibility of the project cost and time impacts" throughout
the design phase. It proved to be an effective system,
though not particularly user-friendly. One Division Rear
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Commander felt it was the most successful construction
management technique used during the project./78
One problem with the configuration management system was
that it was unavailable to the Project Manager in Saudi
Arabia. The District Engineer had no direct access to the
system since it was located in the rear. In addition, the
configuration management system wasn't intended to control
the construction phase. This created the second tier of
schedule control that I mentioned earlier. The Al Batin
District had automation capability after MKSAC finally
procured its system. By 1980 the District had a central
control monitoring system that covered every contract. The
District's Construction Division was the primary user. The
computer program had many specialty features but interface
problems limited its usefulness.179 Construction Division
anticipated a need to program construction support
requirements across contract packages for the peak
construction years. It had to determine gross amounts of
aaggregate, cement, precast concrete, asphalt and other
government furnished materials for each contract. The Chief,
Construction Division described how the District developed a
master integrated network to help identify the requirements:
"...this involved a very large effort in trying to break
the requirements of the total city down. We could never
get down to a building basis. It just made it too big
and too unmanageable, but we did get down to...a module
basis - like a group of 78 houses where you have 1750 in
one housing contract."/80
This network was a successful tool in the District's efforts
to project and control the schedule.
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On the other hand, managers for individual construction
contracts had no access to automated schedule control. One
of the Resident Engineers at KKMC described the reality of
schedule control at contract level this way:
"I think our real [control] tool was a one page bar
chart. We probably heard a little bit about master NAS
but, in reality, for the working folks out there, I
don't think it was ever really utilized."/fl
Most of the construction contractors had automated NAS
capability but were uncomfortable using CPM, which was
required under Special Provision 4 (SP4) of their contracts.
Al Batin District's Resident Engineers were often equally
uncomfortable. SP4 didn't limit the size of the required
CPMs and the contractors' automated systems often produced
unwieldy printouts which managers couldn't digest. One
District Engineer described a typical CPM horror story. A
contractor with a $200 million contract for 15 facilities
lasting 2 to 3 years brought a printout with 45,000
activities to the Resident Engineer for approval. The
Resident Engineer couldn't realistically review it and
neither he nor the contractor could use it as a management
tool./82 This story was more the rule than the exception on
the KKMC project. As a result, both the contractors and MED
contract administrators tended to control schedules with
simple bar charts, as described earlier.
MED controlled KKMC's project schedule effectively
despite its low level of sophistication at project level and
the significant disparity in scheduling capabilities between
its rear and forward offices. The configuration management
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system worked well for managing engineering, design and
contract award schedules. However, the Al Batin District had
to create a completely separate schedule control system
because configuration management wasn't integrated overseas.
In addition, it failed to validate CPM use at the contract
level. Although MED successfully controlled the project
schedule, it could have gone farther during planning toward
developing a single system which could be used everywhere.
Instead, managers at all levels had to spend much valuable
time developing their own systems. At the contract level,
I'm inclined to attribute MED's schedule control success more
to its project managers' experience than to its CPM control
systems design.
3.5.2 CONTRACTING
Once construction began at KKMC, project focus shifted
from planning and design to construction contract management.
MED concentrated project responsibility and authority with
the Al Batin District Engineer. He became the Contracting
Officer for all construction contracts and the Successor
Contracting Officer of MKSAC's life/construction support
contract.
In this section, I'll examine the aspects of contracting
which had the largest impact on the KKMC mega-project.
These issues are: Al Batin District's Contract Management
effectiveness for its cost plus award fee (CPAF) contract
with MKSAC and for its firm fixed p-ice (FFP) construction
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contractors; its methods for reducing and success in
resolving contract disputes; and its approach for dealing
with the unique management challenges posed by contracting
with international firms.
I don't address MED's engineering contract
administration here because there was nothing unique about
their contract structure that contributes to the study of
mega-projects. This shouldn't suggest, however, that
effective engineering contract management isn't critical to
mega-project success. On the contrary, it was crucial to
this project. I pointed this out in the preceding section on
systems used at MED Rear to control cost and schedule
throughout the design stage.
3.5.2.1 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
During the master planning phase of project planning,
MED received MODA's approval to use two types of contracts
for its construction program - cost plus award fee (CPAF) and
firm fixed price (FFP). The Saudis limited CPAF contract use
to the life/construction support contract with MKSAC. All
construction contracts were FFP.
The decision to use a CPAF contract for
life/construction support involved significant risks for both
MED and its Saudi client. First, the goal of using a
contractor to provide life/construction support was to
reduce risks for construction contractors (see Section
3.3.3). Second, the choice of a CPAF contract for this
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purpose meant that MODA absorbed all of the risks that it
removed from the construction contracts. MED attempted to
build performance incentives into its agreement with the
support contractor (MKSAC). USACE selected the MKSAC
consortium after reviewing its written an,- oral prese;.tation
against one by Brown and Root. The winner negotiated a
target cost on a 3-year contract with USACE, a base fee at 3%
of costs and an award fee at a maximum 3%, based on periodic
MED performance appraisals. Thus, with the exception of its
award fee (potentially $30 million on a $1 billion contract),
MKSAC had virtually no risk of its own. MODA would
completely bear costs resulting from MKSAC's mistakes. In
return for accepting this risk, MODA stood to save money in
its FFP construction contracts because bidders would reduce
their contingency fees.
This was a difficult concept for MED to sell to its
client. The Saudis feared the possibility of severe cost
escalation in a CPAF contract. They were more inclined to
accept higher FFP contract bids because the costs could be
understood and budgeted up front. Initially, MED attempted
to convince MODA to approve of a single CPAF contract to
construct the entire city./83 MODA rejected the concept.
The Saudis ultimately agreed to a CPAF contract for
life/construction support after continued urging by MED, but
they continued to have misgivings about the concept.
CPAF contracting was also risky for MED. Virtually all
of MED's previous construction in Saudi Arabia was under FFP
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contracts. In addition, USACE employees had little cost-plus
contacting experience because US Government construction
regulations mandate FFP contracting. Therefore, MED lacked a
base of construction managers with knowledge of CPAF contract
administration procedures. If MED failed to administer the
contract properly, it could lose credibility with its client,
drive up construction costs and lose control of the schedule.
Unfortunately, the CPAF contract was poorly executed and
some of these fears came true. As I discussed in Section
3.5.1.1, MKSAC never established the computerized cost and
schedule control system for procurement that was required by
the contract. This caused serious cost overruns and some
schedule slippage. . However, there were two other factors
which made equal contributions to the problem.
The first problem was that the contractor (MKSAC) didn't
put the quality of personnel and effort into the contract
that it promised during contract negotiations. The Project
Manager (District Engineer) noted :
"It was apparent after the first month that MK was
staging it very slowly and had not brought good people
aboard, and they really weren't jumping into this thing
as fast as they indicated they would be able to do
it. "/84
After a weak start, MKSAC never recovered in the fast-paced
construction environment. It was generally acknowledged that
Morrison Knudsen's consortium partners, Fischbach and Moore
and Interbetton did a professional job on their portions of
the contract. Morrison Knudsen, however, spun its wheels
throughout the project. MKSAC tried to overstaff the job
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and generally didn't use its top managers to get on track.185
The second problem was that MED didn't staff up quickly
enough and recruit sufficient personnel with CPAF experience
to manage MKSAC back onto track. One key MED manager noted:
"...the staffing seriously lagged start-up demands; i.e.
the contract was well under way before the civilian
personnel system could respond to hiring requirements.
I am satisfied that USACE did ultimately staff properly
to effectively manage the CPAF contract. Unfortunately,
much of the staff had no previous knowledge or
experience with cost reimburseable contracts, much less
a CPAF contract. Many of the employees brought a "Fixed
Price" mentality to the job, making the learning curve
excruciating. "J86
It's clear from this comment that the early understaffing was
only part of the problem. The other part was that CPAF
contracts were foreign to USACE's corporate culture. Its
managers weren't trained to administer this kind of contract.
Since its recruiting pool was restricted, MED simply couldn't
staff the contract with enough people who knew how to monitor
MKSAC. They attempted to do what they'd been trained to do
on fixed price jobs - monitor the contract. One USACE
manager with experience in cost reimburseable contracts
maintained:
"...you don't monitor a cost-plus contract. You run it
because, if you don't run it 24 hours a day, it goes
completely out of control. You cannot live with the
costs and you cannot live with what gets turned out.
You must be the manager of that cost-plus contract
because there is no way that you can build incentive in
there for [the contractor] to put the first team in, to
do things cheaply."/87
MKSAC quickly fell out of favor with the Saudis. They
pushed MED to let the life/construction support contract
expire after its first 3 years (in 1980) and put the same
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functions out for competitive FFP bidding. The timing was
terrible because the KKMC project was entering its major
construction phase and contractor support demands were
peaking. MED resisted because it saw more pitfalls in trying
to turn over all of MKSAC's equipment, materials and
functions to a new contractor without interrupting support
than in living with the old contractor's inefficiencies. MED
tried to negotiate a fixed price extension with MKSAC but
felt the contractor's proposal was outrageous. Ultimately,
the Saudis prevailed and MED put the remaining life and
construction support requirements into 2 competitive FFP
contracts.
Al Batin District planned every detail for the
transition between support contractors and managed to
complete the turnover with minimal disruption to construction
contractors. Its ability to make this transition at a
critical stage in the project without throwing the entire
effort off schedule must be considered a major factor in its
ultimate success.
The Corps of Engineers was considerably more successful
in managing its FFP construction contracts. Although some of
its 38 contract packages were under $10 million, 10 were in
the range of $100 to $270 million and one exceeded $300
million. This was in line with the MED master plan to create
FFP contract packages in the $100 to $200 million range. The
planners felt that contracts of this size would be extensive
enough to interest large international firms without
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eliminating smaller but qualified firms from competition.
The District prequalified all bidders to ensure that they
were capable of performing on the critical contracts. The
results supported the planning objectives. By and large, the
contractors were well qualified and performed effectively.
Even though the CPAF contract was poorly executed, it
allowed mobilization and construction support work to begin
before the A/Es completed facility designs. In turn, this
bought time for the A/Es to finish designs in sufficient
detail to make FFP contracting practical. This enabled MED
to use USACE's preferred form of contracting for construction
packages. MED's employees were trained and experienced in
this form of contracting. The organization had time-tested
standing operating procedures for dealing with FFP
contractors. MED did an excellent job administering its
construction contracts despite being short on construction
inspectors. Of course, the FFP contract managers had their
share of problems, but few were related to the type of
contracting selected.
3.5.2.2 CONTRACT DISPUTES
One of the most difficult facets of contract
administration is avoiding and resolving contract claims and
disputes. The KKMC project was rife with risks for budget-
breaking claims.
Of itself, FFP contracting theoretically provides more
claim opportunities than other forms. Since price and
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performance time are fixed under FFP contracts, builders
facing additional costs or delays beyond their control have
no recourse but to claim for an equitable adjustment to the
contract against the owner or his representative. The other
forms of contracting provide (to varying degrees) routine
methods of adjusting price and time without placing the
contractor and owner in adversarial positions. Of course,
reality doesn't always bear out this theory but it's
generally accepted that FFP contracts experience more claims
and disputes than other contract forms.
Since it has a long history of FFP contracting
experience, USACE knew that the probability of claims and
disputes was high for KKMC. Five factors increased the
likelihood of claims and disputes:
1. MED had only 4 years to produce and integrate the
designs for an entire city. The time constraint
guaranteed that some significant design omissions
and errors wouldn't surface until the construction
stage.
2. MED planned huge commitments of GFE, life support
and construction support to its contractors. Any
delays or inadequacies in providinq these services
could have cost and time impacts for the
contractors.
3. City utilities and facilities were interdependent.
Delays in completing utilities for a critical
facility would likely have a domino effect on other
contracts.
4. International contractors were unfamiliar with USACE
contracting procedures. They could easily
misunderstand or misinterpret specifications and
special provisions in their contracts.
5. Limited opportunities to perform geotechnical
studies of Al Batin before completing project
designs increased the likelihood of differing site
conditions.
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The Owner's attitude toward claims and disputes was also
potentially divisive. The Saudis' cultural attitude toward
construction contractors was combative and uncompromising. A
construction manager noted that the Saudis:
"...don't believe in a contract that affords as much
protection to the contractor as it does to the Owner...
Their concept of doing business is to twist arms. Theyjust don't understand where a contractor has a right to
claim and a right to question."/88
Despite this array of obstacles to amicable relations
with its construction contractors, MED completed the KKMC
project with a minimum of claims. By 1988, MED closed out
all contracts and settled $120 million in claims and disputes
for less than $40 million. On average, there were no more
claims per contract than on a stateside project._89 How did
MED avoid the crippling disputes which could easily have
plagued KKMC?
The answer to this question appears to be found in a
mixture of three strategies:
1. An intensive prequalification effort that generally
insured high contractor quality.
2. A pervasive teamwork concept throughout the project
reduced the amount of contractor - construction
manager antagonism.
3. Adherence to proven USACE techniques of dispute
resolution, including review by the Engineer Board
of Contract Appeals.
During initial project planning, MED began an intensive
contractor prequalification process to insure that all
contractors bidding on a contract were capable of performing
the work. This was critical for two reasons. First, MED had
never contracted with most of the foreign firms bidding on
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the KKMC work and lacked institutional knowledge of their
capabilities. Second, the Division faced a scheduling
catastrophe if it had to terminate an inept contractor on a
major construction package. Saudi Arabia lacked the internal
construction resources necessary to mobilize management,
labor and equipment to replace a terminated contractor on
short notice. Therefore, firms winning important contracts
had to be well-qualified. Initially, MED Rear prequalified
KKMC's constructions contractors. However, the Division soon
realized that it was more effective for the Al Batin District
to prequalify contractors because they ultimately had to work
with them and the District also had a better idea of whether
contractors were overcommitted to other construction projects
in Saudi Arabia./190 A residual benefit of the
prequalification process was that high quality contractors
approached their contracts professionally and tended to avoid
making frivolous claims. They were well-organized, planned
effectively and rarely generated their own problems. Thus,
the claims these contractors made generally had merit and
were negotiable.
The second factor which reduced the claims experience
was, in part, an extension of the first. MED fostered a
teamwork concept that reduced some of the natural friction
generated by FFP contracts. Part of this was the result of
selecting excellent contractors. These firms, although
profit-driven, took great pride in performing quality work.
MED also promoted the historic magnitude of the project to
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foster a sense of teamwork between the contractors and
construction manager. Although I don't want to overstate the
importance of this attitude, it's likely that the contractors
perceived MED as a buffer between them and the Owner. MED
acted as both a mediator and stakeholder in the project's
successful completion. Thus, MED could both enforce its
contracts and support its contractors. The dual position
that MED held in the project allowed it to create a sense of
teamwork with the contractors that the Owner would have had
difficulty creating on its own. The sense of teamwork is
reflected in two facts: (1) contractors generally ignored
small claims (under $10,000); and (2) contractors generally
submitted valid claims. Only the amount of an equitable
adjustment was questionable in most cases./91
The third and possibly most significant factor which
reduced claims and disputes at KKMC was MED's adherence to
USACE dispute resolution procedures. Unlike most
construction managers in Saudi Arabia, MED strictly followed
US dispute resolution standards rather than Saudi Arabia's,
which were based more on religious principles than contract
law. This seemed to give contractors confidence that their
claims would be dealt with fairly. Also unlike most of its
counterparts, MED had full authority under the Engineer
Assistance Agreement to negotiate and settle all contractor
claims on behalf of the Owner. Although its extensive
authority didn't always please the client, contractors felt
confident when negotiating with MED that an agreement
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wouldn't be arbitrarily dismissed by the Owner later.
Of the total number of change orders and claims handled
by KKMC contract administrators (I estimate there were
ultimately more than 2000, based on 1983 figures), only
approximately 50 were appealed to the Engineer Board of
Contract Appeals. Most were settled in wrap-up modifications
prior to reaching the Board. Less than 10 of the disputes
went to the Board for resolution./92 MED didn't employ the
mini-trial concept to settle any disputes, so I can't review
its effectiveness. Most of the claims and disputes were from
2 of the 5 likely sources identified at the beginning of this
section; differing site conditions and mistakes in delivery
of government furnished equipment and materials./93
In summary, MED created a plan for building KKMC which
was full of opportunities to generate claims and disputes.
However, its plan also minimized the effects of the risks it
took by adopting respected dispute resolution methods and
decentralizing authority to resolve them. MED and its
contractors worked as a team to complete the mammoth project
and generally acted in good faith with one another. These
factors helped hold down the number of disputes and lead to
their complete resolution.
3.5.2.3 MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTORS
The challenge of building a mega-project at a remote
location was compounded by special considerations for
managing international contractors. They fall in two general
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areas: (1) standards and specifications; and (2) cultural
considerations. MED discovered that skills required for
international mega-project management include the ability to
anticipate and plan for differences in contractor cultures
and knowledge.
Some of the foreign contractors simply didn't understand
US specifications and measurements and tried not to follow
them. One of the Al Batin District Engineers remarked,
"There's a propensity among international contractors to
build things the way they want to build them without regard
to the plans and specifications."/94 He then related a story
about a Filipino contractor that built a sewage treatment
plant. It disregarded the plans and specifications and
attempted to install the contract's electrical system as it
would in the Philippines. In turn, this required more Corps
supervision and considerable rework to correct.
The South Korean companies dominated the major
construction packages at KKMC. They followed plans and
specifications to the letter, yet almost totally disregarded
safety planning. Finally, Al Batin District's construction
representatives began to order work stoppages until the
Koreans corrected their safety deficiencies. Once they got....
the safety message the Koreans did a good job. MED won
USACE's safety award in 1985./95
Another example of the need to plan for international
contractors comes from the MKSAC contract. MKSAC's Dutch
partner for precast concrete plants designed them to European
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standards but had difficulty developing American standards to
bid for US materials contracts. This problem slowed down
plant construction and start up.196
These stories illustrate some of the peculiarities that
MED faced by virtue of managing an international mega-
project. MED overcame the difficulties mentioned above.
However, some c them could've been avoided altogether if the
Division had integrated international contracting factors
into its project planning.
A related aspect of planning for international
contracting is preparing to accommodate the cultural
differences of foreign contractor work forces. The need for
this kind of planning became painfully obvious at KKMC when
MKSAC's workers began to inhabit their mobilization camp.
Under normal FFP procedures, contractors set up their own
camps. At KKMC, this was a government provided service. It
quickly became apparent that different cultures required
different types of facilities and some cultures had to be
physically separated. MKSAC had recruited its workforce
primarily from Turkey, Thailand and El Salvador. The
cultural mix was volatile. Turks and Salvadorans using the
same dining facility frequently started fights, apparently
based on a Moslem-Catholic rivalry. Ultimately, the workers'
camps had to be moved to prevent riots.9L7
In another instance, worker facilities were shown to be
culturally inadequate. According to the District Engineer,
MKSAC procured Canadian-made prefabricated dining facilities
169
that were:
"...too nice to put Turks in...And the kitchens really
weren't designed for feeding third-country international
folks, Thais and Turks, who used big
cooking vessels and big sinks."198
There were several other incidents that point out the
cultural pitfalls of an international workforce. The
important point of this discussion from the construction
manager's perspective is that some of these cultural
differences can be planned for to reduce their disruptive
impacts. Since MED provided mobilization camps for the first
contingent of its construction contractors it should have
planned for some of the cultural impacts. However, it
doesn't appear that MED considered these cultural differences
during project planning for KKMC.
None of the cultural difficulties that MED experienced
while managing its international contractors was disastrous.
In retrospect, some were even comical. However, the Division
had to address these problems at some point in the project.
It could have dealt with them most effectively during the
planning stage. Instead, construction managers at Al Batin
had to solve cultural problems at a time when they needed to
concentrate on construction issues.
3.5.3 LIFE CYCLE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
In June 1988, USACE implemented the Project Management
Initiative. It represents an organized effort by the Corps
to improve project management in its divisions and districts
by adopting policies that systematize the entire process of
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project planning, organization, staffing and control. A
large part of the USACE effort is a program it calls Life
Cycle Project Management. Its goals are to:
1. Improve USACE management performance while
considering the concerns and expectations of [its]
customers.
2. Increase accountability for scope, quality, cost,
budget and schedule.
3. Improve project management continuity.199
This initiative came about as a result of customer
dissatisfaction regarding their involvement in project
planning and execution and USACE's difficulty in establishing
long term project accountability. Was this concept applied
to the KKMC project? If not, should it have been? I'll
summarize three areas of the project I've already described
in the case to determine if MED used a life cycle project
management concept on the KKMC project. They are: customer
involvement in the design and construction process; staffing
for continuity and accountability; and establishing systems
for continuity.
As I mentioned in Section 3.3.2.1, the customer wasn't
deeply involved in establishing some of the basic design
criteria for the city. As a result, MED designed KKMC to be
a pedestrian city (it planned only 7 parking spaces per 10
houses) but later discovered that modern Saudis value their
automobiles. KKMC lacked adequate parking space./100 In
addition, the houses were too small to suit Saudi tastes and
had to be expanded by an average of two rooms apiece. The
change's impacts carried over into the electrical
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distribution, water and cooling system designs.1101 As
construction began, Saudi participation increased. MED
created a Saudi Engineer training program under the Engineer
Assistance Agreement (EAA) to prepare its MODA counterparts
to perform their own construction contracting and engineering
management. Saudis also took a larger role in management at
KKMC once construction began. Although they infringed on
MED's authority as defined by the EAA, the Saudis gained a
voice in determining the project's direction that they lacked
during the planning stage. Both MED and MODA were
responsible for the lack of early customer involvement in the
project. MED didn't actively seek Saudi participation and
MODA was incapable of visualizing what it ultimately wanted.
Still, it's clear that institutionalized customer
participation from the earliest stages is an essential part
of the Life Cycle Project Management (LCPM) concept. It
could have been applied more effectively at KKMC.
The second tenet of LCPM is staffing for continuity and
accountability. MED did this reasonably well despite its
short term (2-year) contracts for Saudi Arabian work. There
was a relatively high degree of continuity in the Division
Rear office in Virginia. Since the Rear office was
responsible for project development, design and programming,
its continuity helped keep the project on course. Also, many
employees working in the Rear eventually transferred to
offices in Saudi Arabia and vice versa. Thus, although there
was high turnover in Saudi Arabia, much of the project
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expertise stayed within the MED organization and contributed
to KKMC in different capacities. One Al Batin District
Engineer noted the importance of continuity as the project
matured:
"I think it's important to draw down the same way the
organization was built up, leaving the high grades in
position until literally the last man leaves there.
There are reasons for that, a little different than on
the buildup, but just to retain the expertise as an
organization draws down."/102
However, MED lacked continuity in some of its key
positions, particularly in those held by military officers.
Short military tours guaranteed that the KKMC Project Manager
(Al Batin District Engineer) would change at least every
other year. The Engineer Studies Center noted in 1984 that
MED, "did not have project managers responsible for projects
from start to finish and involved in all aspects of the
operation."/103 The lack of continuity at the top of the
organization muddied the accountability trail as the project
progressed. In the final analysis, MED's personnel
continuity and accountability procedures during the KKMC
project were adequate but probably wouldn't fulfill LCPM's
requirements.
Since MED couldn't assure continuity through its
personnel policies, the Division developed systems to provide
procedural continuity on the KKMC project. The Chief,
Construction Division for the Al Batin District explained
that the District developed a systems concept to support the
construction program:
"By systems concept, I mean developing systems that we
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could follow - a piece of paper right on through from
the bottom of the organization to the top. And be able
to establish strong SOPs [standing operating procedures]
so that no matter how big the organization grew,
everybody would know how to operate and be able to fall
in very easily."/104
Where appropriate, the Project Manager used time-proven USACE
procedures. Where he found them lacking, he developed his
own procedures and institutionalized them within the
District. Al Batin District also made use of USACE's
Training Division in Huntsville by arranging for it to teach
classes at Riyadh on estimating, negotiating, inspection,
safety and quality management. MED also held seminars for
resident engineers and contracting officer representatives.
It created a Society of American Military Engineers post at
Al Batin to provide a forum for exchanging ideas regarding
construction in the desert. MED encouraged its contractors
to join and invitea them to make presentations. In this way,
MED diffused knowledge and standardized its systems in a way
that promoted continuity within the organization. The
systems and procedures developed during this time lasted
through the entire Saudi construction program. In some
cases, they were adopted by stateside districts. Therefore,
I feel that MED's systems concepts provided continuity in
areas that couldn't be guaranteed by its customer involvement
and personnel policies.
Thus, although MED didn't follow a Life Cycle Project
Management concept to the degree that was recently mandated
by USACE, it exhibited elements of the philosophy. MED's
failure to involve the customer in the project's early stages
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and its inability to stabilize KKMC's key project managers
had a negative impact on the Division's performance. By the
same token, MED's ability to retain and reassign many of its
top managers within the Division and the management systems
it developed improved project continuity. In my opinion,
this validates the LCPM concept. Its full implementation
would have had a positive impact on the KKMC mega-project.
175
3.6 CASE SUMMARY
Over a 12 year period, the US Army Corps of Engineers
Middle East Division performed the largest and most
challenging single military construction project in USACE
history. It entered an area with a harsh climate and no
infrastructure, labor or manufacturing base and built a $6
billion city for 50,000 people. The Division completed the
project within its schedule and budget constraints and turned
over the fully functioning city to the Saudi Arabian Ministry
of Defense and Aviation. MED also trained its customer to be
self-sufficient in construction management. The Division
accomplished its objectives in Saudi Arabia.
The purpose of this case study has been to determine the
effective: ess of MED's mega-project planning, organization,
staffing and control efforts. To that effect, I've reached
several conclusions. They're stated below under the four
applicable management areas and fall within the categories of
strengths and weaknesses.
PLANNING
Strengths
1. Excellent project master plan detailed design
and support considerations.
2. Excellent quality of design work.
3. Contractors responded positively to MED's
commitment to provide government furnished equipment,
materials and services by lowering risk contingencies in
their bids.
4. Validated the USACE concept of "centralized
planning" and "decentralized control".
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Weaknesses
1. Didn't adequatel determine user design
requirements and cultural considerations.
2. Didn't adequately coordinate design planning
with construction planning.
3. Didn't perform contingency planning to
accommodate program budget and schedule changes. Based all
project planning on a 6-year construction program.
4. Didn't define a GFE program manager. Segmented
authority and responsibility for the program.
ORGANIZATION
Strengths
1. MED Rear organization facilitated management of
US-based architect/engineers.
2. Functional area control of the project during
the design phase was appropriate given the scope of the
design effort.
3. Creation of a district organization at Al Batin
provided the on-site functional expertise required by the
Project Manager during the construction phase.
4. Al Batin District organized its Resident
Offices under the Chief, Construction Division's direct
control. This arrangement worked well though not normal USACE
procedure.
Weaknesses
1. Construction Division's complete geographical
separation from Engineering Division impeded timely
resolution of design-constructability issues.
2. The Division Forward's office and the District
office were located in the same complex (Riyadh) at the
beginning and end of the project. This resulted in a
duplication of staffs and functions.
3. The Engineering Division liaison element which
was added to the District office during the construction
phase had no authority to resolve constructibility and change
issues.
4. Office of the Chief of Engineers usurped the
Project Manager's authority early in the MKSAC contract.
This temporarily reduced his effectiveness when dealing with
the contractor. It violated the USACE concept of
"decentralized project execution."
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STAFFING
Strengths
1. Excellent pay and benefits structure attracted
a high quality workforce.
2. Effectively used Management Assistance
employees from MKSAC, temporary duty personnel from other
USACE districts, and Title II consultants to cover shortages
of its own personnel.
3. Managed a successful employee outplacement
program as the project's staff downsized.
Weaknesses
1. Short military tour lengths insured a high
turnover rate for key project managers.
2. High percentage of accompanied tours drove up
supervision and administration costs.
3. Understaffed the MKSAC contract with contract
administrators. MED couldn't keep up with the contractor's
activities.
CONTROL
Strengths
1. Established an effective in-house configuration
management computer system in MED Rear to process data and
control the schedule through the end of the design phase.
2. Al Batin District created a master integrated
network which effectively projected construction support
requirements throughout the construction phase.
3. Al Batin District effectively managed its FFP
construction contracts.
4. The intensive construction contractor
prequalification process generally insured that good
international contractors won contracts at KKMC.
5. Al Batin District did an excellent job during
its transition from CPAF to FFP life/construction support
contracts. It prevented the diminution of services to
construction contractors during the transition period.
6. Avoided excessive claims and disputes by
promoting a teamwork concept and by following standard USACE
dispute resolution procedures.
7. Successfully applied some concepts which now
comprise Life Cycle Project Management in USACE. However, it
didn't apply some of the concepts very well.
Weaknesses
1. Failed to establish an effective cost/schedule
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control schedule for the life/construction support contract.
MED lost control of spending and never completely recovered
on the contract.
2. Lacked a single data base that could be used by
both forward and rear elements of the Division. As a result,
each office created its own schedule control systems and data
bases.
3. Didn't validate the usefulness of CPM for
project control as currently required under USACE contracts.
4. Didn't accommodate cultural differences in the
international workforce when it provided life support
services. MED didn't prepare for the different approaches to
construction that international contractors take.
The KKMC project was not an unqualified success, but
USACE overcame the problem areas I described. It's evident
from the summary that USACE made some costly mistakes in the
way it approached the mega-project. However, the
organization displayed the flexibility needed to manage
crises and correct deficiencies before they became critical.
It also displayed a willingness to take risks and the skill
to make most of them pay off. The problems I described are
for educational purposes and should not be allowed to
overshadow the ultimate success of the project. The King
Khalid Military City project is an excellent example of how
an engineering/construction manager combines planning,
organization, staffing and control to complete international
mega-projects.
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CHAPTER 4 - CASE #2: BECHTEL GROUP AND THE INDUSTRIAL PORT
CITY AT JUBAIL
4.1 CASE BACKGROUND
Bechtel Group's $20 billion development program (by
conservative estimates) to create a self-contained industrial
port city near the site of the old fishing village of Al-
Jubail, Saudi Arabia is huge by any standard. That venerable
chronicle of superlatives, The Guinness Book of World Records
labelled it "the largest construction project in history."
Time magazine gushed, "In all the expansive sweep of civil
engineering, from the pyramids of the Nile to the
construction of the Panama Canal, nothing so huge, or costly,
as Jubail has ever been attempted by anyone."/l No matter
whether you believe the superlatives that have been heaped on
the Jubail operation, there's no disputing its significance
to the study of international mega-projects.
This chapter is a case study of the construction
management techniques applied at Jubail by Bechtel Group
through its subsidiary, Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited (now
called Saudi Arabian Bechtel Company). The first part of the
chapter provides a background on the Jubail project and its
challenges. The remainder of the chapter examines how
Bechtel addressed those challenges and determines the
effectiveness of its management efforts.
The Jubail project's origins go back at least to 1973
when Stephen Bechtel Sr., then the corporation's CEO, met
with Saudi Arabia's King Faisal. The King was concerned that
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Saudi Arabia squandered much potential wealth by burning off
natural gas at its oil fields because there were no cost-
efficient uses for the gas. ARAMCO had been working on a
long-range gas conservation program since 1956 and had
initiated efforts to export liquid natural gas (LNG).
However, ARAMCO plans to expand oil production guaranteed
that future LNG production would outstrip market demand for
the fuel. Some foreign companies, such as Mitsubishi and
Shell, had proposed to build industries that used LNG for
fuel and methanol and ethanol as feedstocks. However, the
effort was fragmented and going nowhere.LZ Bechtel initiated
an unsolicited study to determine how best to exploit the
natural gas resource. It enlisted the help of the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) to evaluate Jubail's development
potential.j3 After approximately two years of study, Bechtel
returned to Saudi Arabia to present a development plan.
According to Time:
"Bechtel proposed an audacious solution: assemble a
complex of automated petrochemical plants near the
oilfields to process and use the wasted gases. The fuel
could be used not only to provide raw material for the
development of a new petrochemical industry, but also
supply the energy to process and manufacture products
ranging from plastics and fertilizers to steel and
aluminum."_L4
The King agreed with Bechtel's concept. After a year of
negotiations and further studies, Bechtel produced a master
plan for the industrial project at Jubail and was selected to
be its construction manager in 1976. Figure 4.1 shows
Jubail's location.
The port and industrial city at Jubail became part of a
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FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF SAUDI ARABIA SHOWING LOCATION OF JUBAILL5/?
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larger development program which involved industrialization
on both coasts. The Saudi Arabian government planned to
expand its industrial base using petrochemicals as both fuel
and feedstock. During the Kingdom's second and third five
year plans, construction began at Jubail and Yanbu, a smaller
sister port city on the Red Sea 200 miles north of Jeddah.
The master plan called for development of steel production
and rolling mills, as well as ethylene, ethylene glycol and
polyethylene plants. In addition, plants at both cities
would perform oil refining activities and produce methanol,
fertilizer and more ethane-based products. Under the plan,
the downstream plants would allow the Kingdom to add value to
its crude oil exports and create opportunities to train a
Saudi workforce for the future.L6
Saudi planners realized that the Kingdom's economy was
totally dependent on government crude oil revenues. They
determined that the Kingdom's proven oil reserves of 165
billion barrels could be depleted in 65 years. The planners
concluded that the Kingdom's future economic success depends
on private industrial investment and development. The
natural gas development program was the consummation of this
ambitious "privatization" concept. The Saudis felt that the
industries resulting from the Jubail and Yanbu
industrialization projects could, "keep the country's small
but rapidly growing population employed and enjoying a rising
living standard far into the 21st century."L7
Many Saudi organizations and other construction managers
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became involved in the natural gas development program. The
Saudi government created an independent, ad-hoc commission
called the "Royal Commission for the Development of Jubail
and Yanbu" to direct the construction of the ports and cities
on the Kingdom's east and west coasts. Its purpose is to
provide the infrastructure, land and services to support an
industrial complex. This included providing power, water,
sewerage, ports, airports and rail networks. To execute
those responsibilities, it has more power than other
government agencies. The Royal Commission was created to
avert bureaucratic delays to development that were common in
other government organizations. Initially, the Royal
Commission was like a super-municipality, with the additional
mandate to build and run schools and hospitals, design and
build roads and establish utilities rights of way.L8
Other Saudi government organizations, notably Petromin
and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation also became
involved in the development program as joint venture partners
with multinational corporations. In addition, they created
incentives to attract private investment for secondary
industries. ARAMCO built a 623-mile liquid natural gas
pipeline to connect the two industrial cities and provided
oil and gas as industry feedstock. The Saudi Saline Water
Conversion Corporation was responsible for creating the fresh
water to satisfy Jubail's demand. The Saudi Consolidated
Electric Company provided electric power under ARAMCO
supervision as part of a regional electrification program.
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The US Army Corps of Engineers built a naval base south of
Jubail's commercial port.
A number of geographical and ecological factors led to
Jubail's selection as the site for the huge industrial port.
ARAMCO's lucrative Berri Field is just a few miles offshore.
In addition, it is one of the best locations for a port along
Saudi Arabia's Persian (Arabian) Gulf coast. There's shelter
from Ras Abu Ali, a promontory 10 miles to the north. Also,
the Gulf's 100-ft depth contour runs closest to the coast
around Jubail._9 The city was built on a 16,000 acre, low-
lying area which extends onto the neck of a peninsula north
of the industrial complex. Figure 4.2 shows the Jubail's
development limits. Figure 4.3 shows the Jubail sub-region
and identifies the areas to be developed into the community
and industrial sections.
Saudi government agencies formed joint ventures with
multinational corporations to build the huge primary
industries, then offered a range of significant incentives to
Saudi firms willing to put up private money for industrial
development. The government offered low-cost loans, tax
holidays, extensive oil lifting rights, customs exemptions
and freedom to repatriate funds as investment incentives. By
1990, the government's 15 operating primary industrial
facilities included an oil refinery, a steel mill, 5
petrochemical complexes, 2 methanol plants, 2 fertilizer
plants and factories producing plastics, lubricating oil,
sulphur and industrial gases./10 However, private investment
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lagged because of expense and risk of failure. Worldwide
production gluts existed in many of the proposed industries,
although a predicted pickup in the global economy could
stimulate demand. After years of discussions and
negotiations, planners had to cancel two thirds of the export
industries originally scheduled for Jubail to ensure the
viability of the remaining ones./13 As of 1990, the city had
only one privately owned petrochemical plant and 64 other
support and light manufacturing industries.
Another reason that private industrial development was
slower than predicted has been explained by Saudi social
scientists. Although the Saudi culture advanced from camels
to Cadillacs in little more than a generation, the majority
of its people still have strong tribal and regional
loyalties. They're reluctant to move away from their
traditional home regions to previously undeveloped areas.
Since the government has no plans to force worker migration,
residents must move voluntarily./14 Some industries have
offered potential employees long term home ownership loans to
encourage their relocation to Jubail./15 It's not been
entirely successful. The city's original target population
for 1986 was 170,000, with an ultimate goal of 370,000. In
1987 its actual population was less than 30,000, many of whom
were expatriates. In 1990, Jubail had almost 40,000
residents, 77% of whom were Saudi nationals./16
Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited signed a 20-year
management support contract with the Royal Commission in 1976
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to provide engineering and construction management assistance
at Jubail. Bechtel acted as an agent to the owner (the Royal
Commissior:) without the authority to commit funds or enter
contracts. In effect, Bechtel was the primary advisor to the
owner for engineering and construction matters. Bechtel
performed some engineering tasks itself, such as master
planning and conceptual design. It wrote requests for
proposals and prequalified contractors. Once the Royal
Commission awarded a contract, Bechtel managed it through
completion as the owner's representative. It also provides
assistance in city operations and maintenance.
Award of the Jubail contract in 1976 came at an
opportune time for Bechtel. It hadn't been a major presence
in Saudi Arabia for nearly a decade and had suffered some
major domestic debacles during the same period. The firm was
fired from its management contract on the Alaska Pipeline
project and experienced contract losses due to the near-
collapse of the nuclear power industry. In addition, it
faced prosecution by the Justice Department for cooperating
with the Arab Boycott of 1973. Although it eventually
settled the case out of court, the corporation was severely
embarrassed by the episode. It needed a winning project and
Jubail was the one. Bechtel projected Jubail to be worth
several million dollars in profits to the company every year
for the next two decades./17 Bechtel also bid for the job of
construction manager on the smaller Yanbu port city but lost
to Ralph M. Parsons Company.
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From the beginning of the Jubail project, Bechtel and
the Royal Commission staffed up and worked closely together.
Bechtel trained Saudi engineers for the Royal Commission to
take the place of its own staff. As the project advanced,
more and more Saudis replaced Bechtel's expatriates. By
1990, the Royal Commission had replaced 60% of Bechtel's
staff with Bechtel-trained Saudi engineers. At the same
time, 33% of Bechtel's 192 remaining employees were Saudi
nationals. According to its Program Manager, "Bechtel has
basically accomplished what it came here to do - help the
Royal Commission get Jubail up and running successfully and
create a self-sufficient Saudi organization."/18
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4.2 PROJECT SIZE AND SCOPE
Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited accepted a daunting
engineering task in 1976 when it began detailed planning for
the Jubail industrial port and city. The official project
area covers 355 square miles. The main development is sprear
out over 100 square miles with a grid of wide boulevards
connecting the major sectors. The industrial area is located
slightly inland to the south and is divided into sectors.
One is for primary petrochemical industries built by
government-private joint ventures; another is tor secondary
industries being developed by private firms; and a third is
for light manufacturers that support the primary and
secondary industries. At this time, only the secondary
sector is still largely undeveloped./19
Bechtel's primary task was to develop the infrastructure
needed to support private development of the city. This
included the construction of two ports, an airport, cooling
water systems, liquid and solid waste handling systems for
sanitary and industrial wastes, telecommunications and
electrical distribution systems, solid and liquid bulk
materials handling systems, road and rail networks. Bechtel
also installed generators, wells and small desalination
plants as temporary support for contractors until national
systems came on line. Bechtel provided fully graded
industrial sites with all utilities available at lot
boundaries so that, in the words of one employee, "All a
company has to do is build its plant and plug it in."120
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Bechtel also had to coordinate its work with that of the
government agencies that provide infrastructure on a national
scale.
The following summarizes some of the construction
challenges:
- A $1.4 billion, 18-berth port to serve the industrial
complex, handling ships up to 60,000 dwt. At the end
of a 6-mile long causeway is a 1.8-mile long
deepwater tanher terminal large enough to accommodate
a 500,000-ton supertanker.
- A $1.4 billion, 16-berth commercial port south of the
industrial port.
- An airport with a 13,000-foot runway capable of
receiving any existing aircraft.
- More than 340 million cubic yards of cut and fill was
required to raise ground level in the industrial area
above flood height. This is enough material to build
a road around the equator 9 meters wide by 1 meter
deep.
- The development required 200 miles of primary roads,
much of it 4-lane.
- A wastewater treatment system designed to treat 40
million gallons per day.
- A cooling water system designed to provide up to 8000
cubic feet per second. Also, a system to re-cool
water after use before it's returned to the Persian
Gulf. This protects marine life in the discharge
area. Its capacity equals the average daily flow of
the Rio Grande.
- Three man-made lagoons; two for swimming and one for
boating. /21
The first primary industry (the steel mill, under the
direction of the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation with a
West German partner) broke ground in 1980 and came on line in
1982. By then, several other heavy industries had begun
construction. Most of Bechtel's infrastructure work was
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completed by that time to support industry construction being
done by others. Community development continued in tandem
because the Royal Commission needed sufficient housing to
accommodate workers for the new industries as they were
completed.
Although not the subject of this paper, it's worth
mentioning some of the huge engineering challenges that
Jubail's port designers and constructors faced. Port
construction alone involved dredging more than 50 million
cubic yards of rock and sand. It enclosed 250,000 acres of
water with 12 miles of causeway and breakwaters and reclaimed
1760 acres of land. Contractors dredged 4-mile long, 46 foot
deep cuts 100 feet wide to provide shipping channels into
both harbors. Dredged material was used to reclaim land for
large quays and the 6-mile long causeway.
A 3 to 10 foot layer of cemented calcareous material
(called caprock) covered the seabed near Jubail. It has a
compressive strength of nearly 9000 pounds per square inch.
It took more than a year for the dredging contractors to
obtain government blasting permits. In the meantime, the
world's largest cutter-suction dredges flailed at the caprock
with little effect. Cutter heads often had to be changed as
frequently as every 20 minutes. The Dutch port construction
contractors designed and built 2 rock breaker barges
containing 16 hammers apiece to break through the caprock.
Ultimately, the Saudis issued blasting permits and dredging
progress improved.
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The commercial harbor has 2.5 miles of 56 foot high quay
walls made up of precast cellular concrete blocks on a
limestone rock foundation. This lies in a trench lined with
a synthetic fiber stabilization cloth. Builders combine.
precast concrete pieces weighing 7 to 15 tons with 2 to 5 ton
limestone boulders to form the seaward side of the
breakwaters.
The 1.8 mile long deep sea tanker terminal was the most
challenging engineering and construction task in the port
project. After it investigated deep friction piles, the
design consultant (Sir William Halcrow and Partners, London)
decided to drill belled piles into a loadbearing mudstone
bank to reduce the average pile length by 30 feet. Steel
templates with box beams went on top of the piles and 200-ton
precast concrete road sections measuring 65 by 35 feet topped
the structure. The contractor (Hyundai, Seoul) had to bring
in a 1600-ton floating derrick and a 400-ton model to speed
the operation./22
Some additional statistics provide examples of the
Jubail project's total magnitude:
- The project required approximately 150 design
contracts, 450 construction contracts and 200 service
contracts through 1990.
- Bechtel's management force in Saudi Arabia peaked at
1831 workers in 1983.
- The contract labor force eventually came close to
35,000 people.
- Basic program length is 20 years. Most construction
was completed from 1977-1985. However, some
construction continues today and will continue for
the foreseeable future./23
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In recent years, Bechtel's role in the Jubail project
has evolved from that of construction manager to one of city
manager. Construction has tailed off since 1984. The Saudi
president of the new municipality described the necessary
transition: "Until fairly recently, everyone thought of
Jubail as a huge construction job. Now people realize that
Jubail is really a modest, but growing city."2_24 Figure 4.4
shows the developed Jubail program site.
As planned, the Royal Commission has assumed
responsibilities previously performed by Bechtel. Bechtel
now assists in city management, operation and maintenance, as
well as supervising ongoing infrastructure development and
closing out construction contracts. Its management force has
scaled down from a high of 1831 in 1983 to fewer than 200
today. By 1996, Bechtel will finally have worked itself out
of the job.
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4.3 PROJECT PLANNING
Although Bechtel had a long history of mega-project
accomplishments and considerable experience in Saudi Arabia,
it had never built an entire city from scratch before in an
area that totally lacked an infrastructure. It faced severe
time pressures imposed by the client to match the Royal
Commission's industrial development plan. It faced
additional planning challenges imposed by a country in which,
"The logic of planning was often defeated by [Saudi Arabia's]
logic of politics and religion."/26 Saudi Arabian Bechtel
Company had to produce a detailed, workable plan to construct
the city quickly. This section details and critiques the
company's planning efforts.
4.3.1 PLANNING OBJECTIVES
According to Jubail's Program Manager, the overriding
consideration that drove and focused project planning was the
need to develop the industrial site and community site
simultaneously and on a compressed schedule.L27 This
requirement emanated from the Royal Commission's desire to
begin producing commodities at Jubail as soon as possible.
Bechtel inherited a timetable that required the first
petrochemical plant to be on line by 1982, less than five
years from the date of groundbreaking.
The key to project planning, according to one of
Bechtel's Program Managers, is, "To know ahead of time, in
sufficient detail, what you are trying to do."L28 Bechtel
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established three strategies for Jubail's planning which, if
met, would enable the organization to meet its planning
objective:
1. Break down the project into manageable parts.
2. Conduct planning at contract level.
3. Minimize on-site fabrication./29
The strategies sound simple and, indeed, they're intended to
be. Bechtel's planners understood that, at a glance, the
project's size and scope was so big it was mind boggling. If
Bechtel tried to integrate the entire project plan from the
start, it risked getting caught up in its complexity and
ultimately going nowhere. This problem plagued the program
during its first year. Instead of breaking the program down
into manageable parts and producing the optimal design to
deliver a functional city by 1982, Bechtel's first Program
Manager designed for total program requirements. The company
fell behind by attempting to design and contract to build
infrastructure for the entire 370,000-person city even though
decades would pass before it could be fully utilized. It
lost control of the schedule because to couldn't design the
city fast enough to begin construction.
When a new Program Manager took charge, Bechtel decided
to break the project's conceptual design down into its
smallest elements and proceed with an incremental city
design./30 Instead of completing all of the infrastructure
at once, Bechtel would build the city in phases to match
industry requirements. Once the project had been dissected
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in this way, planners could recognize the challenges involved
in small chunks of the work and create a plan for phased
design. The Engineering Department Chief could then match
small project scopes to his staff's expertise and assign
manageable design responsibilities. Bechtel divided the
project by geographical area (industrial, commercial and
residential areas) and by systems (power and
telecommunications, water and waste, roads, airports,
railways, residential buildings, commercial buildings,
etc.).L1.
This discussion leads to the second strategy-Conduct
planning at contract level. Once Bechtel established what
the pieces of the Jubail puzzle were, it decentralized
planning by assigning the pieces to those who were
responsible for the individual parts. Essentially, Bechtel
conducted project planning at the individual contract level.
After the design parameters had been established at the
contract level, Bechtel reassembled the plans to get a
picture of the entire program. It then integrated the
individual plans to determine where conflicts existed that
would affect the program. Where conflicts became apparent,
the contract-level planners developed alternative approaches
to avoid schedule impacts. Again, Bechtel integrated the
proposed solutions into its program plan and studied their
feasibility. When necessary, this process continued in
iterations until Bechtel solved the problems. The
decentralized nature of this exercise allowed a large number
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of planners and managers to become involved in the project
and help put it together. This arrangement was not merely
nice to have, it was a requirement to keep Bechtel from being
overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of the task.
The other primary planning strategy was to minimize the
amount of construction performed on site. This gave Bechtel
several advantages. First and most important, it saved time
because its suppliers preassembled as many components as
possible at the factory and its architects designed a modular
city. Bechtel designed a special berth at the new port to
accommodate some the oversized equipment and building modules
that were shipped from foreign factories. The Module
Transfer Point could accept pieces weighing up to 2000-tons
and with dimensions of 45-meters H x 30-meters W x 40-meters
L. Bechtel had to integrate this design with the remainder
of the infrastructure to insure that its roads and bridges
made a sufficient module path to the industrial area. A 1982
review described Jubail as:
"...a gigantic expanse of clip-together factories and
buildings. The 205-bed Al Huwaylat Hospital, provided
by the H.B. Zachry Co. of San Antonio, is arriving at
the site virtually in kit form and being assembled room
by room, each module having been delivered complete,
down to the toilet paper holders in the bathrooms. Even
the hospital's prayer room, which has mosque carpets and
lighting directed toward Mecca, was built in Alabama and
transported overseas."L32
Another advantage of the plan for preassembled/modular
building components was that it reduced construction costs.
Preassembly in a factory setting is more efficient than on-
site construction. This advantage was even more evident when
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applied to Saudi Arabia because virtually all work was more
expensive to perform inside the country than outside. Also,
the preassembly/modular concept bought time for Bechtel's
civil contractors to prepare the infrastructure Jubail needed
to support a massive influx of construction workers,
equipment and material.
The final advantage offered by preassembly was that it
improved the opportunity for contractor quality control.
Manufacturers were better able to control the conditions
surrounding production and assembly than construction
contractors could. Also, specialized supervisory and testing
capabilities existed at the factory that didn't on site. Of
course, the large amount of off-site production made
Bechtel's quality assurance task more difficult. The firm
simply couldn't place quality assurance personnel in each
manufacturing plant to monitor production operations. Thus,
it risked lengthy project delays if critical preassembled or
modular items arrived that failed to meet specifications.
Also, it was more difficult to control and force adjustments
to manufacturers that had problems meeting the schedule when
they were working in another country.
The three planning strategies described above led to
another planning decision that Bechtel made to support the
them. It placed great emphasis on construction contract
sequencing. Bechtel's goal was to identify when each part of
the construction program was needed and arrange the parts in
the proper sequence to avoid delays. It accomplished this
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by creating two kinds of networks. The first was a
"physical" network, which identified design/construction
interface nodes. Take, for example, the highway design.
What utilities had to pass under or over it? Where would the
crossings be located? How could the drawings be coordinated
between separate projects at the interface point? What cloup
of planners would be responsible for controlling the
interface? The second was a "time/budget" network. Using
the same highway example; which contracts must be awarded
first to avoid tearout and rework? How much detail must be
set out in contracts so that builders know exactly where
their responsibilities end and someone else's begins?
Bechtel managed the "physical" and "time/budget" networks
independently but they were interdependent from the total
program perspective./33
The Program Manager resolved interface issues identified
during the networking process by bringing together his
engineering, contract procurement and construction functions
and managers of the affected projects to work out a solution.
This entire process ties back into the objective of breaking
the program into manageable parts that could be visualized.
Bechtel had to pick out the key elements of the smaller
contracts and sequence them so that they fit properly into
the big picture. Bechtel's strict adherence to these
planning objectives was a major source of its success at
Jubail.
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4.3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Bechtel faced an extremely tight timetable for
completing Jubail's infrastructure. It had to design and
build two ports, a road network, an industrial railway,
industrial pipelines, irstall basic utilities and create
sewage treatment plants for the industrial and residential
sections in tandem. One of the planning difficulties Bechtel
faced was to anticipate contingencies caused by delays in
infrastructure projects performed by other agencies. Other
government organizations were to provide permanent electric
power and desalination plants. The power came on line in
time. However, Bechtel had to issue a design-build contract
to a Japanese Firm to produce a floating desalination plant
for an interim fresh water supply. The Japanese manufactured
a 6-story-high barge that began processing 5 million gallons
of fresh water per day for Jubail within 12 months of
contract award./34
The single largest infrastructure planning contingency
was to design and build the $1.4 billion industrial port in
26 months. The Saudis dropped this project into Bechtel's
lap with no notice. The Saudi Arabian Port Authority was
originally responsible for designing and constructing the
port. However, the Port Authority didn't have the capability
to manage the large engineering and construction effort.
After several months of foot-dragging, the Royal Commission
transferred responsibility for the port's construction to
Bechtel. The company didn't have the time to go through the
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preferred design and firm fixed price (FFP) contracting
procedures, so it planned to accelerate the process. Bechtel
performed the port's conceptual design, then negotiated
engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) contracts to
complete it. This plan saved at least a year over the normal
design first, formalized construction contract bidding
process. It facilitated the port's completion within the
required 26 months.135
Bechtel also planned effectively to avoid over-
developing Jubail's infrastructure. It master planned 8
community districts, each of which would provide housing and
services for 50,000 people. However, it soon became apparent
that the industries would not grow quickly enough to justify
developing all of the districts at once. Bechtel's plan
provided flexibility in district development, since each was
designed to stand alone. The company's plan provided site
preparation (clearing, grubbing and fill to rough grade) for
6 districts. It provided complete site development (finish
grading and major utility distribution lines) for 3 of them.
By 1990, Bechtel has completed community construction in 1
district and part of another. This has provided plenty of
permanent housing for the active industries. As important,
Bechtel avoided over-developing districts that could not
possibly be utilized right now. In addition, the districts
that have been developed are recognizable as cities in their
own right, since each has all the institutional and
residential support facilities of a modern city. Thus, they
210
are complete entities, instead of appearing to be merely part
of an unfinished development./36
4.3.3 PROCUREMENT
One decision that may not have directly supported the
planning objectives was the Royal Commission's refusal to
allow Bechtel to make advance material purchases and provide
them as owner furnished materials. Bechtel wanted to procure
and provide some important materials and equipment itself.
This would have circumvented the delays inherent in
completing facility designs and going through the entire bid
process before the winning contractor could initiate
procurement on his own. However, the Royal Commission was
completely opposed to this concept because of its inherent
risk of causing contractor claims and disputes. It was
adamant that construction contractors procure their own
materials and equipment.
The Royal Commission compromised on one important point,
however. It approved the use of concessionaires to provide
many of the common bulk building materials that almost all
contractors required. Bechtel wrote concession contracts for
many firms to produce and provide aggregates, bulk cement,
concrete, reinforcing steel, asphalt, electrical wire and
other materials to its construction contractors. Bechtel
negotiated unit prices with the concessionaires but didn't
pay them directly. Instead, Bechtel required its contractors
to buy these materials from firms on the approved list. This
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system gave Bechtel three advantages. First, it provided a
way to control materials costs through contract negotiations
with concessionaires. The concessionaires faced some
competition because Bechtel arranged to have more than one
supplier for most of the materials. Also, Bechtel controlled
some of the bid elements on its construction contracts
because it already knew the actual costs of the concession
materials that contractors were bidding.
Another advantage of the concessionaire concept was that
it provided Bechtel greater oversight of bulk materials
quality. Bechtel quality assurance inspectors could
periodically inspect the suppliers to ensure they met
contract quality standards. The final advantage of the
concessionaire system was that Bechtel reduced risk for both
the owner and its construction contractors. Contractor risk
was lower because the designation of concessionaires
guaranteed them a steady supply source that consistently met
specifications. The system reduced owner risk because the
concessionaires, not the owner, had the responsibility to
provide construction contractors adequate amounts of the
specified materials. Thus, the concessionaire concept
offered many of the advantages of owner provided materials
with fewer pitfalls.
Although it didn't start out with this approach, Bechtel
also eventually adopted the concessionaire concept for its
construction contractor life support planning. After it
completed the 41,000-man contractor mobilization camp,
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Bechtel planned to provide life support (mess, facilities
maintenance, etc.) itself. It soon found itself overmatched
by the magnitude of the support effort. Ultimately, Bechtel
created concession contracts for the operation of its
mobilization camp and competitively bid them. This proved to
be a more efficient system in the long run.137
4.3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDEPRATIONS
Environmental concerns drove some of the planning for
the Jubail mega-project. The Saudis wanted to create an
environmentally adapted state-of-the-art model city. As a
result, the Royal Commission directed Bechtel to follow
existing US environmental protection standards when it
designed Jubail. Saudi environmental policy was as yet
undeveloped.
A major issue sprang up immediately. The industrial
port site was near some of the best fishing grounds in the
Persian Gulf. Shrimp, in particular had been harvested just
off-shore for decades. Bechtel determined that water from
the seawater cooling system would gain an average of 15
degrees (F) during industrial use before being discharged
back into the Gulf. Thus, officials became concerned during
conceptual planning that the cooling water would raise the
Gulf's temperature several degrees near the old fishing
center at Al-Jubail. They predicted that the warmer water
would have a devastating impact on the shrimp population.
Bechtel had to determine a way to mitigate the outfall's
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effects on the coastline.
Its environmental engineering consultants calculated
through computer models that they could use the industrial
port's long causeway as a cooling manifold for the discharge.
They could reduce the outfall water temperature 14 of the 15
degrees it had gained from the industrial process by routing
the used water through a pipe running the length of the
industrial port's 6-mile causeway. Smaller branch lines
would apportion the flow at intervals along the port. The
longer outfall run would allow the water more time to cool
and branch lines would scatter the discharge water across a
wide area. Bechtel accepted the plan and incorporated the
idea into the industrial port's conceptual design. After
several years of operation, it appears that the mitigation
plan works effectively./38
Bechtel also designed state-of-the-art pollution and
toxic chemical controls into its industrial area utilities.
It used extensive sand stabilization techniques and provided
for camel crossings over highways, railways and pipelines to
accommodate Bedouin nomads. Bechtel avoided using
underground aquifers for fresh-water supply because other
parts of the country had experienced severe aquifer depletion
by over-using wells. All fresh water at Jubail was provided
by desalinating water from the Gulf.
It's evident that Bechtel made an honest planning effort
to mitigate environmental impacts at Jubail. However, it
didn't face organized opposition to the area's development by
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knowledgeable interest groups, as one would expect of an
international mega-project in a fragile environment. As a
result, Bechtel faced no threat of costly construction halts
and court battles when it planned for Jubail's contingencies.
Thus, its environmental planning experience at Jubail doesn't
illustrate the kinds of management challenges that builders
can expect to face in future mega-projects.
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4.4 PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
One of Bechtel's Program Managers at Jubail claimed that
the program placed greater demands on organizational skill
than on engineering expertise./39 Bechtel recovered from an
early failure to establish a viable Jubail program
organization. Although the current organization no longer
resembles the one originally conceived to get it back on
track, it's the result of a 14-year evolution rather than a
revolution. The size and composition of Bechtel's staff has
changed significantly as a result of "Saudiization" and
completion of the program's major construction projects. In
this section, I examine Bechtel's organization and staffing
throughout the project and determine the effectiveness of its
selections.
4.4.1 ORGANIZATION TYPE
Bechtel removed Jubail's first Program Manager after
early projects fell far behind schedule. One of the reasons
for the change was that the Program Manager had failed to
create an organization that could grow to keep pace with
program requirements.L40 Engineering and contract
procurement lagged and caused the program to fall behind in
its first year. The new Program Manager made creating an
appropriate organization his top priority. After the change,
Bechtel's organization type remained remarkably consistent
from the planning through the design and construction phases.
The company established a matrix organization with
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integrating managers imposed on a functional structure. It
has only recently evolved into a flat organization with
complete functional management.141
The organization has always had a unique feature because
of the Royal Commission's involvement, however. The Saudis
superimposed a parallel organization on Bechtel's. The Royal
Commission matched every Bechtel functional or project area
manager with one of its own. The Royal Commission Director
General is the Program Manager. Bechtel's Program Manager
heads the management services contract group and reports to
the Director General. Bechtel and the Royal Commission
totally integrated its workers at lower levels of the
operations and functional departments, as well as in the
entire city management organization.
In the early years, the Jubail Program's organization
had three main components; Project Management, the
Departments, and the City. The Royal Commission's managers
in these three areas reported to the Director General. The
management services contractor's managers reported to
Bechtel's Program Manager. Figure 4.5 shows these parallel
organizations at the highest levels of the three main
components. Note that each Bechtel manager had a Royal
Commission counterpart, except for Bechtel's Deputy Program
Managers for the Community and the Industry Construction.
The Royal Commission chose to assign one man as Director of
Projects instead of assigning equivalent managers to each of
the two major construction areas.
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FIGURE 4.5 JUBAIL PROGRAM ORGANIZATION/42
(PROJECT MANAGEMENT) (CITY)
NOTE: Solid line is Bechtel's chain of command and control. Dotted line
is the Royal Commission's chain.
218
Although the Royal Commission maintained this parallel
organization throughout its lower tiers, I'll delete its
organization from further figures and discussion to avoid
confusing the subject of this study. Also, I'll not discuss
Bechtel's involvement in the "City" component of the program
organization since, aside from its advisory responsibilities
at the highest level (the Municipal and Public Services
Managers), Bechtel personnel were totally integrated with the
Royal Commission in this area. The City component was, in
effect, the client for the Construction Management component.
At the top of the Bechtel organization for Jubail was an
autonomous Program Manager. The Planning/Control,
Engineering, Procurement and Construction Department Managers
were staff leaders who reported directly to the Program
Manager and coordinated the entire effort. These departments
were staffed with functional area experts who assisted the
line managers and coordinated with the A/Es, clients, the
other departments and project managers on interfacing issues.
The Planning/Control Department tracked and analyzed
construction progress, manpower, cash flow and work
forecasting. The Procurement Department prequalified
contractors and evaluated bids. It also took part in
negotiations to clarify bids.
The Engineering Department divided the program into 10
functional groups that matched the program's construction
systems - such as materials handling, water supply and
wastewater, and power and communications - and placed an
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engineer in charge of each. The Project Engineers
coordinated the designs of all A/Es in their functional
areas. They placed Bechtel representatives in each A/E's
office to assist in coordinating the design. The Project
Engineers also coordinated their jobs and reports with
Project Managers from the two Project Management groups that
I'll describe below.143 The Engineering Department reviewed
contract packages for constructability, developed standard
specifications, drawing details and procedures.
Figure 4.6 shows the Construction Department's
organization during this period. Like the other departments,
it provided both expert pooled staff assistance across the
projects and dedicated staff for the separate projects in a
matrix form. Unlike the other departments, it also
permanently assigned staff members to work on Construction
Project Teams in line relationships, thus strengthening the
matrix. The Construction Department also had a small team
that coordinated with industries and other government
agencies for product piping right-of-ways, constructability
and interface reviews and agency construction progress
monitoring.
The Deputy Program Managers for Community and Industry
Project Management had operational responsibility for
construction of all infrastructure and Bechtel-managed
facilities. They assigned Project Managers to each of the 10
"systems" being constructed in the two geographical areas.
The systems which fell under the Project Management Groups
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FIGURE 4.6 BECHTEL CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION/44
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are identified below:
1. Community Group
- Site Development
- Institutional Buildings
- Community & Religious Buildings
- Residential & Commercial Buildings
- Parks & Health Facilities
2. Industry Group
- Site Preparation
- Material Handling
- Power & Telecommunications
- Water & Waste
- Transportation/45
A Project Manager from one of the Project Management groups
headed each of the Construction Project Teams. He reported
directly to the Deputy Program Manager for either Community
or Industry. The teams were divided into sections with both
line and staff relationships. Figure 4.7 typifies the
organization of a Bechtel Construction Project Team. The
line and staff relationships follow:
- Contract Supervision (Line)
- Field Engineering (Pooled support - assigned
to line supervision as
required)
- Cost and Schedule (Pooled support staff)
- Contract Administration (Pooled support staff)
- Safety (Staff)
The number of sections in a Construction Project Team
varied from 3 to 5 depending on the project's extent. A
Facility Contracts Supervisor headed each section and was
designated "Authorized Representative of the Royal
Commission" for contract management. Several contract
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FIGURE 4.7 ORGANIZATION OF A BECHTEL CONSTRUCTION PROJECT TEAMI46
I
FIEr
I
JECT
ENGINEERING SUPERVISION SUPERVISION SUPERVISION CONTROLS
CONTRACT
ADMIN
SPECIALISTSI --
COST &
SCHEDULING
SPECIALISTS
223
supervisors worked for him, depending on the number of
contracts. The Project Field Engineer reported as a staff
function to the Project Construction Manager. Field
Engineers and Inspectors provided both pooled staff and line
support. Cost and Schedule Control specialists provided
pooled staff support for work planning input, cost and
schedule reviews of contract packages during formulation and
monitored and forecasted costs, manpower and progress.
Contract Administration specialists provided pooled staff
support for documenting contract matters. Finally, Safety
specialists were assigned to each Construction Project Team
as a staff asset to monitor contractor safety programs.
The matrix organization that Bechtel selected was well
suited for its mission. It organized on a functional basis
for economy and expertise. However, Bechtel also assigned
the Operating Groups' Project Managers enough personnel and
gave them adequate access to pooled staff resources to be
responsive in Jubail's fast-paced construction environment.
This arrangement provided the resources that the Project
Managers needed in order to be proactive on their contracts.
As construction progressed and became a smaller part of
the program, Bechtel's responsibilities and, hence, its
organization has become smaller. It's now flat, with a
Program Manager and 6 functional areas. Figure 4.8 shows the
current organization, as Saudiization becomes more of a
reality and the program settles into the city management
phase.
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FIGURE 4.8 BECHTEL'S JUBAIL ORGANIZATION - 1990/47
Under the current organization, Bechtel eliminated its
Project Managers. Its austerity is dictated by staffing
levels imposed by the client. Bechtel is no longer involved
in the City Organization and has reduced capabilities in
field supervision and planning.L48
4.4.2 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
Although I don't intend to study construction manager -
client relations in this thesis, it's impossible to examine
Bechtel's internal authority structure without understanding
the Bechtel - Royal Commission contractual relationship.
Bechtel has suffered throughout the Jubail Program from being
given a considerable amount of responsibility without
commensurate authority. Early in the program the Royal
Commission's first Director General made it clear who
retained authority when he said:
"There is but one Manager of the Jubail Project and that
is the Royal Commission. In the beginning Bechtel will
do all the work and in the end the Royal Commission,
having learned from Bechtel, will do everything."/49
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From the beginning, the Royal Commission reserved the
authority to sign contracts and pay contractors. However, it
has proven reluctant to take control of Jubail's operations.
This leaves Bechtel in an awkward position. Although it has
always technically been part of the Royal Commission's
organization, only recently have the parallel organizational
lines of the two groups begun to blend. As the lines merged
and the Royal Commission gained more capability, one expects
it would also have accepted more responsibility. Instead, it
left Bechtel with much of the workload and even more
restrictions on its authority. A current Bechtel manager
noted:
"In theory, authority and responsibility are compatible.
In practice, the Royal Commission has increasingly
imposed bureaucratic restraints and taken positions
which limit our ability to manage as effectively as we
would wish."_50
Bechtel's internal authority structure appears to be
more sensible. During the prime construction phase of the
program, Bechtel established 6 centers of authority and
responsibility. They were:
1. Program Manager - Given complete responsibility and
authority by Bechtel Group to carry out the program.
2. Two Deputy Program Managers - Operational
responsibility and authority to complete
construction projects in their separate geographical
areas.
3. Department Managers - Functional managers and
influential staff advisors to the Program Manager.
Engineering and Construction department managers had
the additional responsibility to coordinate all
design and construction efforts, respectively.
4. Project Construction Managers - Direct operational
responsibility to complete high-quality construction
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in their project areas on time and within budget.
Also responsible for inter-department planning and
coordination in their project areas. Had dedicated
Construction Project Teams to increase authority.
5. Project Engineers - Coordinated the work of all A/Es
in their functional areas. Responsible for
coordinating with Construction Project Managers on
constructability and interface issues.
6. Facility Contract Supervisors - Responsible for
managing individual construction contracts. They
were designated "Authorized Representatives of the
Royal Commission" with the authority to direct
contractors and authorize payment - within the
contract terms and policies established by the Royal
Commission.
Bechtel's authority structure complemented its matrix
organization. The Jubail Program Manager had complete
control of all Bechtel operations groups and functional
departments working on the project. However, he
decentralized both planning and execution to the project
operational level, while maintaining the capability for
centralized decision making at the program level. Project
Managers' responsibilities in the 2 operational groups
(Community and Industry) were usually geographically
separated. However, Industrial Group Project Managers were
responsible for interfacing in those areas where crossovers
occurred. For example, the Transportation Project Manager
(from Industry) was responsible to construct major road
arteries that ran through the Community Group's area. The
Community Group built secondary road networks in its area.
Likewise, the Power and Telecommunications Project Manager
(Industry) was responsible for providing the major power
distribution system into the Community. The Community picked
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up from there to provide the subnets. In any case, Bechtel
made it clear who had responsibility and authority for
coordinating interfaces between the 2 operational groups
managing the construction.
The Program Manager expected his organization to settle
conflicts at the lowest level. When internal differences
occurred between line and staff members of Construction
Project Teams, Project Managers attempted to settle them with
their functional counterparts. Failing that, the appropriate
Deputy Program Manager for Operations worked out the
differences with the Department Managers. Only the most
serious matters that defied lower-level resolution went
before the Program Manager.
Bechtel also created a system of checks and balances
within its organization by establishing separate reporting
chains and dual reports for the operational groups and
functional departments./51 The Program Manager compared the
periodic reports to determine if everyone on his staff had
the same perception of planning, progress and problems.
Discrepancies became the subject of coordination meetings
that enforced the teamwork concept and ensured the right
problems were addressed.
Bechtel delegated authority to the lowest possible
level. The Program Manager gave Facility Contract
Supervisors the maximum authority allowed by the Royal
Commission to carry out their responsibilities on individual
construction contracts. The organization also matched the
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level of authority with responsibility for its functional
staff members. They had adequate resources and authority to
carry out their planning, coordination and technical
assistance functions. Bechtel delineated lines of authority
and responsibility well enough to avoid major confusion in
program planning and development. Its organization also
successfully avoided a systematic duplication of staff and
effort.
4.4.3 STAFF LOCATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS
The decision Bechtel made to locate its management staff
in Saudi Arabia was one of the strong points of its
management efforts. Although Bechtel performed some
contracting and personnel activities early in the program
from its offices in San Francisco and London, the Royal
Commission wanted Bechtel's entire staff to be located in
Saudi Arabia. Despite the significant cost implications of
recruiting, moving and maintaining a workforce in Saudi
Arabia, Bechtel complied and had excellent results.
With virtually no exceptions, Bechtel created an
organization in Saudi Arabia at Jubail under the Program
Manager's direction. Although personnel functions continued
to be performed by the Home Office through the peak
construction years, all of the other functions were located
at Jubail with the Program Manager. This was a significant
advantage from a command and control point of view. Bechtel
staffed the organization to be self-sufficient. It imbued
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the functional staff at Jubail with the appropriate expertise
to enable them to address even the most technical matters
internally. In addition, the staffs at Jubail weren't
involved in any other Saudi Arabian programs, so there were
no other projects competing for their attention.
The close proximity of staff and project managers
facilitated planning, scheduling, design and construction
interface coordination efforts. It also reduced the
potential for duplicating staff and work and it simplified
the procedures for imposing corrective measures when they
were needed.
Since almost all of the detailed design work for Jubail
was performed off-site by architect/engineers around the
world, Bechtel assigned Resident Engineers to the
headquarters office of each firm to help coordinate their
efforts. The functional Project Engineers and the Resident
Engineers worked together as equals, although design control
remained with the Project Engineers./52 Some of the A/Es
weren't used to this level of scrutiny by engineers from a
competing firm and felt uncomfortable with the presence of
Resident Engineers in their offices. It was clearly not a
normal procedure and at least one of the primary architects
felt the arrangement hindered, rather than facilitated
progress./53 However, Bechtel feels that the Resident
Engineers helped identify and address possible interface
problems during the design phase, when they could correct
them inexpensively.
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4.4.4 PERSONNEL DECISIONS AND EFFECT ON STAFFING
Less than 2 years after it won the management contract,
Bechtel had assembled a Jubail workforce of 600. During the
peak work placement year, 1983, its workforce peaked at 1831.
Bechtel's cu rent force is less than 200 since the Royal
Commission's own staff has increased significantly. In all,
more than 5000 Bechtel employees have participated in the
project during its 14-year history. How did Bechtel's
personnel policies enable it to staff up so quickly in such
an austere environment, then cut down sensibly when the time
came? I'll answer that question in this section.
Bechtel had a distinct personnel advantage going into
the Jubail Program. The Group's myriad of operating
companies and wholly-owned subsidiaries had experience in
virtually all of Jubail's engineering functional areas. Its
organizational base was already in the Kingdom in the form of
Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited. Bechtel Petroleum,
Chemical and Industrial Company and Becon Construction
Company had personnel with considerable experience in
petrochemical and industrial plant design and construction.
Bechtel Civil Company had experts in airport, roadway,
railway and port construction. Bechtel Telecom, Incorporated
was full of communications systems experts. There are too
many examples of in-house expertise to mention all of them
here. In summary, the company generally had enough
capability to recruit key management and engineering
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positions from internal resources. Also, Bechtel Group was
able to loan the services of ultra-specialists to Jubail for
short periods of time when required.
Still, Bechtel couldn't afford to decimate its existing
companies to fully staff the Jubail project. Also, it had to
recruit some specialties that Bechtel didn't normally staff.
For example, Bechtel had to recruit health and community
service workers, security experts and education
administrators to fulfill its city management mission.
Bechtel split personnel recruitaent goals between three
separate geographical areas and job groupings. The majority
of the professional staff was American and came from Bechtel
business lines. This accounted for approximately one-third
of the peak manning level. Another one-third of professional
staff and middle management came from international sources -
primarily British, Canadian and Australian. The remaining
third, consisting of secretarial, clerical and manual
workers, was Filipino./54 About half of all employees had no
prior experience with Bechtel. The company also sought Saudi
nationals to fill positions and had more success locating
qualified ones as the program progressed. Many of its Royal
Commission engineer trainees later joined Bechtel because of
the company's more attractive pay and benefits.
Bechtel created an impressive contractual package of pay
and benefits to attract the needed workers to Jubail. Some
of its features were:
- Pay. Offered an approximate 40% premium over
standard wages for a 60-hour, 5-day work week. Later
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in the program, this became a 54-hour week.
- Accompanied Tours. Authorization for family
accompaniment depended on the worker's level and
number of years in the organization. Generally,
young profess lonals with 7-9 years in the company and
older people with less experience were qualified to
bring their families at Bechtel's expense. This
amounted to about 20% of the total staff.
- Vacations. All employees were allowed one paid home
leave per year and an extra week's leave above the
norm. Married staff also received a European R&R.
- Housing. All housing was modern, high-quality,
furnished, air conditioned, with free utilities
(other than telephone).L55
In return for these benefits, workers signed 2-year
contracts. Bechtel actively encouraged its employees to
extend their tours. Ultimately, the average worker stayed at
Jubail for 3 years. While some employees didn't complete
their 2-year contracts, many stayed as long as 6 to 8 years.
Even with this great package of pay and benefits and an
international job market to select from, it took the Program
Manager 7 months of almost full time effort to flesh out his
matrix organization. A prime reason was that the job
required of its managers both a requisite level of skill and
a temperament which would accommodate working with the Royal
Commission. After Bechtel located 3 or more qualified
applicants for key positions, the Saudis often interviewed
them and selected the man that best suited their personality
preference./56 The Royal Commission provided sufficient
funding to ensure that Bechtel could adequately staff for
peak construction.
As Bechtel completed the major construction projects in
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the mid-1980s, Royal Commission cost-cutting measures
impacted Bechtel's staffing. The company is no longer able
to adequately staff its project to fulfill all of its
contractual obligations due to staffing and cost limitations
imposed by the Royal Commission.L57 During the drawdown,
Bechtel has had considerable success outplacing employees
into its other operating companies and subsidiaries. Also,
the Royal Commission direct-hired a significant number of
former Bechtel employees at Jubail. These outplacement
procedures cushioned the transition for many of its workers
when their contracts expired.
4.4.5 MANAGEMENT COSTS
From the beginning of the Jubail program, the Royal
Commission stressed keeping project costs down. It placed
constant pressure on Bechtel to minimize its management
costs. As major construction projects were completed, the
Royal Commission severely cut Bechtel's management staffing
authorizations to save money. This section examines the
sources of Bechtel's contractual costs and their efforts to
control them.
Under its management services contract with Bechtel, the
Royal Commission paid all of the contractor's direct costs
plus a percentage markup for overheads and a percentage fee.
The contract had provisions for the fee to vary based on
Bechtel's performance. Bechtel followed strict company
accounting guidelines to document its costs. The Royal
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Commission frequently audited these costs to validate them.
Bechtel's engineering and design charges equalled
approximately 3% of the total project costs. Its
construction management fee varied from 7% to 9% of direct
construction costs during the life of the program.
Generally, Bechtel achieved the lowest percentage markups
during peak placement years while its highest percentages
occurred during project planning and city management
phases. 58
The company's largest single expense was employee
salaries and benefits. It was able to control these costs
somewhat by using the international recruiting market.
Bechtel kept its management costs ccmpetitive because it
recruited labor from all over the world. Its large European
contingent was less expensive than the Americans and its
Filipino workers were even more cost effective, considering
their skills. Ultimately, the Royal Commission was pleased
with Bechtel's performance and felt it received excellent
services for its investment in the Management Services
Contractor.
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4.5 PROJECT CONTROL
One of the most difficult aspects of project management
is maintaining control and achieving progress simultaneously.
One of Jubail's Program Managers said that it's easy to
maintain control of a project but it often comes at the cost
of stifling progress in a sea of bureaucracy. On the other
hand, it's fairly simple to achieve progress at the cost of
losing schedule and budget control. However, Bechtel managed
to control the Jubail program year after year, yet it never
deviated from its budget and schedule goals by more than a
few percent.J59 How did the company control the program so
effectively? In this portion of the case study I'll examine
the systems that Bechtel developed to control costs and
schedule on the Jubail program and determine how well they
worked. I'll follow the control systems through contract-
level to see how well they were applied. I'll study
Bechtel's contract disputes history, its international
contracting experience and its efforts to manage Jubail
through the program's entire life cycle.
4.5.1 COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS
Bechtel adapted a proprietary budget and schedule
control system from its Churchill Falls and James Bay
projects to assist in managing Jubail at the program level.
The system was automated, had a high-capacity data bank and
could execute user commands quickly to provide an accurate,
timely and useable product. Project Managers updated this
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program and also used it as a management tool. At lower
management levels, the system became more basic so that at
the lowest (contract) level, control measures were manual.
Bechtel adapted its budget and schedule controls system
to complement its program plans. Bechtel created an annual
budget/schedule plan, a 5-year plan and a total project (10
to 12 year) plan. It performed a monthly review of planned
versus actual progress on the annual plan. At the end of the
year, Bechtel created a new annual plan that was approved by
the client. The five year (with a quarterly level of detail)
and total project plans (annual level of detail) were then
adjusted based on the new annual plan. The annual plans were
grouped by each project manager's scope of work. From there,
project managers broke them down into facility detail and,
finally, to individual contracts. Project Managers then
updated and tracked budget and schedule at contract level.L60
From the Program Manager's point of view, the key to
schedule and budget control was to keep enough projects in
the design - contract procurement - construction stages to
maintain a steady flow of expenditures and construction
progress over the long term. As a rule of thumb at Jubail
during peak construction, the Program Manager preferred to
keep commitments ahead of expenditures by about $5 billion.
When the gap closed to under $3 billion, he knew there was a
significant problem in either engineering or construction
that had to be addressed.L61 In most cases, he discovered
that the engineering process was too slow and unable to keep
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up with the progress made on construction projects. This was
the program's biggest problem during the first year, when it
fell way behind schedule. Too many engineering studies were
performed and not enough detailed design work. After the new
Program Manager identified the problem, his operational group
managers and department managers redirected engineering
efforts toward making design progress so that Bechtel could
continue to get work under contract. Bechtel regained its
schedule within a year by following this procedure and never
fell behind again.
From the preceding, it's apparent that the principles
the managers applied at Jubail had a greater impact on cost
and schedule control than the type of computer system that
Bechtel employed.
4.5.2 CONTRACTING
In this section, I'll examine the contracting issues-
which had the greatest impact on the Jubail program. The
issues are: Bechtel's choice and use of different contract
types; its methods for avoiding and settling contract claims
and disputes; and its techniques for managing international
contractors. I will concentrate on Bechtel's management of
engineering and construction contracts.
Since it's not the subject of this study, I won't
address service contracts in detail. However, I should point
out that service contracting is an essential part of Jubail's
city management. For example, Jubail obtains facilities
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maintenance through service contracts. As facility
construction slows in the coming years, service contracts may
become the dominant form of contracting at Jubail. However,
they're beyond the scope of this study since they generally
don't apply to the construction program.
4.5.2.1 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
For the most part, Bechtel used traditional forms of
contracting to accomplish its engineering and construction
tasks. The Saudis were enamored with fixed price contracting
and wanted to use it for everything, including A/E contracts.
This idea was inconceivable since there was no way for A/E
firms to make accurate estimates of the work required to
produce the detailed designs. Fixed price contracting would
restrict the owner from making necessary changes to the
design concept and from requesting additional products from
the designers. After considerable efforts, Bechtel convinced
the Royal Commission that Fixed Price A/E contracts wouldn't
work.
Architect/Engineer firms won the majority of design work
under Technical Services Contracts which typically contained
unit prices for estimated man-hours, plus overheads and fees
based on a percentage of direct labor costs. Bechtel
controlled A/E contracts through two methods. First, it
imposed a Bechtel engineering control system on A/Es who were
new to the field and who hadn't developed their own. That
way, the construction manager could monitor A/E efforts and
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provide more assistance to those that needed it.162 Second,
Bechtel established monthly coordination meetings involving
key Project Construction Team members and A/E representatives
for key contracts. In some cases, these meetings were held
quarterly. They discussed key issues, such as interfacing,
design progress and constructability./63
Most construction contracting was competitively bid Firm
Fixed Price. In some cases, such as dredging and placement
of hydraulic landfill, Bechtel used Fixed Unit Price
contracts./64 However, Bechtel displayed the versatility to
use less common contracting forms when the situation called
for them.
The best example of Bechtel's use of alternative
contracting involved the critical port construction
activities that occurred early in the program. As I
mentioned earlier, Bechtel received a directive with no
notice. to design and build the industrial and commercial
ports within 26 months. Since the normal planning cycle
(conceptual design, detailed design and formal bidding) took
2 to 3 years to complete before a construction contractor
could begin work, it was clear that Bechtel had to use an
accelerated procedure to meet its suspense date. It
completed the conceptual design in-house and created a number
of design-build (also known as Engineer-Procure-Construct or
Fast Track) contracts to get the process moving. Although
Bechtel viewed this type of contracting as more expensive and
difficult to administer, it was the only way that Bechtel
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could get the ports completed on time. It worked, as the
ports came on-line in time to support industry and community
development. Bechtel also used design-build contracts in a
few cases when A/Es failed to perform on important
contracts.1/65
Bechtel used some interesting techniques to increase its
level of budget and schedule control through its construction
contracts. The basic principle of its design and
construction philosophy was that if schedule, construction
methods, equipment and resources required were planned in
conjunction with project designers, a practical design would
result. If it followed this procedure, Bechtel would know
ahead of time what it takes to build a project. The company
institutionalized this process in its contract procurement
procedures. In addition to performing its own cost estimate,
Bechtel prepared a "Crewed Up Estimate" which detailed its
view of the construction means and methods required to build
the contract's scope of work. It required all bidders to
provide their planned schedule, methods, equipment, resources
and quality control plan in their bids. Bechtel then
reviewed the lowest bids to determine whether the contractors
had underestimated (or overestimated) the construction
effort. Bechtel notified contractors who had apparently made
mistakes and gave them the opportunity to retract their
bids./66 This procedure helped insure that the contractor
and construction manager agreed about the approach to
construction before it began.
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Another technique that helped Bechtel meet its budget
and schedule goals while improving construction management
was its policy of authorizing mobilization advances of up to
20% of the contract price for large contracts. The
contractors needed the funding to build momentum early. This
usually improved project performance. At the same time, it
gave project managers an extra budgeting tool. If a project
was underspent as it approached the end of the fiscal year,
the project manager could expend mobilization advances to
help reach the goal. In contrast, the project manager could
withhold mobilization advances until the next fiscal year
without affecting the work if the project was overspent.
Bechtel also used its contracts to reduce owner risk in
materials procurement while maintaining a measure of control
over it. The Royal Commission declined to procure any
materials and equipment for its construction contractors. It
wouldn't accept the risks inherent in an Owner Furnished
Equipment program. It transferred procurement risks to its
contractors. However, the contracts also required builders
to use Bechtel's procurement control system. Contractors
entered all major procurement actions into Bechtel's data
bank. This allowed the construction managers access to
updated procurement information on all contracts. Armed with
this information, they could better influence contractor
procurement activities./67
Under normal Bechtel contracting procedures, the
construction manager performs quality control on its
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contracts. However, Royal Commission preference and staffing
limitations forced Bechtel to abandon its plan to perform
quality control at Jubail. Instead, the company required its
contractors to perform their own quality control while
Bechtel handled quality assurance responsibilities. Under
the terms of its contracts, the builders had to submit
quality control plans for approval. The contractors also had
to separate their quality control organizations from their
operational chain of command to reduce the opportunities for
conflicts of interest. Bechtel helped contractors who had no
experience with quality control set up their programs and
performed validation testing of its own through Technical
Services Contracts.L68 Despite Bechtel's initial uneasiness
with its quality assurance role, its quality control plan was
usually effective. The overall quality of construction at
Jubail is excellent.
4.5.2.2 CONTRACT DISPUTES
The Jubail program had many elements which could have
led to major claims and disputes. The program's tremendous
scope could have led to serious design omissions and errors.
Its tight timetable caused Bechtel to put some fixed price
construction contracts out for bid based on 80% drawings./I3
To compound the difficulty, its Saudi client established an
unrealistic "no change order" policy at the beginning of the
project. At the same time, Bechtel's Middle East contractors
had "difficulty accepting the concept that contracts, once
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signed, are not subject to continuing flexibility of
interpretation." /7 Yet, despite the numerous factors that
should have caused claims and disputes, Bechtel's claims
experience on the Jubail program has been inconsequential.
How did the company manage to avoid major contract disputes?
The answer appears to lie in three areas: (1) competent
planning and contracting procedures; (2) cultivation of a
"teamwork" concept; and (3) the realities of pursuing claims
in Saudi Arabia. I've already introduced the first area in
the preceding section. Bechtel's requirement for contractors
to submit detailed descriptions of schedule, construction
methods, equipment and resources not only helped the manager
perform detailed bid evaluations but also eliminated the
opportunity for future disputes over methods. Bechtel also
established an effective prequalification procedure for
construction contractors. Thus, it was able to eliminate
many unqualified contractors prior to the starting the
bidding process. In addition, Bechtel's emphasis on planning
and design review assured production of the most complete and
detailed contract documents possible.
The second area may be the most important, yet it's also
the hardest to define. Bechtel cultivated a subtle feeling
of "teamwork" among its contractors. The company often
performed in the role of trainer for many of its first-time
Saudi architect/engineers and construction contractors. Not
only did Bechtel enforce the contract, it also assisted its
contractors to make sure they followed its provisions. In
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some cases, it found ways to keep the contractors afloat long
enough for them to get organized. Bechtel also minimized
contract terminations and didn't use liquidated damages
clauses in its contracts./71 When disputes did arise, the
company attempted to deal with them quickly, fairly and at
the lowest organizational level possible./72 Contractors
returned the good faith in kind. The international firms
that performed the majority of design and construction during
the early and peak program years were generally not claim
oriented. In the words of a Deputy Program manager, "They
were treated fairly, earned a fair profit, and did not wish
to jeopardize their reputation or inclusion on future bid
lists by submitting claims."/73
The third area was undoubtedly a major reason that
contract disputes were minimized. There were two realities
of pursuing contract disputes in Saudi Arabia. One, it would
take a long time (upwards of 3 years) to go through the legal
disputes process. Two, the ultimate resolution authority
provided under the contract was the Saudi Grievance Board,
which was comprised of religious officials. It had a
reputation for ruling on the perceived intent of claims,
rather than their legal bases./74 Bechtel didn't provide for
alternative forms of dispute resolution in the contracts it
prepared and administered on behalf of the Royal Commission.
Thus, it's likely that many contractors who normally would
have pursued disputes to the board were convinced not to
because the time involved and uncertainty of the outcome.
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Claims and disputes have become more common in recent
years. This appears to be caused by several factors. Since
major construction is complete, most of the contractors are
inexperienced Saudis. They often enter losing contracts due
to poor bid preparation and attempt to recoup losses through
claims. They also tend to be unwilling to accept a
consistent application of contract provisions. Finally, the
Royal Commission has pressed for a conservative
interpretation of contracts, often at the expense of
contractors, due to a tightening budget.175 Even though it
has experienced more claims in recent years, Bechtel's total
program disputes experience has been negligible. Over the
program's life, it has averaged only one claim per three
contracts and has settled half of them at 6.46% of the value
claimed. 76
4.5.2.3 MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTORS
Bechtel had to marshall resources from all over the
world to plan and construct Jubail. American, European and
fledgling Saudi firms won most of the Architect/Engineer
contracts. Europe and Japan produced most of the major
installed equipment. Many of Jubail's support industries
produced bulk construction materials for the program. Korean
and Turkish construction firms performed much of the civil
work, Dutch contractors specialized in the dredging and port
jobs, Japanese firms completed some of the most technical
work and British and Americans won a few construction
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contracts.
As the program matured, the Royal Commission I .gan
placing a great deal of emphasis on contracting with Saudi
national construction firms to help build up their
capabilities. According to a highly-placed Royal Commission
official:
"The construction contract packages are planned with two
ideas in mind: the value of each contract should be of
the order of SR 50 million [$15 million]; and the scope
should be limited to as few disciplines, or specialties
as possible. In this way it is hoped to encourage the
development of the Saudi Arabian construction industry.
Very large, multi-discipline contracts could only be
undertaken by well-established international
contractors. "/77
In 1986 a Saudi law requiring that government contracts be
awarded only to Saudi-owned firms began to affect Royal
Commission contracts at Jubail. Generally, Saudi
participation in the firms was only financial. However,
Saudi involvement in financial management decisions created
contract administration problems. It also discouraged some
competent non-Saudi subcontractors from becoming involved./78
Bechtel had great international diversity in its own
management organization. Only about one-third of its
employees were American. At least half of all employees were
new to the Bechtel Group and were unfamiliar with its
procedures. This mix could easily have created internal
conflicts.
Given the variety of nationalities involved in all
facets of the program, one would expect to see cultural
clashes and conflicts generated from the participants'
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different ways of doing business. As a rule, this didn't
happen. What techniques did Bechtel use to manage its
international contractors to avoid these problems?
Bechtel made effective use of contracting procedures to
avoid creating problems with international contractors. For
example, all contracts required key personnel to be
functional in the English language. They also required all
contractual correspondence to be in English. This ensured
that all communication would be in the same language and
reduced opportunities for misinterpretation.
Bechtel avoided significant disagreements over
specifications by authorizing variations. It didn't
establish a single specification standard for equipment and
materials (such as American or European). Bechtel cross-
referenced various international specifications and allowed
substitutions liberally, provided they were thoroughly
reviewed during the design/bid process. In some cases,
Bechtel used entirely different specifications or established
performance specifications to make materials produced by
Jubail's own support industries competitive. These policies
allowed contractors more flexibility in procuring materials
and reduced disagreements over substitutions.
Bechtel also found that most of the major international
contractors were familiar with its contract provisions and
procedures. The contracts produced a common understanding of
project requirements based on their general, special and
technical provisions. This was not the case with new Saudi
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firms, however. Many of them viewed contracts as loose
agreements which could be interpreted flexibly.L72 This
produced a contract administration nightmare. Bechtel found
itself in the role of trainer when dealing with these firms.
It took an inordinate amount of effort to administer these
contracts. However, Bechtel did it to support the Royal
Commission's secondary objective of developing Saudi Arabia's
construction industry.
Bechtel had to make some accommodations for the diverse
nationalities that comprised contractor workforces. In all,
61 nationalities have occupied the Bechtel-built workers
camp. It provided worker accommodations by leasing housing
to construction contractors and providing support concession
contracts for items such as food and health care. Bechtel
discovered that food service was the most important area it
could influence to keep the workers happy. It ensured that
concessionaires operated multiple kitchens to provide the
variety of foods that different ethnic groups required. It
was a major administrative headache but Bechtel emphasized
providing workers sufficient food of the right varieties to
avoid agitating them./80 The fact that more than 51,000
workers over 14 years have worked at Jubail without any
significant unrest attests to its success at meeting their
needs.
4.5.3 LIFE CYCLE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The Bechtel Group doesn't have a formal Life Cycle
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Project Management program. However, it had to perform life
cycle planning to be a successful management services
contractor at Jubail. Bechtel's 20-year contract is one of
the longest ever signed for its scope of work. The company
had to plan based on long term performance goals encompassing
the full scope of city planning, rather than focusing on
short-term facilities completion dates. Bechtel not only
planned and built facilities, it also maintained and modified
them throughout its contract. Thus, it had to perform
facility life cycle planning to avoid creating its own future
problems. Its master plan alone consisted of 15 volumes,
covering such topics as land use planning, urban design and
growth management. This project truly represents the
importance of project life cycle management.
Bechtel performed life cycle management primarily
through the planning systems and organization it created.
Bechtel's system of annual, 5-year and total project planning
systematized the process throughout the program's life. The
system forces short-term planning to be done in conjunction
with long-term planning. Thus, the short-term effects of all
projects are routinely measured against their long-term costs
and benefits to the community.
The Jubail program organization may be unique in the
world. From the beginning, it has been geared to support the
city management concept. The organization has done this in
two critical ways. First, it was created to tie city
planning, private and public construction and city operations
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together under a single manager. This amounts to more than
being the Mayor of a city. The Program Manager's supporting
organization is meshed together so that each department's
plans and decisions are reviewed by the others before
implementation. Representatives from each department form
permanent planning teams for this purpose. This makes it far
more likely that planners will develop project plans that
take into account land use, environmental and societal issues
as well as, design, construction, operations and maintenance
issues. Second, Bechtel (and the Royal Commission) created a
parallel organization which eventually became an integrated
one. This concept provided not only for Saudization of the
program but also for organizational continuity. Even though
program managers rotate every few years, the systems and
organization are in place to provide an accurate program
history, short-term and long-term planning no matter who
staffs the program. It's a well-designed organization that
encompasses all aspects of managing a city into a single
headquarters.
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4.6 CASE SUMMARY
Saudi Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited managed the
planning, design, construction and continuing development of
Saudi Arabia's model industrial city. A regional publication
described Jubail as, "a marriage of Islamic tradition with
high technology and civil engineering."/81 Fourteen years
after it began to master plan, Bechtel has seen 15 primary, 2
secondary and 64 support industries come on line. Twelve
more primary, 10 secondary and 30 support industries are in
some stage of active planning, design or construction. The
city's industries employ more than 23,000 people and its
total population exceeds 39,000 (50,000 during working
hours)./82 Although the development of secondary industries
has been somewhat disappointing, it's a function of Saudi
demographics and economics rather than program management
problems. Clearly, Bechtel's role in the Jubail development
has been a success.
The purpose of this case study has been to determine the
effectiveness of Bechtel's planning, organization, staffing
and control efforts at Jubail. The company faced severe
restrictions on its authority under the terms of its contract
with the Royal Commission. However, it appears that Bechtel
worked skillfully within those limits to be the program's
driving force. I've reached several conclusions about
Bechtel's management of this mega-project from the case
research. They're listed below under the four applicable
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management areas.
PLANNING
Strengths
1. Broke the huge program into manageable parts
and planned at contract level to make best use of available
staff.
2. Minimized amount of on-site construction. This
expedited procurement and construction and improved quality
control.
3. Effectively sequenced contracts to support the
program schedule and minimize contract delays.
4. Planned to develop the industrial and community
areas simultaneously and in phases. This way, industry and
community kept pace and Bechtel avoided overdeveloping the
city's infrastructure.
Weaknesses
1. Initially, failed to plan for phased city
development to avoid overbuilding infrastructure.
ORGANIZATION
Strengths
- 1. Created a matrix organization with strong
Project Manager control. Responsive to program needs.
2. Program Manager had complete control of the
program within Bechtel Group. All staff and managers working
on the project (except personnel) worked for him.
3. Program Manager delegated authority and
responsibility to promote decentralized planning and control.
4. Separate reporting chains from the operations
groups and functional departments provided the necessary
checks and balances to the matrix.
Weaknesses
1. Initially failed to create an organization that
could grow to keep pace with program requirements.
STAFFING
Strengths
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1. Located complete management staff in Saudi
Arabia. Made organization more responsive in a fast-paced
planning, design and construction environment.
2. Recruitment of international staff saved money
without significantly impacting the quality of the staff.
3. Able to draw specialized expertise from other
Bechtel companies.
Weaknesses
1. Obtaining qualified staff required precedent
setting pay and benefits packages which are difficult to cut
back late in the program.
2. Locating the entire staff in Saudi Arabia
created high turnover across the organization and difficulty
in maintaining continuity.
CONTROL
Strengths
1. Concentrated on keeping commitments ahead of
expenditures by several billion dollars so that there was
always a steady flow of work from the design through the
contracting to the construction phase.
2. Effective use of annual, 5-year and total
project plan reviews to flag budget and schedule issues which
needed to be addressed.
3. Tailored the type of contracting used to
specific program requirements.
4. Requirements to submit methods, equipment and
resource plans with bids helped Bechtel control the
construction contract and reduce disputes.
5. "Teamwork" concept in managing contractors
helped avert disputes.
6. Created a system to cross-reference
international specifications that ensured procurement
flexibility without reducing quality.
7. Accommodated workers' cultural preferences for
food to avoid unrest.
8. Guaranteed life cycle program management by
institutionalizing planning systems and program organization.
Weaknesses
1. Initially failed to control the engineering
process to ensure that enough designs were completed to get
construction work committed.
2. Requirement to contract with inexperienced
Saudi firms has increased administration difficulties and
disputes later in the program.
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It's clear from this summary that Bechtel's management
of the Jubail program has been a great success. However, it
could easily have been a disaster. The firm got off to a
poor start and lost control of the schedule during the first
year. It failed to create a workable design process or an
organization which could grow with the program. The Bechtel
reaction to these early problems was just as significant. It
took decisive action to replace the source of the problems
and, within a few months, turned the entire program around.
Bechtel has made all of its major milestones and stayed
within its budget to the present day. This case clearly
demonstrates the importance of proper planning, organization,
staffing and control to successful international mega-project
management.
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CHAPTER 5 - COMPARISON OF USACE'S AND BECHTEL'S APPROACHES TO
MEGA-PROJECT MANAGEMENT
I chose to perform case studies on the KKMC and Jubail
projects for several reasons. Most important among them were
that they were international mega-projects which involved the
two largest construction management firms in the United
States and they were constructed in the same country during
the same general time period. I felt that the basic project
similarities would allow me to control for some of the
largest variables encountered in construction project case
study design. However, as I performed research for the case
studies I discovered many more similarities between the
projects, as well as a large number of differences. Some of
these involved circumstances (such as owner-manager
relationships, project scopes and geographical
peculiarities); others involved the firms' approaches to
mega-project management. In this chapter, I'll identify
these similarities and differences and use them as a basis
for comparing USACE's and Bechtel's approaches to mega-
project planning, organization, staffing and control.
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5.1 CASE SIMILARITIES
Following is a list of the significant similarities
between the two cases:
CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Both firms performed planning and control
functions and contracted for the majority of engineering and
design and all of the construction on their projects.
2. The clients for both USACE and Bechtel were
Saudi Arabian government agencies.
3. Construction project sizes were similar.
Jubail was an order of magnitude larger than KKMC, however
both projects involved the construction of complete, self-
contained and self-supporting cities.
4. Both KKMC and Jubail totally
infrastructure at the beginning of the projects.
lacked an
PLANNING
1. Both planned and built ports to support their
operations.
2. Both planned and constructed camps for all
construction workers to reduce mobilization time and support
costs.
3. Both were responsible for developing programs
to train their clients so that they could eventually take
over responsibility for managing the projects.
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
1. Both offered similar, lucrative
benefits packages to attract large numbers of
managers quickly.
2. Both established matrix org
Bechtel's had stronger Project Manager control.
pay and
qualified
anizations;
3. Both charged their clients design and
engineering costs at 3% of project total and management
services costs at 8-9% of direct construction costs.
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CONTROL
1. Both used automated, proprietary control
systems at project level.
2. Neither used automated control systems at
contract level.
3. Both prequalified potential contractors prior
to advertising for bids.
4. Both required construction contractors to
perform their own quality control. Both performed quality
assurance duties on behalf of their clients.
5. Both had an unofficial policy of working with
marginal contractors and training them when necessary rather
than terminating them.
6. Neither used alternate dispute resolution
techniques. Both developed a "teamwork" concept to get the
job done and minimize claims.
7. Both used very similar contract management
procedures and techniques.
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5.2 CASE DIFFERENCES
Following is a list of significant differences in
project circumstances and in the way Bechtel and USACE
approached project management:
CIRCUMSTANCES
1. USACE - Role at KKMC was to plan, design, build
and leave.
Bechtel - Role at Jubail was to plan, design,
build, operate and maintain.
2. USACE - Had almost total authority c: the
project under terms of the Engineer Assistance Agreement.
Could commit funds, issue changes, settle disputes, select
and terminate contractors. Saudi participation initially was
limited. Later in the project the Saudis attempted to reduce
USACE authority. They were unable to significantly reduce
USACE authority but increased the amount of Saudi review.
Bechtel - Had little inherent authority under
its Management Services Contract with the Royal Commission.
Could direct the contractor as the Royal Commission's
authorized representative. Saudis had the authority to make
all decisions with Bechtel as primary advisor. The Royal
Commission was totally integrated into the process from the
beginning.
3. USACE - Had little interference from influence
peddlers in Saudi Arabia because it was restricted by the
Defense Acquisition Regulations. However, was impacted by
Office of the Chief of Engineers interference during early
dealings with Morrison Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium.
Bechtel - Saudi influence peddlers affected
Bechtel. It had to deal with its own Saudi business partner
(Suliman Olayan) as well as Saudi firms who wanted to do
business with the Royal Commission. Was forced to contract
with many Saudi firms that were unqualified. Followed Saudi
Arabian contracting laws.
PLANNING
1. USACE - Used only US construction standards.
Bechtel - Used international construction
standards.
2. USACE - City plan revolved around a concept of
precast (at Al Batin) concrete facilities for
standardization, quality control and economies of scale.
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Bechtel - City plan concept was to maximize
modular design and off-shore fabrication to minimize
construction time and amount of work performed at Jubail.
3. USACE - Planned heavy use of Government
Furnished Equipment, Materials and Services to minimize
contractor risk, lower costs, speed mobilization and enhance
quality control.
Bechtel - Provided virtually no Owner Furnished
Equipment, Materials or Services (except mobilization camps)
to minimize owner risk of claims and disputes. Used
concession contracts to provide bulk materials.
4. USACE - Had no significant environmental issues
to consider.
Bechtel - Had a number of environmental
engineering design challenges. The plan minimized the
project's adverse affects. However, Bechtel faced no
organized opposition to development from environmental
groups.
5. USACE - Selected almost all Architect/Engineer
firms from the US.
Bechtel - Selected Architect/Engineer firms
from all over the world.
6. USACE - Planned many of its construction
contracts to be from $100 to $300 million with a 3-year
construction duration to attract the best international
firms.
Bechtel - Planned most of its construction
contracts to be from $10 to $30 million to attract fledgling
Saudi companies and develop the Kingdom's construction
industry.
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
1. USACE - Placed as much of its organization in
US as possible to reduce management costs.
Bechtel - Placed almost its entire organization
in Saudi Arabia and at Jubail for better coordination and
control.
2. USACE - Most members of the USACE organization
were Americans who were previously employed in US government
agencies.
Bechtel - Only about 1/3 of Bechtel's
organization was American. About 1/3 were Canadians,
Europeans or Australians. The final 1/3 were Filipinos.
Later in the program Bechtel hired more Saudis.
3. USACE - Made several major organizational
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changes during the life of the project (ex. Engineer
Logistics Command took over Government Furnished Equipment
Program half way through the project).
Bechtel - Maintained the same organizational
thrust throughout the program. Changes were more of a
natural evolution of the organization based on program
requirements.
4. USACE - Had to follow US Civil Service hiring
rules to build-up and displace its management staff.
Bechtel - Followed general industry hiring
principles to obtain and release its management staff. It
was not bound by US labor laws for workers employed in Saudi
Arabia.
CONTROL
1. USACE - Used only Firm Fixed Price contracts
and one huge ($1 billion) Cost Plus Award Fee contract to
perform construction.
Bechtel - Used mainly Firm Fixed Price
construction contracts. Also used Fixed Unit Price and
Design-Build contracts. Didn't use any Cost Plus contracts.
2. USACE - Ultimate dispute resolution authority
was the Engineer Board of Contract Appeals in Washington,
D.C.
Bechtel - Ultimate dispute resolution authority
was the Saudi Grievance Board in Riyadh, S.A.
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5.3 COMPARISON OF USACE AND BECHTEL MANAGEMENT
The preceding discussion established that, despite the
similarities in circumstances at KKMC and Jubail, USACE and
Bechtel Group didn't always take the same approach to project
management. In this section, I'll compare some of the major
management techniques used by these firms in their mega-
projects and determine why some were more effective than
others.
5.3.1 PLANNING
Both USACE and Bechtel exhibited significant strengths
in project planning, particularly master planning. They
approached master planning in slightly different ways but
they were equally effective. For the most part, USACE
performed centralized master planning at the Middle East
Division Rear office in the United States. Bechtel performed
master planning from its offices at Jubail and decentralized
the process a little more. USACE centralized planning for
two reasons. First, centralized planning and decentralized
control has long been an American military imperative. It's
an accepted and proven part of the USACE corporate culture.
Second, USACE attempted to limit the size of its workforce in
Saudi Arabia until construction began in order to hold down
management costs. It was able to plan effectively from the
United States because it hired American A/E firms and managed
them through the Engineering Division in its Virginia office.
Bechtel, on the other hand, mobilized at Jubail as soon
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as possible under Saudi requirements. The project was so
large it split the job immediately into 10 or 12 projects
with separate managers to plan Jubail in manageable pieces.
As a result, Bechtel's planning had to be more decentralized
than USACE's. Evidently, both approaches worked well because
the master planning products were excellent and remained
virtually intact throughout both projects.
Due to the size and complexity of the projects, as well
as the difficult building conditions in Saudi Arabia, both
companies incorporated time, cost and risk reducing elements
into their plans. USACE planned a large Government Furnished
Equipment, Materials and Services (GFE) program as part of
its project plan. This program included government furnished
precast concrete panels and structural members for all
facilities. This program lowered construction contractor
risk while increasing the owner's. It's believed to be
responsible for many contractor bids that were lower than
government estimates. Given the extreme environment, remote
location and uncertain supply situation at the beginning of
the project, this appears to have been a reasonable approach
at KKMC.
Bechtel and its client were more risk-averse than USACE
and insisted that contractors shoulder most of the risk.
However, it too developed a plan to reduce construction
costs while improving materials supply and quality. Bechtel
planned to supply bulk construction materials through a
system of on-site concessions. Although they weren't
268
officially supplieC by the owner, Bechtel controlled
materials costs by arranging for limited competition between
concessionaires. Bechtel also reduced construction costs by
planning a modular city, much of which could be prefabricated
and shipped partially assembled to Jubail. This approach was
also reasonable, considering the difficult environment and
working conditions at Jubail.
USACE had planning shortcomings in two areas which
Bechtel managed to avoid. Due primarily to the geographical
separation of KKMC design and construction managers, USACE
didn't perform an adequate amount of constructability
planning during project design. As a result, KKMC
experienced significant utilities interfacing problems at
contract boundaries during construction. Also, there are so
many different concrete panel designs that USACE lost much of
the economy of scale and efficiency it hoped to gain by
building a "precast city". These problems may have been
avoidable if USACE had performed constructability reviews
with its construction managers during detailed project
planning.
For the most part, Bechtel managed to avoid similar
contract interfacing and other constructability problems by
involving construction managers more in the detailed project
planning phase. It institutionalized constructability review
by the construction managers during the planning process. In
fact, the operating groups provided each project manager,
even during the planning phase. Thus, it encouraged proper
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review by having one manager responsible throughout the
entire planning and construction process. On the other hand,
USACE probably performed less-effective constructability
reviews because it had separate project managers (also
separated by an ocean) during the design and construction
phases.
A less critical planning problem for USACE, but one
which caused construction change orders, was a lack of
cultural planning and Saudi involvement in design review.
There were few Saudi liaisons located the United States to
perform detailed design reviews with USACE. As a result,
USACE produced some poor designs from a cultural perspective.
Some of the designs were ultimately changed by owner
directives after construction had started, causing increased
project costs.
Bechtel generally avoided this difficulty because its
organization fully integrated Saudis from the beginning.
Also, the Royal Commission had more direct responsibility for
design review under its contract with Bechtel. Thus, most
cultural design problems were caught and corrected during
design. I should note that, in both USACE's and Bechtel's
circumstances, the Saudis often didn't really know what they
wanted and performed only cursory design reviews even when
they had the opportunity to participate. This was especially
true early in both programs. Therefore, the Saudis often
gave incorrect and contradictory directicns when they
participated in design reviews.
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Both construction managers initially overlooked one
other planning consideration that they had to recover from
later. Although USACE planned to build KKMC in phases
(First, Second and Third Brigade areas), it created only one
schedule, based on a six-year construction plan.
Consequently, as money for development tightened and the
Saudi's cut planned expenditures on KKMC, USACE was initially
unprepared to adjust its budget and schedule because it had
no alternative plans. It recovered during construction by
creating plans based on more realistic budgeting levels.
Thus, it was able to make rapid and rational adjustments to
budget and schedule when the owner changed project
appropriations.
Bechtel's problem stemmed from a lack of phased planning
early in the program. It fell behind schedule in the first
year at Jubail because Bechtel planned to build
infrastructure to support the city's projected 370,000
residents at once, even though it would be decades before the
city really needed that much capacity. Bechtel couldn't
complete designs on the huge facilities needed to support the
entire population fast enough to get construction under
contract. After the first year, Bechtel regained its
schedule by planning to build the city in phases. It insured
that each phase of the city would have the infrastructure
required to support it. It designed and built a series of
smaller facilities or large facilities built in stages but
which were functional at each stage. Bechtel was then able
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to produce designs with reduced scopes that kept construction
commitments flowing.
5.3.2 ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
As was the case in project planning, USACE and Bechtel
organized and staffed effectively for their projects although
they approached their tasks differently. They both
established matrix organizations. However, Bechtel's
organization had a greater level of Project Manager control
than did USACE's. This difference was primarily due to
locations of their respective staffs. USACE staffed most of
its planning and engineering capability in the US while
Bechtel's entire staff was in Saudi Arabia. During the early
stages of the KKMC project, the Chief, Engineering Division
at the Middle East Division Rear office in Virginia had
greater control of the project than did the Project Manager
(District Engineer), who was in Saudi Arabia. This
arrangement was reasonable during project planning, although
USACE suffered coordination problems due to split staff
locations and responsibilities. When construction began, the
Project Manager in Saudi Arabia took control of the project.
He had a complete support organization on-site with the
exception of design/engineering personnel. That element
remained in the US and the Project Manager never controlled
its efforts.
In contrast, Bechtel had virtually its entire program
organization in Saudi Arabia and placed all responsibility
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(and authority) for program completion on the Program
Manager. Unlike the USACE Project Manager, Bechtel's Program
Manager completely controlled planning, design, construction
and operations at Jubail. His 10 Project Managers were the
driving force of a strong matrix which coordinated
decentralized planning and project execution. As the program
progressed the organization evolved into different
configurations, but Bechtel managed to avoid making radical
changes to its structure.
As I mentioned before, both USACE's and Bechtel's
organization and staffing plans were successful in the
context of their projects. However, I prefer Bechtel's for
two reasons. First, it established a clear chain of command
(responsibility and authority) at all organizational levels
which didn't change as program phases changed. It provided
for a greater amount of continuity and a chain of
responsibility (Life Cycle Project Management). Second,
locating its entire staff in Saudi Arabia didn't appear to
cost significantly more than USACE's split US-Saudi Arabian
staff.
The primary reason for USACE's split staff was to lower
its management costs by doing as much work in the US as
possible. It was willing to accept a certain amount of
organizational inefficiency in exchange for lower staffing
costs. However, the decreased efficiency and duplication of
effort that resulted from the split staff may have, in the
long run, increased costs enough to offset savings. This may
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be reflected by the fact that, despite USACE's cost control
strategy, both firms cost their clients virtually the same
percentage of construction costs for their services. It's
impossible to make an accurate cost comparison, since
government and private firm pricing policies and objectives
are so different. It's probable that USACE's per-employee
costs for managers in Saudi Arabia exceeded Bechtel's because
of its huge fringe benefits package and government
reemployment rights. Conversely, Bechtel charged its client
a fee for profit that USACE didn't. Therefore, it's likely
that USACE lost much of the cost advantage it gained by
keeping staff in the US due to the management inefficiencies
it caused.
A major advantage that both companies displayed during
their projects was their depth of organizational talent.
Although both USACE and Bechtel had to direct- ire a large
number of managers, they were also able to staff most of
their key management and engineering positions with home-
grown talent. Both firms had considerable internal planning,
operational and research capability. They mobilized it
quickly for their mega-projects. This capability gives
USACE and Bechtel a competitive advantage in the
international mega-project management industry.
5.3.3 CONTROL
USACE and Bechtel mega-project management techniques
were most comparable in the area of project control. At all
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levels of the project, from program direction to contract
management, the firms used similar control techniques. They
were very successful in both projects. At program level,
USACE and Bechtel employed large mainframe data banks and
tracked schedule and budget using proprietary computer
programs that had been adapted for the unique requirements of
their Lrega-projects. At successively lower organizational
levels, control techniques became less automated and more
traditional. Control methods at the individual contract
level were manual.
Detailed reports, statistics and data processing
programs were essential at higher levels as tools to note
schedule and budget trends and to flag potential problems.
However, the most critical aspect of control for the Project
Managers seemed to be their ability to break the projects
down into simple components. The general principles they
established and applied had greater impact on cost and
schedule control than did the automated control systems.
USACE and Bechtel applied proven and institutionalized
control systems at contract level. Their procedures were
similar in most respects. They both required contractors to
produce and follow detailed quality control plans and
establish quality control chains of command that were
separate from and parallel to the contractors' operational
chains. They followed strict submittal and phased quality
control planning systems. Field inspection and quality
assurance testing by the construction manager were also key
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components of quality control systems at KKMC and Jubail.
Neither used automated cost and schedule control systems
at this level. They required contractors to develop their
own schedules within the limits established by their
contracts. Contract managers used the schedules to control
construction progress. USACE required contractors to
establish CPM networks for schedule control. It discovered
that most of the international contractors weren't
comfortable with this system at the contract level. Many of
the CPMs were oppressively large (some had more than 20,000
activities). The unwieldy size of many of the CPMs and lack
of contract-level automated systems to process them often
rendered them useless as a control tool.
USACE and Bechtel both used monthly progress payment
requests, advance payments, and retainage to control contract
costs effectively.
USACE and Bechtel also used similar control systems to
avoid contract disputes and promote cooperation. Instead of
concentrating on creating detailed alternative dispute
resolution procedures, they attempted to control disputes by
avoiding them. They produced high quality, detailed drawings
and explicit contract documents to reduce the number of
possible ambiguities. USACE and Bechtel prequalified
contractors to insure that those who bid were capable
builders. They cultivated an unofficial spirit of "teamwork"
by working to help contractors get their own control systems
in place. In addition, they minimized contract
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terminations. Both firms also decentralized dispute
resolution authority to the lowest possible level. This
combination of measures helped reduce conflicts and resolve
most that occurred before they required official Contracting
Officer Decisions.
Although the procedures that USACE and Bechtel followed
and the "teamwork" atmosphere they created definitely reduced
their project disputes history, I don't want to overestimate
their success. Much of the credit for the small number of
disputes is probably due to contractor reluctance to become
involved in them. Most of the international firms hoped for
more contracts in Saudi Arabia and feared losing future ones
if they got a reputation for being "claims oriented". Also,
many contractors avoided taking disputes to the Saudi Dispute
Resolution Board (Bechtel) and the Engineer Board of Contract
Appeals (USACE). Bechtel's contractors were skeptical of the
Saudi board's religious influence and. USACE's faced an
expensive, time-consuming process when they dealt with the
Engineer board. Because of these outside factors, it may be
more coincidental than by design that USACE and Bechtel
avoided a large number of disputes.
USACE and Bechtel preferred Firm Fixed Price
construction contracts but both of them used other forms when
required. USACE created a $1.2 billion Cost Plus Award Fee
(CPAF) contract for construction support services at KKMC.
Bechtel used several Engineer-Procure-Construct (EPC)
contracts for port building at Jubail. Neither firm has used
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these types of contracts often. Both found them difficult to
administer, partly because of their lack of familiarity with
the contract types. USACE's CPAF contract was ultimately the
biggest disappointment of the KKMC project. Severe owner
pressure forced it to switch to Firm Fixed Price construction
support contracts halfway through project execution. USACE's
failure was in control rather than concept. It failed to
establish an adequate contract administration organization or
schedule and budget controls for this type of contract.
USACE attempted to control a flexible type of contract with a
Firm Fixed Price system and got burned.
Bechtel's experience with its EPC contracts was better.
The port construction contracts actually helped Bechtel
regain a year on its schedule after it had fallen behind
early in the Jubail program. However, even after its good
experience, Bechtel didn't become a convert to EPC contracts.
It still feels that EPC contracts generally cost too much and
are too difficult to administer to warrant their use in
standard contracting situations.
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5.4 SUMMARY
The KKMC and Jubail case stuc es were examinations of
the way a public (USACE) and private (Bechtel) construction
management firm planned, organized, staffed and controlled
two international mega-projects. I discovered that USACE and
Bechtel followed the same general principles in virtually all
aspects of project management. Although many of their
specific management techniques were different, USACE and
Bechtel based them on similar thought processes. Their
management techniques were both very successful.
The following summarizes key elements of USACE's and
Bechtel's combined management performance during the KKMC and
Jubail mega-projects.
PLANNING
- Both centralized and decentralized master
planning techniques were effective.
- Contingency planning, especially for changes in
funding levels, had to be performed in conjunction with the
master plan.
- Projects had to be broken down into
understandable, self-contained components for planning.
- Designs that standardized construction elements
(modular, pre-fabricated or precast facilities) sped
construction, lowered costs and enhanced quality control.
- Constructability and contract interfacing review
were essential parts of the detailed design process.
- They had to plan and build supporting
infrastructure in conjunction with the projects.
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ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
- Matrix organizations were effective during the
project planning, design and execution phases.
- Strong Project Manager control of the matrix
helped focus functional efforts in the fast-paced mega-
projects.
- Costs saved by locating staff off-site may have
been neutralized by increased costs from lowered management
efficiency.
- Both firms staffed most of their key project
management positions from within without decimating their
other operating companies.
CONTROL
- The ability to spend large sums of money
consistently (by keeping design progress ahead of
contracting) was a key to project completion.
- They attracted good international builders by
adjusting contract scopes and lengths, limiting risk by
providing services and easing supply problems by building
dedicated port facilities.
- Learned to accommodate cultural differences of
clients, A/Es, and contractors into planning and contracts to
enhance project control.
- Reduced the anticipated number of disputes
through prequalification, good planning, fair treatment,
management assistance, as well as the uncertainty of claims
resolution in a foreign legal system.
- Standard operating procedures for contract
control were effective in the mega-projects.
- Use of unfamiliar contract types required
greater planning and contract control efforts.
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
6.1 CONCLUSIONS
It's time to return to the central problem and focus of
this thesis. The goal of this study is to determine
techniques construction managers can use to effectively plan,
organize, staff and control international mega-projects. In
Chapter 1, I posed 10 questions that I intended to address in
this paper. In this section, I'll restate those questions
and answer them in the form of conclusions drawn from
multiple case studies of the KKMC and Jubail mega-projects:
1. What organizational forms are effective for a
construction manager to use in international mega-
projects? At what levels within the organization
should responsibilities and authority be assigned?
Conclusion
From the KKMC and Jubail case studies, I'm
convinced that the most appropriate organization for
international mega-projects is a matrix with strong
Project Manager control over functions. The large
scope, tight timetable and budget of mega-projects
necessitate a greater level of operational control
over specialized functions than is common on smaller
projects.
It's critical to the success of international
mega-projects that responsibilities and authority be
assigned to facilitate decentralized project
control. Planning can be either centralized or
decentralized. The Project Manager must have
virtually complete authority and responsibility
since international mega-projects are often far-
removed from the construction management firm's home
office. The fast-paced nature of mega-projects
requires an on-site manager with the experience and
authority to make crucial decisions. Lower level
managers within the project framework must also be
given a great deal of responsibility and authority
to avoid decision gridlock, which can result from
centralized project control. In all cases,
authority must match responsibility.
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2. What personnel policies can be used to attract the
right people with the right skills to t e project at
the right time, and to support them during
demobilization?
Conclusion
Lucrative pay and benefits packages are
essential to attract qualified engineers and
managers to remote job sites. However, firms should
keep in mind when developing the packages that they
will have to start downsizing the workforce just
after reaching the construction peak. If the
benefits are too good or the contracts too long, the
firm will set precedents that are difficult to
change when it needs to cut back. As a result, it
may be better to offer higher pay with fewer fringe
benefits and shorter contract lengths (although this
may create continuity problems).
Another possibility is to create packages with
increasing benefits for those who serve beyond the
standard contract length but with decreasing
benefits if they serve beyond the target length. In
any case, personnel recruitment and outplacement
planning must be conducted in conjunction with
project planning to ensure that personnel policies
support the construction plan.
3. What are the logical physical locations for the
construction management staff?
Conclusion
Generally, I conclude that the entire
construction management staff should be located as
close to the project site as possible. Long-term
efficiency and coordination concerns should
overshadow the shorter-term management cost savings
plans that influence decisions to staff elsewhere.
4. How can construction managers adequately staff
projects while controlling management costs?
Conclusion
Owners and, therefore, construction managers
often worry too much about management costs early in
the project. Construction management firms must
mobilize quickly to get planning and procedures
established and to get key management personnel
involved, even if their primary responsibilities
come later. The top-level organizational shell
should be the first thing established and the last
thing dismantled. I believe that spending extra
management money up front will reduce the amount
needed later because it should produce better
planning and execution. Also, owners may be able to
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control management costs by linking construction
management firm compensation to efficiency. Instead
of paying construction managers a percentage of
direct construction costs, owners may base pay on a
variety of other factors which may better reflect
construction manager efforts. Some alternatives
are: (1) Declining percentage fee based on a direct
construction man hour scale; (2) Fixed fee for a
given range of direct man hours; and (3) target
direct costs with incentives for completing under
budget and ahead of schedule. Of course, the
construction manager contract would have to provide
for adjustments due to owner-directed scope changes.
These procedures may relieve the (sometimes)
perverse incentive of the cost-plus system, where
increased project direct costs result in increased
payments to the construction manager.
5. What construction contract types are the most
appropriate for use in international mega-projects?
Conclusion
No single contract type stands out as the best
to use in international mega-projects. However, it
appears there can be a place for each of the
recognized contract types under appropriate
circumstances. USACE and Bechtel demonstrated that
Firm Fixed Price construction contracts based on the
lowest responsible bid can be used successfully even
in fast-paced international mega-projects. Cost-
plus contracts also have a place, as do design-
build/fast track contracts.
The key point is that each contracting type can
be applied to international mega-projects if they're
used under the circumstances for which they were
designed.
6. What special management techniques are effective for
controlling international contractors?
Conclusion
An often overlooked facet of dealing with
international contractors is that many (probably
most) of them aren't familiar with American
contracting techniques or construction standards.
Also, they may not be familiar with the laws and
procedures of the country they will be working in.
To compound the problem, their workforce may be
comprised of different nationalities than their own.
It's difficult to control this blend of
nationalities, cultures and business practices using
standard procedures.
Managers must take into account the cultural
differences of the owner, contractors and workforce
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when planning international mega-projects. If
American standards and procedures are to be used, a
training program to familiarize foreign contractors
may help avert problems during the construction
phase. If different standards and procedures are
used, the construction manager will have to train
its own staff. The construction manager must ensure
that the different needs (housing, food, recreation,
etc.) of an international workforce are met. There
are two salient points here: (1) Construction
managers who simply expect international contractors
to be ready to comply with American standards and
procedures will discover the fallacy during
construction, when it's most expensive to correct.
(2) Procedural and cultural differences in owners,
contractors and workers must be identified and
addressed during the master planning and detailed
design phases.
7. How can construction managers minimize contract
disputes?
Conclusion
First, the prequalification process is
important. The process allows construction m:niagers
to identify and eliminate marginal contractors
before the bidding process begins. The remaining
contractors tend to be more professional and usually
less claims oriented than marginal contractors.
Second, it's essential to decentralize authority to
promote informal dispute resolution at the contract
manager level.
Third, mega-projects provide a unique
opportunity to get away from a traditional
adversarial construction manager - contractor
relationship and build a feeling of teamwork. It's
difficult to terminate poorly performing contractors
during mega-projects because the completion of one
contract often impacts the progress of others.
Thus, there's a greater need for construction
managers to work with contractors who are having
trouble, rather than simply administering their
contracts.
The case studies didn't validate ADR techniques
as a requirement to minimize court actions on
international mega-projects. ADR techniques are
probably more applicable to projects in the US
because American owners and contractors appear to be
more litigious than their international
counterparts.
8. Does a Life Cycle Project Management (LCPM)
philosophy apply to mega-projects?
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Conclusion
LCPM is probably more important to mega-project
management than it is to smaller projects.
Primarily, this involves doing two things: (1)
Establishing an organization which can take a
project through all of its phases. The same
personnel that start a project don't necessarily
need to finish it. However, positions should evolve
so responsibility and authority can be traced
throughout the life of the project.
(2) Establishing a way of doing business that is
institutionalized and followed. This provides the
project a permanent set of standard procedures to
complement a steady organization.
Mega-project management requires a greater
level of continuing organizational knowledge and
responsibility than smaller projects. Their long
duration insures that many of the facilities the
construction manager produces will be in operation
before the project is completed. As a result, the
construction manager has a personal (as well as
professional) stake in facility performance,
operation and maintenance. Therefore, the Project
Manager at the end of a program must be able to
determine why a facility designed seven years
earlier was built the way it was. There has to be a
clear record of decisions and accountability. This
is the essence of LCPM.
9. How many construction support services should
construction managers provide their contractors?
Conclusion
In remote areas, it may save contract costs and
time to provide a number of services to contractors
that they would normally provide for themselves.
Some of the possibilities include contractor
mobilization camps, food and facilities, bulk
construction materials, installed equipment,
construction equipment, materials handling and
transportation. However, each service an owner
provides through its construction manager increases
owner risk.
For owners who are risk-averse, concession
contracting with service providers may have the same
effect without requiring the owners to accept the
risks associated with owner provided services. If
properly administered, concessions are an excellent
alternative to owner provided services.
In developed areas, it may be inappropriate for
owners to provide any services to their contractors
due to their local availability.
10. How do construction managers plan for infrastructure
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development in conjunction with completing mega-
projects?
Conclusion
An aspect of many international mega-projects
is that they are executed in areas which lack a
supporting infrastructure. Planners must consider
how the project is to be built, not only what will
be built. They must include infrastructure
requirementL in schedule and cost planning, such as:
(1) moving, housing, feeding and caring for
thousands of construction workers living away from
the project site; and (2) providing electric power,
water, sewerage, roads, transportation and
communications to support the construction effort.
This requires planners to examine construction
in view of project support needs. They must
reorient the priorities of these items to allow them
to be designed, purchased and completed early to
support construction.
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6.2 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
I'r satisfied that the multiple exploratory case study
methodology I used for the KKMC and Jubail projects was
appropriate to accomplish my research objectives. I'm
confident that the ten conclusions in the preceding section
are applicable to current and future international mega-
projects. However, my research was limited by the factors
listed below:
1. Both mega-projects were performed for government
agencies. Mega-projects constructed for private
firms or consortiums could be driven by different
factors than those performed by government agencies,
which tend to be less cost-sensitive.
2. I had sufficient access to USACE records and
personnel to analyze the case from both the project
and individual contract levels. In Bechtel's case,
I had little access to company or Royal Commission
documents. Also, all of my interview subjects
viewed Jubail from the program perspective. I was
unable to obtain contract-level insights which may
have exposed additional strengths and weaknesses on
the Jubail project.
3. Neither project was significantly impacted by two
factors which are becoming commonplace in other
large projects. The missing factors were: (1)Organized environmental opposition; (2) Requirements
for innovative financing. The importance of dealing
with these factors during the master planning
process shouldn't be underestimated but I couldn't
examine them in this thesis.
Although these research limitations don't diminish my
confidence in the conclusions of this thesis, they do
indicate the need for further research in this field.
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6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Although many aspects of mega-project management are
identical to those for smaller projects, there are also many
differences. Therefore, mega-projects deserve a separate
body of research to determine ways to improve their
management. I chose to research international mega-projects
using an exploratory multiple case study methodology. I'm
satisfied that I accomplished my original research
objectives. Still, this study barely scratches the surface
of mega-project management research opportunities. The
following are recommended areas of more focused research for
those with an interest in mega-project management:
1. Construction management of mega-projects for private
companies.
2. Planning, engineering and constructing mega-projects
in an environmentally sensitive world.
3. The application of innovative financing techniques
to mega-projects.
4. Planning infrastructure to support mega-projects.
5. Impact of construction technology on mega-projects.
6. In-depth research into any of the following aspects
of mega-project management:
a. Master planning.
b. Management of detailed design.
c. Mega-project schedule and cost control
methods.
d. Organizing and staffing for mega-projects.
e. Dispute resolution techniques for mega-
projects.
f. Planning and managing contract interfacing.
g. Management of international contractors.
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APPENDIX A KKMC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT SUMMARYL_
IFINAL K ISTART SCHED I#CHANGES
CONTRACT # FACILITIES PRIME CONTRACTOR IAMOUNT IDATE COMPL I& CLAIMS
75-76-C-00181 Test Wells Ibrahim Abunniyan Organization l$9.394M I Oct 751 Oct 781 ??
I I I III
75-76-C-00651 Construction Wellts I Conpagnia Mediterranea Di Prospezioni 1$14.353M ?? ?? ??
I I I I I
78-76-C-00011 Port at Ras At Mish'ab I Santa Fe Overseas, Inc. I$218.000M 129 Jul 76101 May 811 ??
I I I II I
78-79-C-00011 Gas Turbine Generators Westinghouse I63.684M 108 Jan 79114 Nov 821 26
78-82-C-02631 KKMC Telecommunications & f Telefonaktiebolaget ?? ?? ?? ??
I Construction of 1st Bde Area
I I
III I
86-77-C-00911 KKMC Support Services I Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consort. S1.076B 126 Jul 77120 Feb 811 N/A
I I I
86-77-R-00941 Advance Support Family Housingi Laing-Wimpey Atireza, Ltd. 1$27.815M 1 ?? 7? ??
Phase I I I
87-79-C-00641 Self Contained Living Units - Atlantic International Marketing Corp.I 20.275M I11 May 79129 Nov 801 32
Workers Community Phase III I I I
I I I I
93-78-C-00011 Family Housing KKMC, AL Batin ILaing-Wimpey Atireza, Ltd. 1$28.059M 116 Jan 78126 Apr 791 21
93-79-C-00011 Areas 1&3 Family Housing I AlHuseini-ADA 15207.730M 116 Sep 79119 Dec 821 77
I I I I I I
I I 1I
93-79-C-0002j Chilled Water Plant Area, 19A I Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. S64.692M 105 Jul 79122 Oct 821 40
1 1 1 II
93-79-C-0003j Switchyard & Substation, 19E I Daelim Industrial Company, Ltd. 1528.112M 103 Jul 79115 Oct 821 54
I II
93-79-C-00041 Runway, Taxiway & Cargo Fac. I DeMauro-Shuwayer 1$14.635M 108 Jut 79112 Jul 811 22
1 I I I
93-79-C-00051 Troop Facilities, 10 & 10P I Saudi Building Technical Gen. Cont. CoIS104.545M 126 Sep 79128 Feb 831 72
IIll
93-79-C-00061 Sewage Treatment Plant, 20 1 DeMauro-Shuwayer 1S25.113M 129 Oct 79128 Dec 81! 35
1 I I I 1
93-80-C-00011 Fuel Facilities Area 19F Saudi Arabian Development Co./ IS35.158M 101 Mar 80106 May 821 60
Kier International, Ltd. I I
I I II
93-80-C-00021 Sitework & Utilities Site B Dong Ah Const. Ind'tl Company, Ltd. I$38.045M 129 Mar 80130 Sep 821 71
I I I
93-80-C-00031 Plant Nursery I EID Establishment 153.303M 101 Apr 80103 Mar 831 11
SI I I I
93-80-C-00041 Well Water Collection System Kuk Dong Construction Company, Ltd. IS28.050M 110 Mar 80130 Sep 821 37
I I I 11
93-80-C-00051 Site Management/Life Support j Saudi Maintenance Company, Ltd. 1$128.661M 103 Jun 80113 May 831 48
SI ervices I I I I
1 I I I I1
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FINAL K ISTART ISCHED I#CHANGES
CONTRACT # I FACILITIES PRIME CONTRACTOR AMOUNT (DATE ICOMPL I&CLAIMS
I I I I
93-80-C-0006) Service to Operate & Maintain Saudi Computer Services/Statskonsult l$33.081M 106 Jul 80105 Oct 831 13
IBM 370/158 Computers International AB
I I I
93-80-C-00071 Construction Support Services Sam Whan Corporation 1$272.663M 123 Jun 80109 Jun 831 52
I l
93-80-C-00081 Areas 8&12, Family & Ind'tt General Agencies Corporation/ Sam Whenl$141.315M 118 Aug 80123 Jul 831 41
Facilities Phase I
I I I
93-80-C-00091 Wastewater Treatment Plant, 21) Development International Trade Co. $S11.522M (20 Oct 80129 Mar 831 27
I I I I
93-81-C-00011 Ancillary Facilities Items 1-31 At Huseini-ADA IS4.632M 102 Sep 80120 Jun 831 16
I I_ _ I _ _ _
I IIl
93-81-C-00021 Troop Facilities Area 9 1 Chin Hung International, Inc. l$139.726M 106 May 81110 May 841 30
SI I I1
93-81-C-00041 Ancillary Facilities Items 4-61 Daelim Industrial Company, Ltd. 1S15.063M 109 Jul 81102 Sep 821 44
I II
93-81-C-0006j Areas 2&5, Family Housing At Huseini-ADA 1$226.258M 128 Sep 81108 Oct 841 15
I l
93-81-C-00071 Hospital Area 15H j Kuk Dong Const. Co./At Mashrik 1$164.836M 110 Nov 81108 Mar 851 10
I I I
93-81-C-00081 Support Paving & Sitework Saleh & Abdulaziz Abahsain Company ($7.471M 115 Nov 81120 Nov 821 12
SI I I I
93-81-C-0010j Centrum Area 13 You One Construction Company I$330.085M 118 Nov 81126 Feb 861 16
I I I I
93-81-C-00111 Ammo Storage Fac. & Firing Rngi Lotte Construction Company, Ltd. I$63.956M 123 Nov 81126 Oct 841 9
I IlI
93-82-C-00011 Family Housing Area 4, Supportl Sam Whan/Keang Nam Enterprises, Ltd. I$154.542M 103 Feb 82102 Jan 851 17
Facilities Area 15S I
93-82-C-00021 Central Plant Control System,21 Honeywell-Turki Arabia l$29.945M 114 Dec 81110 Jul 861 5
93-82-C-00031 Crude Oil Facility Area 19G I Chon/Shinhan Engineering & Const. Co. IS12.221M 130 Mar 82120 Dec 831 2
I I I I I I
93-82-C-00041 Womens' Clinic Addition & I Almusaadiah-Pepper Company, Ltd. I$4.503M 12 Apr 82103 Mar 831 1
1 Miscellaneous Construction I
I I I I
93-82-C-00051 Engineer Center &.School I Obaid & AL Mullsa Construction Co., LtdI$92.984M 126 Jun 82108 Jun 851 1
I I
93-82-C-00061 Areas 8&12 Family Housing & Sam Whan Corporation 1S225.188M 122 Jun 82123 Jan 861 3
Industrial Facilities Phase III
1. Compiled primarily from USACE reports on active construction contracts during 1983. Since construction actually
coitinued until 1988, contract amounts, completion dates and nurber of changes and claims for contracts completed
after 1983 are not final figures. "At Batin District Active Contracts Status Report," USACE, 1 Sep 1982. Also,
"Contracts Assigned to Hospital Resident Office - MEECD-MA," USACE, Undated.
290
APPENDIX B KKMC ARCHITECT/ENGINEER KEY CONTRACT SUMMARY/1
CONTRACT #
75-74-C-0027
75-76-C-0045
75-76-C-0047
75-76-C-0055
75-76-C-0062
78-77-C-0052
78-77-C-0064
78-78-C-0051
FACILITIES
KKMC Master Plan
KKMC Engineer Center
Airfield
KKMC Design
Engineering Support
Services
KKMC Hospital
KKMC Schools
Telecommunications
System
PRIME CONTRACTOR
Brown, Daltas & Associates
Reynolds, Smith & Hills
Burns & McDonnell
Brown, Daltas & Associates/Sippican
Consultants, International
Burns & Roe Industrial Services
Corporation
Stone, Marraccini & Patterson/
Bently
Earl R. Flansburgh & Associates/
Anderson-Nichols/R. S. McMillan (JV)
Teleconsult, Incorporated
1. Compiled by the author from various source documents at USACE
Historical Office, The Kingman Building, FT Belvoir, VA on 6 May
1990. This is not intended to be an all-inclusive listing of A/E
contracts but it identifies the most significant ones during the
KKMC project.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ACO - Administrative Contracting Officer. USACE term
referring to the delegation of specified authority tc another
by a procuring contracting officer.
ADR - Alternate Dispute Resolution. T i hniques used to
resolve contract disputes without resorting to litigation.
Arabian Bechtel Company, Limited - Later, Saudi Arabian
Bechtel Company. Bechtel Group's operating company (with
Saudi partner) that signed a 20-year Management Services
Contract with the "Royal Commission for the Development of
Jubail and Yanbu" to manage the Jubail program.
ARAMCO - Arabian-American Oil Company.
CONUS - Continental United States.
CPAF - Cost Plus Award Fee. USACE term for a contract which
reimburses the contractor for its expenses plus a fee for
profit. The fee is either an agreed amount or a percentage
of total reimbursable expenses.
CS-Squared - Cost Schedule Control System Criteria. A set of
cost and schedule tracking criteria prescribed by DAR for
cost-reimbursable jobs and required by the contract with
MKSAC. MKSAC was to create a management system that met the
criteria to control procurement costs and schedule.
DAR - Defense Acquisition Regulation. Regulation governing
all procurement and construction performed by DOD agencies.
Replaced in 1984 by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
which standardized contracting procedures for all Federal
agencies.
DCAA - Defense Contract Audit Agency. Audited MKSAC's
records for the CPAF contract at KKMC.
DOD - Department of Defense.
EAA - Engineer Assistance Agreement. Country to country
agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, signed in 1965. Agreement which defined USACE's
involvement in the Saudi Arabian construction program.
ELC - Engineer Logistics Command, MED. District-level
command of MED created to control life support contracts and
GFP.
EPC - Engineering-Procurement-Construction. Bechtel term for
design-build and fast track contracts.
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EPLO - Engineering Planning and Liaison Office.
FMSA - Foreign Military Sales Act. Enacted into law in 1968
(Public Law 90-629) and modified 6 times; governs sale of US
military equipment and construction services to foreign
countries.
GDMW - General Directorate of Military Works. MODA's
construction management branch.
GFP - Government Furnished Property. Property, equipment or
materials provided to contractors by USACE. The term can
also be used to refer to Government Provided Services to
construction contractors.
KKMC - King Khalid Military City. A military complex for
50,000 people designed and built by USACE tc accommodate two
Saudi Arabian armored brigades near Wadi Al Batin, S.A.
LNG - Liquid Natural Gas. A useful byproduct of oil
extraction that is the basis for both power and feedstock at
Jubail Industrial City.
MEAPO - Middle East/Africa Projects Office, USACE. Formed as
a District-level element of the South Atlantic Division from
remnants of the MED. Responsible for close out management of
Saudi projects for USACE.
MED - Middle East Division, USACE. Organization established
in 1976 to provide full service construction management for
all USACE construction projects in the Middle East.
Reorganized as MEAPO in 1986.
MED (Forward) - That portion of the Middle East Division,
USACE located in Saudi Arabia. Headquartered in Riyadh, with
primary responsibility for construction management.
MED (Rear) - That portion of the Middle East Division, USACE
located in the United States. Headquartered in Berryville,
VA with primary responsibility for administering A/E
contracts.
MKSAC - Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium. Group of
contractors awarded a $1.2 billion CPAF contract for
construction and support services at KKMC.
MODA - Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation.
Client of USACE and owner of KKMC.
OCE - Office of the Chief of Engineers, in Washington, D.C.
OFE - Owner Furnished Equipment. Private industry term
meaning equipment and materials provided by the owner to
construction contractors. Equivalent to "GFP" in public
293
contracting.
O&M - Operation and maintenance.
PETROMIN - Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, arm
of the Saudi Arabian government responsible for development
of oil processing industries.
RFP - Request for Proposal. Request to a potential bidder
for a contract proposal. Also a request to a contractor for
a proposed cost and time adjustment to an existing contract
resulting from a change order.
Royal Commission - Royal Commission for the Development of
Jubail and Yanbu. Created by the Saudi government to avert
bureaucratic delays to development of the new industrial
cities at Jubail and Yanbu. It has both planning and
governing authority in the project areas.
SABIC - Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation, arm of
the Saudi Arabian government responsible for development of
industries not related to oil processing.
SCECO - Saudi Consolidated Electric Company, government run
company responsible for providing electric power to the
Kingdom.
SOP - Standard Operating Procedures. Established, written
procedures to be followed within an organization.
USACE - United States Army Corps of Engineers.
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